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PREFACE 
My residence in Europe gave me the opportunity to experience EC 
integration practice from within and gain some firsthand impressions. 
During my stay in Europe and when I visited the headquarters of the EC 
in Brussels, a question lingering in my mind was why was it possible for 
several countries to integrate but difficult for several provinces to 
co-ordinate? There must be some basic principles and mechanisms lying 
behind the integration process which make economic integration possible 
and there must be something which can guarantee the integration scheme. 
Consequently, the idea occurred to me that it could be worthwhile to look 
into the experience of EC integration as an outsider and get some insights 
relevant to integration within China. This idea led to this study. 
Obviously, the help I got from my two promoters has been crucial 
to the success of this research. I have benefitted a lot from Professor 
J.M.G. Kleinpenning's careful reading of my earlier drafts and by his 
detailed suggestions. I would like to quote here one of his Phd students 
"one could wish every Phd student such a supervisor". Professor J.G. 
Waardenburg has had numerous discussions with me on the topic and I 
have benefitted from his strategic comments, especially the comments on 
the empirical part. I must also mention the help and the support I got from 
both universities: the Catholic University of Nijmegen and the Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam, as well as from the Commission of the EC 
Communities in Brussels. 
For several years I have been working as the first Fellow under the 
Shanghai-Rotterdam exchange programme in the Centre for Development 
Planning in Erasmus University Rotterdam. I am so familiar with the ТВ 
building that it can never be erased from my memory. Dr.W.M.Lammerts 
van Bueren has also contributed much to my stay at the Erasmus 
University. At the final stage for the present study, the financial support 
from Bank Mees & Hope and, in particular, the understanding and support 
of Mr.Robert Speelman was crucial. 
Among those who have discussed this topic with me I should 
certainly mention Audrey Donnithorne whose pilot work on the topic gave 
me many important insights. I am also impressed by her love of China and 
her kindness in helping. Thomas P. Lyons has also carefully read my 
earlier draft and gave me detailed and helpful comments. 
In fact some of the ideas in this study were encouraged by and 
matured during the discussions with many scholars in Holland and abroad 
and the list below represents only some of them: Prof.J. Tinbergen, 
ν 
Drs.Schmidt and Prof. H.C. Bos at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
Professor H.W. de Jong and Prof. Peter Coffey at the University of 
Amsterdam, Professor Chung-hsun Yu at the International University of 
Japan, Professor George Thoma in Elmhurst College, U.S., and Professor 
Ali EL-Agraa at the University of Leeds. I am particularly grateful to 
Professor W.T.M. Molle, who encouraged me to systematically investigate 
this topic and whose knowledge about EC integration impressed me very 
much. Whilst the comments from all the above mentioned people have been 
helpful, the responsibility of any error in the text remains solely mine. 
For preparing the final version, my sincere thanks should go to Erik 
Baumann who helped to arrange the lay-out and the Dutch summary, to 
Mrs. Angela Needhem who has carefully edited the text, and to AV-service 
KUN/AZN in Nijmegen Catholic University which prepared the maps of 
the book. 
Last but not least, I should mention my wife and son whom I owe 
extra due to my concentration on the study. 
Weixin Huang, 
February 1992 Rotterdam 
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INTRODUCTION 
China forms a Customs Union but not a Common 
Market. That is to say, the whole country has common 
trade barriers against the outside world, but does not 
have free trade within its national boundaries. 
Audrey Donnithorne: China's Cellular Economy 
(China Quarterly No.52 p.605.) 
This study deals with the economic integration issue in China, 
particularly in the Shanghai Economic Zone. 
The term "economic integration" is, in most cases, used in an inter-
national setting and refers to regional groupings. However, as an instru-
ment for development, economic integration can be used in a domestic set-
ting too. By encouraging specialization and competition, and by achieving 
economies of scale in a wider market, economic integration can bring 
benefits not only to several countries but also to several provinces within 
a country. This is the basic starting point for the whole book. 
The hypothesis throughout the study is that China is not integrated 
economically and this results in economic losses. As a matter of fact, the 
economic integration issue in the Chinese economy in general and in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone in particular has never been examined systemati-
cally at home or abroad. This is probably due to the lack of data - the 
Zone has been more or less an experiment - and to the difficulty of 
conducting fieldwork in researching the subject. Some studies of the 
Chinese economy and the economic system have touched upon the nature 
of the Chinese economy. Alexander Eckstein's China's Economic 
Revolution and Audrey Donnithorne's China's Economic System are two 
examples. Although these books are useful as background information on 
the subject, they cannot substitute for researching the integration issue. 
Thomas P.Lyons (1987) has raised the issue of economic integration 
in the Chinese economy and his book gives insights to the understanding 
of the integration issue in China. His book was written, however, with 
particular reference to the period before Mao's death when the economic 
zone issue was not at schedule. The attempt to study the integration issue 
in China along the lines mentioned above can therefore be considered to be 
a worthwhile effort. 
1 
Obviously the limited scope of the present study does not allow a 
comprehensive investigation of the integration issue in China. In view of 
the present state of the data and the understanding of the integration issue 
in China, I decided to limit my research to one specific part of China: the 
Shanghai Economic Zone which includes Shanghai and five other 
provinces. The objective of the research is two-fold: to acquire further 
understanding of the integration issue in China and to link the issue to the 
larger framework of integration theory and practice. 
To those who have studied China's economic and social history, it 
is obvious that there are many differences between provinces, regions and 
even villages. Several hundred years ago there were so many "kingdoms" 
in China. Obvious differences between town and county, between 
mountains and plains, have to be bridged to obtain an integral picture of 
the economy. Furthermore, for quite a long time, China's natural regions 
have been artificially split by the administrative boundaries and the whole 
economy has been vertically organized. What one finds is a politically and 
economically divided China before 1949 and a politically united but still 
economically fragmented China after 1949. The diversity still remains and 
is essential for deriving benefits from possible integration. For a fuller 
exploitation of the country's natural resources - as has been suggested by 
many economists - there should be more economic integration in the 
Chinese economy, possibly at a regional level in the form of regional 
zones, which may be called economic zones and are other than the admini-
strative subdivisions. This may imply that the economy should be 
restructured on a regional basis, or, to put it in another way, regional 
economic integration should be stimulated. 
Analytically, economic integration is "the elimination of economic 
frontiers between two or more economies", and "economic frontier" is 
defined as "any demarcation over which mobilities of goods, services and 
production factors are relatively low" (Jacques Pelkmans, 1984). If such 
economic frontiers (not necessarily territorial frontiers) have existed in 
Western Europe, we may well say that there have been and still are 
economic frontiers within China as well. 
Firstly, the administrative frontiers are barriers which retard the 
movement of products and production factors.' The most important point 
'. The whole country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. Provinces and autonomous regions are further divided into autonomous 
prefectures, counties, autonomous counties and cities, and counties are divided into 
towns and townships. 
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here is that the local authorities usually have a self-sufficiency policy and 
such a policy of local protectionism pursued by the provincial or municipal 
authorities fragments the market. 
Secondly, the sectoral planning hierarchy also fragments the market. 
All economic sectors within the economy are organized into vertical nati-
onal bureaucracies, headed by ministries, located in Beijing. The ministers 
representing the interests of the ministries have some decision-making 
power concerning the economic activities in the respective ministries. The 
importance of provincial boundaries as barriers depends on the relative 
importance of the provinces versus the ministries. China has had this sort 
of administrative and sectoral planning hierarchy with local protection for 
many years. 
A still closer look at China's economy shows that there are both 
horizontal links and vertical links within the economy. The vertical links 
are those between the central agency and the local agency such as the links 
between the ministry and the local subordinate agency, whereas the 
horizontal links are those between the local units, such as the links between 
one city and another. While the vertical links are more concerned with the 
planned part of the economy, the horizontal links are more concerned with 
the unplanned part where market forces are active. The sector planning 
system and the provincial boundaries have cut off many horizontal links. 
The empirical studies in Part 3 tend to support the hypothesis that 
China is not economically integrated and investigation into the industrial 
sector shows that there is duplication in investment and in production. 
For the sake of efficiency it is obvious that economic integration is 
necessary. "China's sheer size and past emphasis on local self- sufficiency 
offer opportunities for large gains in national economic efficiency through 
increased specialization and trade among regions and between urban and 
rural areas" (World Bank 1982). This implies that economic integration in 
China will bring benefits. However, since China is too large to integrate 
all at once, the first step has to be integration at the regional level, i.e. to 
establish economic zones or integration within a region. Such integration 
will be a breakthrough in the traditional model of vertical hierarchy so as 
to stimulate productivity via a more rational allocation of resources. It is 
a device for further development. 
In fact, "economic zones" or "economic regions" are not new 
innovations. As we know, a country may have economic subdivisions other 
than the administrative subdivisions. One example is the Federal Reserve 
System in the United States. The Federal Reserve System consists of 
several banking districts, which are not the same as the administrative sub-
divisions, i.e. states. Another example is to be found in France. In 1955, 
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at the suggestion of the General Planning Commission of France, a decree 
was promulgated to divide the country into 22 regions, which were called 
"programme regions". 
Looking at regional grouping at international level we find that there 
are two models of economic integration: one is the EC model and the other 
is the COMECON model. Needless to say, for regional economic 
integration in China, EC integration is not the only model. COMECON -
economic integration in Eastern Europe - could be relevant for regional 
integration in China, although COMECON has no longer existed. In 
general EC integration is virtually a "joint market" model, whereas the 
COMECON is more or less a "joint planning" model. Since the real 
problem which impedes the economic development of China is that 
"administrative structure, regardless of whether it is organized on a sectoral 
or geographical basis, fails to coincide with the objective needs of other 
economic activities",2 to examine the theory and practice of economic 
integration in the EC is more relevant for the purpose of China's economic 
integration. That is what the author attempts to do in the present study. 
As was mentioned at the beginning, if we regard integration as an in-
strument of development, i.e. as encouraging better allocation of resources, 
the theory and practice of international integration may also be useful in 
integrating units of the same economy. Obviously there is some 
relationship between integration among national economies and integration 
among units of the same economy. This kind of relationship between 
regional integration in China and economic integration in Western Europe 
is what interests this author. As a matter of fact, what links EC integration 
and integration in China are the three pillars of economic integration: 
economies of scale, division of labour and enhanced competition. 
This study intends first to establish an analytical framework for inte-
gration and see how it works in the case of the EC, then to examine the 
integration issue in China and discuss some policy implications. 
One article in the World Economic Herald pointed out: 
"The whole world is looking forward to 1992 
when a new Europe with 3.2 hundred million population 
and more than 200 square kilometre territory will rise 
in the old European continent. The European countries, 
with different historical backgrounds, different 
2
.See Thomas P. Lyons Explaining Economic Fragmentation in China : A 
Systems Approach. He quoted Hu Qiao mu, former president of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences p.223. 
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economie goals and different languages, will lift their 
internal barriers to cooperate and to coordinate to 
achieve scale economies. 
Whereas Europe is pursuing an integrated and 
supranational market, China still has its "kingdom econ-
omy".3 Recently, while we are having our economy 
decentralized, such a kind of "kingdom segment" or 
"feudal segment" becomes more serious.... The local 
authority tries to have dominating influence and have 
put up protective fences... these will lead to economic 
inefficiency. It is doubtless that all these are against 
modern development. 
We should sum up the experience of our 
economic reform and that of foreign countries, actively 
promote economic integration to achieve scale benefits 
and optimize our economy. "4 
A theoretical approach ideally leads to generalization, and generali-
zation always provides an analytical framework which is applicable to some 
practical problems. This is the essential idea of the present study. 
To begin with, we may generalize the institutional arrangement of 
integration as follows: 
Regional decision-making body 
V 
Regional executive agency 
\i II 
Physical infrastructure Financial infrastructure 
(railway, highway, etc.) (banking service etc.) 
'."Kingdom Economy" here refers to the fragmentation of the market with each 
"kingdom" dominating its economy without considering the benefíts of the whole. 
*. The World Economic Herald (418) p.5. November 21, 1988. Zhang Hong-wei 
Europe will rise as an integrated market: China should avoid building up inside fences 
The power of a regional decision-making body either in the case of 
China's regional integration or in the case of European economic 
integration is limited. The extent to which the regional authority has 
decision-making power depends upon the willingness of members to 
diminish their own decision-making power which is to them one of the 
costs of economic integration. In the case of China's regional integration, 
the regional authority's decision-making power is more limited than that of 
the international integration authority as in the case of the EC integration. 
This is because all the regional authorities in China are under the control 
of the central government. On the other hand, the infrastructure, both 
physical and financial, is indispensable to any economic integration scheme 
because it is the basis of economic integration. 
Behind the institutional arrangement is the theoretical framework 
which is summarized here: 
Integration Efficiency in Resource use Net benefits 
(factor mobility a. X-efficiency a. higher 
diffusion of b. (static) allocative efficiency consumption 
technical knowledge comparative advantage b. more rapid 
wider market) economy of scale etc. growth etc. 
с dynamic effects: optimal scale 
for new plants etc. 
d. efficiency of spatial structures 
The present study itself is an integration of three elements: a 
theoretical discussion on integration economics; an analysis of integration 
in the EC as a multi-country model; an analysis of integration in China, 
both theoretically and empirically. 
The book is divided into three parts: 
Part 1 is devoted to the theory and practice of economic integration 
as an analytical framework. The purpose of writing this part is to put the 
discussion of economic integration in China in a wider and systematic 
context and it is the basis for the whole study. In this part an analysis of 
the mechanism and principles of Western European economic integration 
will be presented. 
Part 2 deals with the necessity of China's regional economic integra-
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tion. The integration issue will be examined with particular focus on the 
integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone. The relevance of the ex-
perience of European integration to China's regional integration will be 
dealt with. Some recommendations for China's regional integration will be 
made as some of the findings of the study. 
Part 3 analyzes the findings of the empirical study of integration in 
China. Attempts are made to test both by descriptive and statistical 
evidence the hypothesis that China is not integrated economically and that 
this entails economic losses. 
There will be an epilogue to draw together the different aspects of 
the study and to highlight some conclusions. 
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PART 1 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 

CHAPTER 1 
THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRATION 
There is a large body of literature on the theory of economic integra-
tion, the core of which has been generally understood as being the theory 
of customs union. However, since our analytical framework will be used 
for studying regional integration in China as well, the literature on the 
assessment for customs union is irrelevant. The emphasis will then be 
shifted to the basic concepts and the rationale of integration as a deve-
lopment device. 
The major points which the present chapter intends to analyze are as 
follows: What is economic integration? How is it related to economic 
development? How can we analyze the possible costs and benefits for any 
integration scheme? What is the framework within which we can best 
answer these questions? 
Starting with the definition of economic integration, the discussion 
in this chapter will briefly give an explanation of why economic integration 
can be a device for economic development and will further elaborate on 
this explanation, incorporating both my own ideas on the subject and the 
relevant work of such writers as J.Tinbergen, Bela Balassa, Ali El-Agraa, 
Peter Robson etc. 
1.1 Definition 
"Integration" is a broad and ambiguous term. There is, in theory and 
practice, no general consensus about the term. According to Bela Balassa, 
economic integration usually refers both to a state of affairs characterized 
by the absence of various forms of discrimination among the integration 
partners, and to a process which includes all measures needed to abolish 
discrimination between economic units (Bela Balassa,1961). 
Whilst this definition describes quite clearly the main characteristics 
of economic integration, there may be some confusion in the discussion by 
defining integration both as a process and as a state. For that reason, in the 
present study we prefer to define economic integration differently, namely, 
as a combination of separate economies both by removing discrimination 
and restrictions and by making some appropriate co-operative arrangements 
with the aim of ensuring that major economic and welfare objectives are 
11 
fulfilled 5 
This definition is preferable since it emphasizes that economic 
integration can be a potential device for promoting economic development 
As a matter of fact, economic integration involves the gradual removal of 
barriers between two or more economic entities, national or regional This 
bringing together of separate economies often consists of putting more or 
less explicitly on record some fundamental norms or rules for economic 
activities, and in delineating the area for which these norms or rules are 
valid The Treaty of Rome, norms for economic activities in the EC, can 
serve as an example in the context of European integration 
Some theorists argue that economic integration is a dual-pronged 
process because "it amounts not only to the removal of discriminatory 
barriers, but also to the introduction of coordination and harmonization 
which ensure the optimal functioning and the development of the economy 
as a whole " ' Therefore when examining the theoretical fundamentals of 
economic integration, two important concepts should be mentioned, name­
ly, "negative integration" and "positive integration"7, with the former re­
ferring to the removal of barriers and the latter to the introduction of co­
ordination.8 These two concepts distinguish different phases of integration, 
or different measures taken aiming at integration 
For integration to be realized, however, there are two channels-
either through market forces or through appropriate policies Simplified, 
5
 This definition is similar to that of John Pinder See John Pinder Positive 
Integration and Negative Integration, Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC 
1979 ρ 53 
6
 Ibid , ρ 18 
7
 According to Ah M El-Agraa (1983) negative integration refers to the removal 
of impediments on trade between the participating nations or to the elimination of any 
restrictions on the process of trade liberalization, whereas positive integration relates 
to the modification of existing instruments and institutions, and more importantly, to 
the creation of new ones so as to enable the market of the integrated area to function 
effectively and properly, also to promote other broader policy aims of the union That 
means that for the desired effect to occur "negative integration" is not enough and 
"positive integration" must be instituted through appropriate policy means 
8
 Jan Tinbergen first raised these two concepts in his book International 
Economic Integration Elsevier Publishing Company 1965 Tinbergen defines negative 
integration as "the elimination of certain instruments of international economic policy" 
and positive integration as "the creation of new institutions and their instruments or 
the modification of existing instruments " 
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integration through market forces is "integration from below": integration 
by an invisible hand. Integration through policy measures, on the other 
hand, is "integration from above", meaning that the integration is more 
policy-oriented than autonomous:integration by a visible hand. 
Since there is both negative and positive integration, there is also 
negative integration policy and positive integration policy.' 
Let it be noted that integration by market forces and by policy mea-
sures are interdependent. They are almost always two dimensions of the 
same process. Integration policy is based on market integration whereas 
market integration is dependent on the implementation of integration 
policy. It appears that where there is no tendency to have market inte-
gration, there will be little opportunity for integration policy to be suc-
cessful. 
1.2 Economic Integration: Forms and Purpose 
Forms 
Several forms of integration can be distinguished according to the 
kind of discrimination abolished and the degree of cooperation among the 
integration partners.10 In fact, economic integration need not embrace all 
sectors of the economies concerned. Integration which is limited to one 
commodity, one industry or one sector may be quite a promising form of 
integration. Therefore, among the forms of integration, "single commodity 
integration", "sector integration" and "common market" are relevant to 
integration within a country. J.Tinbergen in 1965 put forward the idea of 
"a partial customs union cum investment plan", which implies an 
agreement between a number of countries to allocate among themselves a 
certain number of projects often characterized by economies of scale. The 
partners to these projects will have free access to the markets of the 
integration projects. This idea is particularly interesting to integration 
9
. By negative integration policy we mean measures taken to remove barriers, 
which, directly or indirectly, impede the free movement of factors. Positive integration 
policy ranges from consultation to unification Starting from consultation, integration 
goes all the way to reaching a stage of unity 
10
. For details of these forms of economic integration, see El-Agraa's book 
Economics of European Community 
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within a country." In China, for example, it is difficult to let inefficient 
plants close down all at once. But investment in new plants can take into 
consideration some cooperative projects which are characterized by eco-
nomies of scale and other economic principles. This means that when 
investment for new plants is being discussed, the size and location should 
be carefully planned so that they may, for example, share some service 
capacity. 
Purpose 
Economic integration, like other economic issues, is related to the 
scarcity of resources. Given a limited available amount of scarce resources, 
economic integration aims at achieving an acceleration in economic growth 
for the participants of the integration scheme, or to maintaining the same 
rate of growth as without integration but at lower cost in terms óf the use 
of scarce resources. The ultimate goal of economic integration is to 
maximize prosperity for the members concerned via the rational allocation 
of resources. Hence economic integration is a means and not an objective 
in itself. To maximize or at least to improve prosperity is the objective. 
However, what are the possible gains which motivate integration? Or 
put it in another way, why and when can integration be a device for eco-
nomic development? To answer this question it seems that we first need to 
define the concept of economic development. As Elias T. Ghantus said: 
"From a functional point of view, the 
development process is considered to involve both 
growth and change. It aims simultaneously at 
expanding economic activity and changing its 
sectorial composition through the allocation of 
factors of production" (p.27). 
The significance of integration therefore lies in the fundamental 
structural changes that will bring economic benefits in the long-run. 
Generally speaking, regional economic integration offers an opportunity for 
overcoming the limitations imposed on the development process by the 
fragmentation of the market. There are possible political gains as well as 
economic gains, because most of the schemes of economic integration were 
" . J . Tinbergen International Economic Integration Elsevier Publishing Co. 
1954. In his interview with the author, J. Tinbergen emphasized that the idea is valid 
provided that there are benefits for all parties involved. 
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either proposed or realized at least in part for political purposes. There are 
sometimes even political gains at the cost of economic losses. Sometimes 
political motives even outweigh economic gains as reasons for economic 
integration. For instance, economic co-operation between France and West 
Germany after World War II was at that time primarily meant to gain 
political rather than merely economic results. In this study, however, the 
analysis will be made mainly in economic terms. 
The sources of potential economic gains can be attributed to the three 
pillars of economic integration: economies of scale, competition and the 
division of labour. There will be an increased output after integration first 
because of the economies of scale made possible by the increased size of 
the market and second because of more economic efficiency brought about 
by enhanced competition within the integrated area. Division of labour in 
accordance with the law of comparative advantage will also increase 
production. Furthermore, integration also stimulates the diffusion of the 
existing technological knowledge. 
In fact, "economic integration has been a central theme in the 
explanation of economic development since at least the time of Adam Smith 
whose interpretation of the growth process rested upon a perception of 
increasing interdependence (the progressive division of labour) and its 
causal role in the wealth of nations. The study of various forms of 
cooperation and their importance to the efficient allocation of scarce 
resources constituted a substantial portion of classical economics" (Thomas 
P.Lyons, 1987, p. 10). 
We will now elaborate on the significance of the integration process 
in terms of scale economies, division of labour and competition. 
1.3 Economic Integration and Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale - the reduction of the average cost by expanding 
the production either in the short run or in the long run - is an important 
motive for economic integration. The cost-saving is due to "economy of 
skill, economy of machinery and economy of materials" (Marshall, 1972). 
Economic integration within a country or amongst countries brings 
economic benefits when production on a regional scale leads to cost-savings 
compared to the production before integration. Cost-savings may be 
achieved through larger-scale operation, fuller utilization of existing 
capacity, joint management, the co-ordinated use of jointly-owned 
resources and "learning by doing". 
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Many economic activities exhibit economies of scale. These 
economic activities have, in general, the following characteristics: 
1. Indivisibility 
Large scale production will be necessary for the opti-
mum use of some indivisible equipment, bulk transactions 
such as large-scale handling, shipping etc., as well as the use 
of the regional infrastructure. Some operating cost is also 
indivisible such as expenditure for management and for the 
development of new products. 
2. Non-linearity 
Nonlinearity here refers to the phenomenon that cost 
increases are less than proportional to the growth of volume. 
For the same equipment such as tanks, pipes, containers etc., 
cost is a function of surface areas, whereas capacity is related 
to volume.12 Processing industries such as fertilizer factories 
and cement factories are outstanding examples. Some 
economic activities are also non-proportional, such as design, 
production planning, research, processing and collecting of 
information. 
3. Continuity 
Large-scale production becomes more profitable when 
continuity is possible so that set-up costs can be distributed 
over a longer period of time and over a larger volume of 
output. 
Some scholars have done empirical tests on the principle of 
economies of scale. They tried to find the minimum efficient plant size 
(MEPS) according to the "economies of scale" principle, namely, the 
minimum production volume for a plant to be efficient in terms of 
production scale. Table 1.1 gives some of the empirical results. The names 
of the academics who did the empirical test are also mentioned as "author 
reference". 
l2
. Some engineers have derived the 0.6 rule from this principle - the increase 
in the cost of equipment of this sort is given by the increase in capacity raised to the 
power of 0.6. See Salassa International Economic Integration George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd. London 1973. 
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Moreover, the scale factor is significant if we examine it in a more 
dynamic way. 
With the growth of the market through integration, efficiency may 
increase because of the growing inter-relation of industries in production 
and consumption. If a larger market enables not only industry A but also 
industry В to survive, then the service industry to A (e.g. repair workshop 
etc.) may also be helpful to B. If industries А, В and С have input-output 
relation with each other, i.e. if B's output is A's input while C's output is 
B's input ( О В > A), the expansion of industry В will naturally raise the 
demand for products of C, and the cost-saving in industry В will stimulate 
the production in industry A. 
Table 1.1 Economies of Scale: Some Empirical Results 
Product Estimate of MEPS 
(minimum production per year) 
Cigarettes 36 billion cigarettes 
Soap 10,000 tons 
Steel 2-3 million tons 
1 million tons 
1 million tons 
Bicycles 160,000 units 
Tractors 90,000 units 
Cement 200,000 tons 
Automobile 1 million units 
Celtic textile 3.85 mill on sq.yds 
Detergent powder 70,000 tons 
Source: Based on A Review of Ц 
Author Reference 
S. Richardson 
С Pratten 
С Pratten &R.M.Dean 
C. Pratten 
G.M. Scherer 
С Pratten 
J.B. Heath. N. Owen et.al 
National Board for prices 
& income 
P.M. Scherer 
С Pratten 
С Pratten 
[onopolies and Merger Policv 
London. Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1975. 
The learning effect is yet another dynamic aspect. Longer production 
runs (if production process becomes longer after the combination of 
separate lines etc.), as was mentioned above, larger size of the plant, larger 
quantities of product will make it easier for managers and operators to 
learn from experience how to operate particular technologies and facilities 
more effectively. Due to the fact that labour is the core of labour-intensive 
industries, the learning effect is more important there, whereas the size 
factor is significant in capital-intensive industries because capital may not 
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increase proportionately in larger scale production. 
Although entrepreneurs should be aware of the existence of 
economies of scale, it does not, however, follow that larger production 
units are necessarily more efficient or that larger production, though 
preferable at the outset, will continue to be beneficial over a period of 
time. Economies of scale depend upon the size of the integrated area 
(therefore the transportation costs), the difference in taste, the managerial 
skill and other factors which may change in the course of time. It also 
varies from industry to industry. 
1.4 Economic Integration and Competition 
The ideas of Adam Smith and the classical school of economics are 
well-known: the invisible hand will take care of the thing that the visible 
hand fails to manage. 
Competition is desirable because it contributes to the elimination of 
inefficient producers and provides producers with incentives for 
technological changes. It will also speed up the readjustment process. 
Generally speaking, a wider market sustains a greater number of effi-
cient production units. B.Balassa argues that "if a small country were able 
to support firms of optimum size in various branches of manufacturing, it 
would rarely be possible to have a number of efficient firms competing in 
a small market "(B.Balassa, 1973,p.74). 
Furthermore, since one objective of integration is to remove barriers 
to trade, it will naturally increase the number of potential competitors and 
loosen monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. In an integrated 
area the market power of monopolies will always decline. In addition, free 
movement of factors of production in an integrated area will not only 
enlarge the output market but also the input market and will intensify 
competition not only in the product market but also in the input market. On 
the other hand, economic integration will extend the openness of the 
market which is likely to "enable competition less personal and more 
effective by lessening the fear of retaliation and the individual producer's 
misgivings about encroaching upon other producer's markets" (B.Balassa 
1973,p.84). 
The following comment of T. Scitovsky on European economic 
integration sums up the significance of competition in the EC: 
"The influence of economic integration is 
likely to be exerted through many channels, and 
one of these is its effect on competition. The 
freeing of intra-European trade would increase 
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the number and geographical coverage of the 
market outlets open to the average producer and 
this increases the number of firms he regards as 
his competitors. This would hardly render compe-
tition free in the classical sense but may well 
render it less personal and therefore less consider-
ate of the interests and profits of the weakest 
members of the group. National monopolies 
would probably be less secure in their monopoly 
position; oligopolies are likely to be weakened; 
cartels, if extended from national into all-Euro-
pean organizations, are expected to come under 
the large and less under the small firms influence 
- a change likely to increase competition within 
the cartel organization itself. All this should 
enhance the individual producer's ability, willing-
ness and inducement to innovate and to expand, 
by encroaching if necessary on his competitor's 
markets"(T.Scitovsky, 1982, p. 133). 
In a market economy, competition is pervasive. It is the preferred 
organization principle if the producers have independent decision-making 
power and strive to maximize their own benefits. This is, however, only 
half of the story. Simply removing frontier barriers is insufficient if goods 
and services are to be freely traded and a single common market is to be 
maintained. Suppression of competition is likely when there are cartel 
agreements, mergers or take-overs. If market structures become more con-
centrated, trio and duo-polies, or even monopolies may occur in product 
markets which was the situation in the EEC during the 1970s. That is why 
a policy which guarantees competition is indispensable. 
1.5 Economic Integration and the Division of Labour 
The existence of comparative advantages is the cornerstone of econo-
mic integration. When comparative advantages exist, benefits are expected 
to be derived from a division of labour among the participants of the 
integration scheme. 
The key point is, where do comparative advantages come from? 
Comparative advantages rest first upon relative costs, which result 
from production technologies, preferences and factor endowment. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade theory explains the determi-
nants of trade patterns. The model suggests that international unit cost dif-
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ferences arise from national differences in factor endowments. Those coun­
tries relatively well-endowed with one production factor will be able to 
produce relatively cheaper commodities by making intensive use of that 
abundant factor. If a production factor is relatively abundant in a particular 
economy, it will tend to be cheaper in terms of other factors compared 
with the situation in economies which are less well-endowed with that fac­
tor. A country with abundant land, for instance, is able to produce food 
cheaply and thus export food in exchange for manufactured goods. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model, modified by Samuelson, is usually a 
model formulated in the international setting. When applied to an individual 
country, the model has to be somewhat modified. However, "due to diffe­
rences among units in production technologies, preferences, or factor 
endowments (natural and acquired), relative costs almost certainly differ at 
the allocations chosen by the various units in autarky. Such cost differences 
imply that specialization and inter-unit trade will permit greater total output 
of at least one commodity, even though each unit, considered individually, 
produces efficiently in autarky; each unit can be made better off if the units 
cooperate, in accordance with their comparative advantages"(Thomas P. 
Lyons 1987, p.41). The basic fact that factor-endowment difference exists 
in an individual country like China will make the application of the model 
possible.13 One Chinese economist mentioned that: 
"(In China) every region has its compara­
tive advantages as well as its comparative disad­
vantages. A correct economic policy should be to 
produce those goods for which the region has 
comparative advantages and not to produce, or 
produce less of, those goods for which the region 
has comparative disadvantages."14 
13
. This can also be explained in terms of micro-economics. Suppose there are 
two economic units A and B. Assume the production possibilities frontier of each unit 
is concave to the origin and each unit produces two goods at its PPF (Production 
Possibility Frontier). In the case that the relative costs differ due to the differences 
in endowments or production technologies, the slopes of the two PPF will differ too. 
If each economic unit produces more of the goods in which it enjoys the lower relative 
cost, then the total output of both goods increases. Both A and В will be made better 
off through trade on condition that transportation costs do not completely offset the 
gains from this re-allocation. 
14
. See He Jianzhang The Current Economic Policies of China in Economic 
Reform in the PRC Westview Press Inc., p.74. 
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Theoretically, a division of labour, as well as competition, will im-
prove prosperity by reducing the cost. Yet the argument of prosperity 
improvement for integration is not merely confined to cost-based analysis. 
The increased size of the market will also allow greater specialization in 
respect of product varieties: each producer may produce one differentiated 
product, something previously impossible due to the limited size of the 
market. When a greater variety of products are available, this certainly 
extends consumer's choice and thus improve the benefits of everyone, even 
if each producer's output remains at the same level. 
1.6 Economic Integration: Costs and Benefits 
The significance of economic integration is that it can be a momen-
tum to economic development. Because of the new structural changes for 
the allocation of resources within the integrated region and/or the new 
production pattern it brings, integration tends to shake off stagnation. The 
determination of the most desirable future structural changes for economic 
development is, however, subject to various constraints. How the 
integration scheme may affect these constraints is therefore of vital impor-
tance.15 
Costs and benefits are involved for every member of the integration 
scheme. What are these costs and benefits? 
The authorities of a member state for integration may have in mind 
some main objectives, and integration fits into the optimum strategy for 
realizing these objectives and there are desirable structural changes related 
to them. 
Now if some sets of obstacles exist for desirable structural changes, 
it may be convenient to think of the benefits of integration in terms of the 
removal or reduction of these constraints. Put another way, the reason for 
the member states to join or to remain in the integration scheme is in order 
to get rid of, or at least, to reduce the obstacles for its economic develop-
ment. One country in question, for example, does not have coal. Having 
become a member of the integration scheme, it may therefore get some 
coal from one of the neighbouring countries at a reasonable price for its 
economic development. 
Obstacles or constraints here may refer to many things, including not 
only the non-availability of raw materials but also the non-availability of 
'
5
. For the trade-offs involved in economic integration, the Polish economists 
Marian Ostrowski and Zdislaw Sadowski have developed a cost- benefit analysis, 
which is useful when dealing systematically with the integration issue. The basic idea 
has been summed up in the text. 
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skilled labour, technology etc. By removing some material obstacles, eco-
nomic growth will certainly be accelerated. Another constraint will be the 
limited size of the market, which makes it impossible to realize economies 
of scale. 
On the other hand, the costs of integration may be looked at as such 
sets of constraints which tend to increase by integration. One particular 
cost is related to the fact that the agreement on integration must necessarily 
make the process of decision-making more difficult. Members of an 
integration scheme have to give up some decision-making power. 
Moreover, integration may directly add to the administration costs. It is 
therefore fair to say that economic integration can be beneficial only at 
some cost. 
1.7 Economic Integration, Factor Mobility and Balanced Development 
In general, the foregoing analysis of economic integration assumes 
that by shifting resources from the places where productivity is lower to 
places where productivity is higher, better economic performance will be 
attained. But a greater degree of integration cannot be said to be equal to 
a "superior economic structure". First, an inappropriate pattern of 
specialization and exchange may lead to economic losses rather than gains, 
and secondly, some undesirable consequences may offset or outweigh any 
realized benefits. In addition, there are also other problems that may arise 
in the process of integration. 
There is first of all the problem of factor immobility, and then, if 
free movement of factors exists, there is the problem of polarization. These 
problems in respect to balanced development exist both in inter-country 
integration and in integration within a country. 
There are general reasons why factors are not very mobile, even 
within a nation. Land is immobile; labour is more immobile than capital. 
Let us look at the mobility of labour more closely. 
Basically, the mobility of labour may fall into two categories: 
geographical mobility and occupational mobility. It is obvious that a job-job 
transition is always harder than a place-place transition. This means that it 
is easier for a person to change his or her place without changing his or 
her job. Moreover there are also tangible (monetary) costs and intangible 
costs involved in labour migration. Intangible costs include, among other 
things, difference between present and future earnings, difference in cli-
mate, language and customs. Thus the assumption of free movement of 
factors is not always valid. 
Another relevant issue for integration is the problem of polarization. 
In fact this issue is related to the relationship between factor mobility and 
22 
balanced development in the integrated area. Since economic integration 
intends to at least abolish the barriers to movement of commodities and 
production factors, there will be freer movement of commodities and 
production factors than before. But in most cases this will lead to un-
balanced development in the integrated area. 
Experiences in the past show that some schemes of economic integra-
tion may fail not because no benefits have ever been derived from econ-
omic integration, but because there is a lack of equitable distribution of the 
benefits. In the presence of disparate views on the distribution of potential 
gains from economic integration, and weak arrangement for redistribution, 
integration may well founder midway. Therefore the equity argument is as 
important as the efficiency argument. Not everyone can have everything in 
the scheme of integration. Anyone would participate in an integration 
scheme if there was a prospect for economic gain, and he would retain his 
participation as long as he considered himself better off in the scheme than 
outside it. On the other hand, any integration scheme would not last long 
unless a reasonably equitable distribution of costs and benefits was main-
tained among the participants. 
Actually, polarization is one of the probable effects of free move-
ment of factors. The production factors of the integration participants will 
be likely to be attracted to one or a few centres. When the barriers are 
removed, a development process will start which will enable the rich part 
to become richer while the poor becomes poorer. The so-called growth 
pole theory examines this phenomenon. Polarization will particularly occur 
when the levels of development differ among the members. It is hardly 
surprising that industrial activities tend to cluster in specific central areas 
where the efficiency of factors of production is higher due to external 
economies, easier communication, better infrastructure and availability of 
skilled labour or expertise. As a consequence, some of the integration 
partners may lose factors of production thus becoming less well off than 
before integration. Naturally they will lose interest in the integration 
scheme. Once free movement of production factors becomes possible, such 
a phenomenon is bound to appear. Unless suitable adjustments in practice 
are made or financial measures are taken, the willingness for integration 
is likely to evaporate very quickly and the backwash effects will occur: 
success breeds success and failure breeds failure, or, the rich become 
richer and the poor become poorer. The integration scheme will thus be at 
stake. Therefore the achievements of the potential gains from economic 
integration will be limited to the willingness and/or the ability to cooperate 
and to distribute the gains from integration, so that all participants may 
benefit in the long run if not in the short run. 
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1.8 Integration Motivation 
The concept of "integration motivation" is used to describe the will-
ingness to integrate, or to what extent the members of the integration 
scheme are devoted to the integration scheme. We may well call it "the 
mental infrastructure" for integration because although it is almost invisible 
it is the basis for integration. 
Integration motivation is a multi-determined concept which is in-
fluenced by many factors. To understand this concept the following 
relationships are important: 
1. Integration motivation and the convergence of objectives 
Goal-means analysis shows that the more convergent the 
objectives are, the more convergent the means. If the integra-
tion partners (member regions) have nothing in common in 
terms of their objectives, they will not be looking for 
integration. 
2. Integration motivation and historical relations 
Basically, the more historical connnections the 
integration partners have, the easier it is for them to integrate. 
The case of the Benelux shows this. 
3. Integration motivation and physical unification 
In an integrated region, integration loyalty tends to 
increase when the economic activities in the region are 
unified, i.e. the infrastructure within the integrated region is 
well-established. If, for example, the integrated area has built 
the common railway, communication system etc., the progress 
of integration will be irreversible. A well-organized system of 
commercial laws etc., will also make intra-region business 
easier and thus stimulate the process of integration. 
4. Integration motivation and outside pressure 
The outside pressure here refers either to outside threat 
or challenge, both political and economic. If there is a threat 
or a challenge as such, the integration incentive will be 
stronger. We will see later that the European integration 
occurred because the European countries became aware of 
their weakness and the economic threat from outside. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
A SYSTEMIC MODEL 
As was mentioned in the Introduction, there are at least two major 
models of economic integration: one is the EC model and the other is the 
COMECON model. The present chapter describes the EC integration 
model. It will glance over the historical development of the EC to identify 
both the mechanisms underlying the integration process and the principles 
that made the process smooth and successful. 
2.1 The Growth of the European Community: A Historical Overview 
In March 1943 Winston Churchill, in a broadcast to the world, held 
out the hope that "under a world institution embodying or representing the 
United Nations, and some day all nations, there should come into being a 
Council of Europe...". Yet the foundation stone in the building of the 
European Community was not laid until 9th May 1950 when Mr. Robert 
Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, delivered a speech in which he put 
forward a plan jointly worked out by himself and Jean Monnet to establish 
the European Coal and Steel Community. This was the formal launching 
of the Community idea.16 It was meant as a first step on the way to a 
"European Federation of Nations". According to this plan, German and 
French coal and steel production was to be subordinated to a common 
"High Authority". 
The initial success of the ECSC encouraged politicians to plan a 
much more ambitious and comprehensive scheme of economic co-operation 
- the European Economic Community (EEC). Europe's realization of her 
own weakness, the conviction that renewed military conflict must be 
avoided, the earnest desire for a better, freer and juster Europe - all these 
have contributed to the establishment of the EEC and to the subsequent at-
tempts towards further integration. 
Two fundamentally different views can be the starting points when 
stimulating a process of international integration: the "confederalist view" 
and the "federalist view". The essence of confederalism is that the 
countries concerned agree to cooperate with each other without ceding any 
of their national sovereignty. The confederalist approach does not aim at 
l6
. The ECSC treaty outlaws tariff protection, quantitative restrictions and 
discriminatory practices in inner community trade. 
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creating a new supranational organization but aims at linking sovereign 
states which retain their own national structures. The federalist approach, 
however, aims at pooling their sovereignty under a supranational communi-
ty. Though they still have their individual identities, their future is 
determined by common authorities. 
The structure of the European Community was deeply influenced by 
the federalist approach. One of the major innovative characteristics, com-
pared with other international bodies such as the U.N.etc., is that its mem-
bers have to cede a part of their national sovereignty. It was, however, 
somewhat modified owing to the member states' reluctance to abandon 
their sovereignty altogether. Compromise had to be found which provided 
more than mere co-operation along confederal lines. Such an arrangement 
was to bridge the gap between national autonomy and European federation 
in a gradual process - spiral progress being a feature of European integra-
tion. The European Community thus started as a political arrangement. 
However, it was in the economic sphere - where progress appeared most 
likely - that was agreed that member states should cede some sovereignty. 
The result has been reflected in the Treaties establishing the Communities. 
2.2 Integration through Market Forces versus Integration through 
Policy Measures: Mechanisms for Integration in the EC 
Integration through market forces and integration through policy 
measures are two mechanisms for any integration scheme. How is in-
tegration in the EC? 
Generally speaking, the focal point of European economic integration 
is the Common Market, which rests on four fundamental freedoms: the free 
movement of goods, persons and capital, and the freedom to provide ser-
vices. It was expected that by stimulating the free movement of production 
factors, competition would increase, and a further convergence of com-
modity prices and factor enumeration would take place. Once again, 
economic interdependence would be reinforced. 
Some may argue that Western European integration, as it is now, is 
basically an integration resulting from market forces, or from the supply 
and demand of the market. But integration through market forces is, rela-
tively speaking, less visible, less political and more autonomous. Let us 
look further at the situation in the EC. 
Among the major achievements of European economic integration, 
progress in monetary integration stands out. The development of the 
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ECU17 in the European monetary integration may very well serve as an 
example of integration through market forces. It would therefore be 
worthwhile to pick out monetary integration in the EC, especially the 
success story of the ECU. 
The ECU was originally the official unit of account of the EC as a 
monetary personality of the Community: a "common currency" for a 
"Common Market". In the beginning it was not designed within a 
framework of market-induced financial innovation and was limited to 
transactions between central banks according to the 1979 agreement on 
European Monetary System (EMS). Yet the ECU has experienced its great-
est success in the market. Early in 1983, three countries - Belgium, France 
and Italy - allowed private accounts to be held in ECU's. The ECU 
developed quickly later and now the ECU is recognized as a foreign 
currency at any rate by the EEC countries. The use of ECU traveller's 
cheques is already an established fact. 
The success story of the private ECU is something beyond the 
expectation of the designers of the European Monetary System (EMS). It 
shows that economic forces which had been in favour of a wider European 
integration had increased the need for a common currency of the European 
integrated area. Both as a reserve asset and a "risk spreader", the ECU is 
very attractive. That is why the use of the ECU is expanding so unabated. 
It has even given rise to market self-regulating structures such as the newly 
set-up clearing system. At present the size and the role of the private ECU 
market is no longer in question. As Peter Coffey says: 
"Once .... travellers' cheques circulate 
freely within the EEC and, most probably, almost 
simultaneously more Member States allow their 
nationals to open banking accounts denominated 
in ECU's, then the road is open for the develop-
ment of an important market in ECU's" (p.76). 
Moreover, the development of the ECU's market would preferably 
go hand-in-hand with the development of a real "European Monetary 
Fund", which is one step further towards a monetary union. 
The story of the private ECU shows that integration through market 
forces occurred because of the existence of a fundamental need for a 
common currency to facilitate trade. 
". ECU replaced ACU which was created in 1977. As an official unit of account 
it has been used among the member states of the EC. 
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Whilst the European economic integration is market-oriented, it is 
also a fact that an active policy has also been provided. In the sphere of 
monetary integration, for example, the Werner Report analyzed the 
monetary situation after the progress of economic integration and the 
Report put forward the blueprint for the future. It made detailed proposals 
for the first stage of the European Monetary Union (1971-1973). Therefore 
monetary integration was first of all "integration from above". Yet the 
private ECU, as illustrated earlier, has developed "from below" as a result 
of progress in monetary integration. 
2.3 Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the EC: Structural 
Arrangements 
Successful realization of economic integration implies the existence 
of a well-developed system of inter-regional institutions and also of a 
corresponding set of rules and regulations - a constitution or rules for the 
"game of integration". We will go into these two aspects of the EC where 
the EC has quite a lot to say about having been an integration organization 
for more than three decades. 
The Constitutional Aspect of the EC 
Providing a constitutional basis involves the establishment of rules 
for integration. Several treaties established the Communities: The Treaty 
of Paris was signed in 1951 to create the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC), valid for 50 years.18 When the experiment of rational 
allocation of resources proved successful, the Member States signed the 
two Treaties of Rome (1957) which are of unlimited duration, setting up 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom). 
The Rome Treaties establishing the EEC and the Euratom, together 
with the Paris Treaty establishing the ECSC, formed the constitution of the 
European Community. Subsequently, other texts have been added to, or 
have amended these basic documents and more important changes are 
incorporated in treaties which must be rectified by each member in 
accordance with its own legal procedures. All these Treaties have the same 
objectives: economic growth and higher standards of living, accompanied 
by political union of the peoples of Europe. 
The Treaty of Rome has spelled out the immediate objectives of the 
". The Treaty founding the ECSC came into force on June 23, 1952. The 
Common Market for coal, iron ore and scrap metal took effect on February 10, 1957, 
for steel on May 5, 1953, and for refined steel on August 1,1954. 
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Community as well as some of the institutional arrangements such as the 
European Investment Bank etc. The preamble and general clauses of the 
EEC Treaty also call for the implementation of common policies on 
agriculture, transport and competition etc., and rules in almost all areas of 
economic and social life. There is a special article which empowers the 
Community institution to set up any policies that may be necessary to attain 
the general objectives set out in the Treaty. Under this article several 
policies developed to deal with industrial problems including a regional po-
licy, a social policy, a policy on the environment, a policy on consumer 
protection and proposals for a passport union. 
In February 1986, a "Single Act" signed and submitted to national 
parliaments for rectification, amended and complemented the Treaties men-
tioned above. The act further confirmed certain objectives of the Com-
munity: technological development, progress towards economic and 
monetary unity, the strengthening of economic and social cohesion, 
improvement of the environment and the working environment, and the 
completion of the European internal market and the creation by 1992 of a 
large area without frontiers, 
The specific details of the treaties are of course not of interest to the 
present study. They have been mentioned here only to show that the in-
tegration process in the EC could not have progressed without all these 
rules. 
The Institutional Arrangements of the EC 
The three European Communities - the ECSC, the EEC and the 
EAEC - are managed by common institutions. Among those institutions the 
Council and Commission are regarded as a bicephalous high authority for 
the EC. 
The Commission and Council are important because the success of 
the Community depends largely on the deliberate coordination of the 
interests of individual nations and that of the Community as a whole. It is 
these two institutions that are engaged in the job of co-ordination - the 
Commission represents the EC whilst each member state working in the 
Council represents itself. The Commission is composed of at least one 
citizen from each member state and altogether there are seventeen - two for 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Great Britain, and one for each of the 
remaining member states. Members of the Commission are appointed for 
four years by mutual agreement of the Community governments. Since the 
Commission represents the EC, its members act only in the interests of the 
Community; they may not receive instructions from any national 
government. The Commission is responsible to the European Parliament 
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which is the only body that can dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds 
majority. 
The Commission acts both as an initiator of policy and as the expo-
nent of the Community interest. It operates as a college and decisions are 
made by majority vote. For the purpose of day-to-day operation, the 
Commission is divided into twenty Directorates-General which cover all 
aspects of the EC's activities. Different Commissioners have a res-
ponsibility for particular fields. The interesting point here is that each 
Commissioner is assisted by a personal cabinet. The functions of the 
Commission are based on statute and custom. Statutes are for the most part 
the treaties establishing the Communities, whereas custom relates to 
working practices within the EC. 
The Council consists of representatives of the member governments. 
It takes the major policy decisions of the Community. As the EC is such 
a huge organization which has to cope with the different and conflicting 
national interests, it would be interesting to examine its function in deci-
sion-making. 
The decisions of the Community are taken by unanimous, simple or 
qualified majority voting. When the last method is used, the system is 
weighted both in favour of the larger members and by the necessity of 
carrying at least one of the smaller ones along with the decision. Such kind 
of method, it was originally hoped, would ensure that decisions were sup-
ported by a wide spectrum of opinion, neither allowing the larger members 
to ignore the smaller, nor the smaller to hold up the whole Community. As 
a general rule the Council has used unanimous voting but at the same time 
a member may abstain from voting on a matter which is not of vital 
importance to it but which it would rather not support, without preventing 
the others from agreeing with the policy. The Council is served by its own 
secretariat and is supported by the Committee of Permanent Representa-
tives. 
2.4 Integration Willingness in Western Europe 
Another important aspect for understanding the economic integration 
in Western Europe is the motivation or willingness to integrate. 
In fact, there have been opinion surveys in different Western 
European countries about European economic integration, asking the public 
how it felt about the unification of Western Europe. Some were ad hoc 
surveys, others were part of a deliberate effort to trace the evolution of 
public opinion on the subject before the Single Act was passed. The table 
below sketches out the way answers evolved to the question: Are you in 
general for or against making efforts towards uniting Western Europe? 
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Answers are to be presented in Table 2.1. In fact these answers are divided 
into five categories: 
1. very much for, 
2. for to some degree, 
3. against to some degree, 
4. very much against, and 
5. no response. 
Table 2.1 The Survey Results for European Integration (1962-1985) 
Year 
1962 (EUR 6) 
1970 (EUR 6) 
1973 (EUR 10) 
1975 (EUR 10) 
1978 (EUR 10) 
1979 (EUR 10) 
1980 (EUR 10) 
1981 (EUR 10) 
1982 (EUR 10) 
1983 (EUR 10) 
1984 (EUR 10) 
1985 (EUR 10) 
1 
40% 
34% 
30% 
33% 
30% 
30% 
28% 
29% 
26% 
30% 
2% 
32% 
2 
32% 
40% 
33% 
36% 
45% 
45% 
45% 
43% 
44% 
44% 
46% 
44% 
3 
4% 
4% 
6% 
5% 
8% 
7% 
9% 
9% 
10% 
8% 
9% 
8% 
4 
1% 
2% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
4% 
4% 
5% 
5% 
3% 
4% 
4% 
5 
23% 
20% 
26% 
22% 
14% 
14% 
14% 
14% 
15% 
15% 
13% 
12% 
Source: European Documentation Periodical 3 /1986 European 
Unification: The Origins and Growth of the European 
Community. 
The figures above indicate clearly that the willingness to integrate 
remains positive (item 1 + item 2 > item 3 + item 4) all the time and it 
has been stable though there were some changes in percentage. It is 
difficult to identify the exact causes behind the changes as willingness to 
integrate is a factor influenced by many elements. On the other hand, 
willingness to integrate is a factor influencing the process of integration. 
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The following matrix illustrates some of the major considerations for 
Western European countries to integrate, including both political and 
economic considerations. The matrix, though non-exhaustive, shows the 
complexity of Western European integration motivation. 
The "external catalyst" here refers to the U.S.A., who hoped, 
through the Marshall plan, to revitalize the European economy. The United 
States would like to see a united and prosperous Europe. The "perception 
of a threat" refers, of course, to the USSR at that time. As for the 
economic incentives, the search for allocative efficiency is primary. At that 
time there were also high expectations in member countries that economic 
integration would enhance economic growth. 
Table 2.2 Various Motives for Integration 
political economic 
1. viability of nation states 1. allocative efficiency 
2. European peace 2. internal growth 
3. affinity 3. economic interdependence 
4. wish for a "superpower" 4. wish for economic power 
5. threat perception 5. fear for recession 
6. external catalyst 6. technological gap 
7. external recognition 
Source: Spinelli (1957), Van der Meersche (1971), and Brugmans 
(1972). 
We will have a closer look at the original six member states: the 
agriculture in France was in a strong competitive position and its industry 
was weak compared with that of Germany. France got the common 
agriculture policy whereas, Germany, keen on freer trade, was satisfied in 
terms of its industrial interests. Italy preferred export-led growth in 
industrial products due to a shortage of home demand. Belgium relied 
heavily on foreign trade and hence on secure export markets, so did the 
Netherlands. The idea of a common market was thus very attractive. The 
complexity of motives for integration listed above shows where the driving 
forces were behind European integration. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE BENEFITS OF THE EC COMMON MARKET 
We have examined the theory that economic integration may bring 
benefits. It is more important, however, to test it in reality: are there any 
benefits for a Common Market like the EC? If there are, how many? 
This chapter intends to answer these questions in the theoretical 
context by looking at economies of scale, the division of labour and 
competition. Some empirical results of EC integration studies will be 
carefully examined. 
As for the benefits of the EC integration, Nicholas Owen has 
conducted systematic research to sum up the development of the EC 
Common Market and has illustrated that competition and economies of 
scale have brought benefits to EC countries. The results of his empirical 
efforts will be discussed later. 
Apart from Nicholas Owen's study, many other studies, accompanied 
by the "Single Act" of 1992's internal European market, have been done 
recently on the empirical aspects of EC integration, which provided 
important material for this study. 
The benefits of economic integration involve several dimensions 
- resource saving because of lower costs related to market penetra-
tion; 
- benefits to consumers by allowing them a wider choice of 
differentiated products. This does not entail any reallocation of 
resources among the integration partners; 
- benefits derived from competition. 
3.1 Economic Integration and Economies of Scale in the EC 
A basic objective of the EC integration from the outset was to es-
tablish a common market among the Six to encourage industrial structures 
capable of taking advantage of economies of scale. The designers of the 
Community must have thought of the fact that the large and integrated 
markets had fostered the development of large-scale production techniques 
in the United States, and were, partly at least, responsible for the American 
productivity level being one of the highest in the world. "The founding 
fathers of the Community envisaged that the creation of the Community 
would ensure for its members levels of productivity comparable to Ameri-
can level through the creation of integrated markets, which are comparable 
to that of North America in economic terms" (Layton,1971). 
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Layton, in his "Benefits of Scale for Industry", stated the idea more 
clearly: 
"For roughly a hundred years, or since the 
end of the American civil war, the long term 
trend of growth in the U.S. economy was faster 
than that of Western Europe as a whole. One 
major reason was economies of scale."19 
We may well start with examining potential gains in terms of econo-
mies of scale after 1992. 
In fact the prospects of the 1992 internal market painted a bright 
picture for the EC countries: increased trade triggered by market 
integration enables firms to make savings linked to large-scale production. 
According to Paolo Cecchini, potential gains after 1992, however, vary 
significantly per industry (Paolo Cecchini et.al. 1989, pp.77-78). 
Table 3.1 Price Falls for Financial Services 
Country potential price falls ( % ) 
1. Spain 
2. Italy 
3. France 
4. Belgium 
5. Germany 
6. Luxembourg 
7 UK 
8. Netherlands 
34% 
28% 
24% 
23% 
25% 
17% 
13% 
9% 
Source: Table 6.2 The European Challenge of 1992 - the Benefits of 
a Single Market. 
The expected reductions in production costs resulting from econo-
mies of scale are of the order of 1 % for sectors like petroleum products, 
". Layton emphasized the principle of economies of scale in his book. This is 
actually the principal reason for European economic integration. As we shall see later, 
many other academics have done a lot of empirical studies into this aspect. 
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but range from 3% to 6% for heavy electrical equipment and means of 
transport other than cars. 
In addition to economies of scale in the sphere of production, in-
creased trade may also lead to economies of scale in the sphere of business 
organization, marketing, finance, and R&D. Take the financial service 
sectors for example (see Table 3.1). 
The estimated gains in consumer surplus resulting from the integra-
tion of European credit and insurance markets is given below: 
Table 3.2 Estimated Gains in Consumer Surplus of Credit and Insu-
rance Markets for Each Country 
Country 
Belgium 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Total 
ECUs billion 
0.7 
4.6 
3.2 
3.7 
4.0 
0.1 
0.3 
5.1 
21.7 
Source: see Table 3.1. 
The table shows that the largest overall benefits are registered by the 
UK and Germany where price falls, though relatively modest, are 
leveraged upwards by the increased size of their financial services markets. 
While potential gains from the EC single market are interesting to 
us, it is important to see the gains which already exist. Nicholas Owen has 
investigated some sectors in the EC which covers the washing machine 
industry, the car industry and the truck industry. Nicholas Owen's book 
Economies of Scale. Competitiveness, and Trade Patterns within the 
European Community reflects on the EC twenty-five years' development 
and the important impact on the industries directly affected. 
As for the washing-machine industry, Owen reported that in the 
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1970s Italy exported some of its total washing-machine output to Britain, 
Germany and France20. As trade and volume increased, the number of 
producers in the Italian industry diminished rapidly from 50 in 1960 to 13 
in 1974. Unit costs in the Italian washing-machine industry declined by 
15% in real terms with every doubling of cumulative production volume. 
Italy's washing machine industry's combined exports to France, Germany 
and Britain, which accounted for 30% of the industry's output, reduced 
unit costs by 8 percent. 
There have been structural changes in the car industry too. Concen-
tration first increased in West Germany from 1955 to 1970. There was a 
similar trend in the British car industry between 1965 and 1970. From 
1965 onwards the French car industry improved its export performance. 
N.Owen made an assessment of the effects of French exports to Britain in 
1976: the resource savings were calculated at 15% to French producers. 
As for the trucks industry, Owen argued that the structure of the 
German industry had adjusted itself slightly in favour of the larger pro-
ducers as a direct result of export. Exports to France (1976) allowed the 
lowest-cost producer Daimler-Benz to increase output by 7.5 percent. 
These benefits are basically those related to economies of scale, i.e. cost-
savings made possible by a wider market. 
3.2 Economic Integration and Competition in the EC 
The achievements after freer competition in the EC Common Market 
are also important. The Commission has declared its policy in favour of 
competition (E.C.1972, p. 11): "Competition is the best stimulant of 
economic activity since it guarantees the widest possible freedom of action 
to all. An active competition policy makes it easier for supply and demand 
structures continually to adjust to technological development... encourages 
the best possible use of productive resources for the greatest possible 
benefit of the economy as a whole and for the benefit, in particular, of the 
consumer."21 
For any product, competitive pressures tend to trigger a convergence 
of prices. In a competitive environment, the adjustment of prices to supply 
and demand pressures is generally greater and quicker, a point mentioned 
20
. According to Owen's book, Italy's exports to Britain, Germany and France in 
1976, for example, enabled Italian industry to achieve a production volume over 40% 
higher than it would otherwise have been. 
21
. Article 3 (f) of the Treaty of Rome has been referred to as "the institution of 
a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted." 
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already in Chapter 2. 
Due to the existence of artificial barriers, there were price dif-
ferences which stopped the natural process of arbitration between member 
state markets. Other studies carried out in Britain and France, which were 
mentioned in Owen's book, show that the losses in efficiency were linked 
to monopoly power in certain industries. 
In Nicholas Owen's view there were also benefits in terms of 
induced efficiency gains among the surviving producers in the importing 
country since "imports from low-cost producers inject a formidable dose 
of competition to which all domestic producers need to respond in order to 
ensure that they will not be the next to succumb" (Nicolas Owen p. 147). 
3.3 Economic Integration and the Division of Labour in the EC 
The division of labour was the starting principle for the EC 
economic integration. The real inspiration for the European Coal and Steel 
Community was the desire to bring about a rapprochement between the two 
economies: France and Germany. Apart from the political driving force, 
the European Coal and Steel Community, one of the entities of the EC, 
was founded for the purpose of establishing conditions "which will in them-
selves assure the most rational distribution of production at the highest 
possible level of productivity." More precisely this means that the ECSC 
was established on the basis of comparative advantage to divert the coal 
production from low labour productivity mines in Belgium and France. The 
high productivity in German mines would raise the average productivity of 
coal miners in the Community as a whole and thus yield a gain. The com-
parative advantage of productivity in West Germany resulted mainly from 
the relative abundance of skilled labour in Germany, generated by its excel-
lent technical education system. 
There are also other examples of specialization in the EC commu-
nity. "Italian producers have substantially improved their relative position 
at almost all levels of the textile and clothing sector. In textiles, capacity 
was reduced primarily in France and the United Kingdom, whereas the 
largest capacity reduction in the clothing industry took place in Germany. 
In terms of intra-EC export specialization, the leading position is held by 
Italy in the clothing sector and by Germany in textiles."22 
According to the report of the Commission of the European 
Community, the Federal Republic of Germany is "achieving better and 
better specialization", the Netherlands "have a considerable involvement in 
M
. All these examples were mentioned in Economics of 1992 p.225. 
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growth products" and in Belgium and Luxembourg "a remarkable 
development is under way in the agro-chemical family of industries."23 
The programme for the completion of the internal market by 1992 
is now under way. As we have already seen, what is on offer will be much 
more significant in terms of competition, economies of scale and division 
of labour: 
- there will be improved efficiency within companies because the 
removal of barriers and freer competition will enable prices to 
move downward nearer to production costs under the competitive 
pressure; 
- there will be a reduction in costs due to economies of scale in 
production and business organization; 
- as the real comparative advantages play the determining role in 
market success, there will be new patterns of competition between 
entire industries and reallocation of resources. 
The benefits of a Common European Market have not only become 
a well-established fact but also have promising prospects. 
23
. See Industrial Specialization in Twelve European Countries before and after 
1973 Official Publications of the European Communities. Luxembourg 1980 EUR 
6920 P.V. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOME LESSONS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
So far we have examined EC economic integration as a systemic 
model: both the institutional and the constitutional aspects of the EC, gains 
from improved competition, the division of labour and economies of scale. 
The present chapter has the modest aim as to sum up some functional 
principles which turned out to be effective in the process of European 
integration. 
4.1 Spiral Progress 
Spiral progress here implies that the process of integration goes 
ahead step by step. The history of European economic integration shows 
that Rome was not built in a day. It was and still is by no means an easy 
job for several economies to coordinate their tough national interests. Small 
steps are necessary. Sometimes even "two steps forward, one step back" 
is unavoidable. 
If we look into the process of the EC integration, the principle of 
spiral progress may be found at different levels. 
The integration scheme in Western Europe as a whole has experi-
enced a process from sectoral to comprehensive. At the outset of this part, 
the survey of the growth of the European Community told us that European 
integration took off with the ECSC which was a sectoral integration. The 
initial success of the ECSC impressed the member countries so much that 
in June 1955, a new attempt at integration was made. The foreign ministers 
of the six ECSC countries met at Messina. A document was prepared, 
suggesting that further integration might be pursued through general 
integration and the creation of organizations for transport and the peaceful 
development of atomic energy. This became the whole of the European 
Community, a story of spiral progress. 
The integration in the trade sphere itself has also experienced spiral 
progress. When the Community started in 1958, its member states sold 
34% of their total exports to the other member states. The ratio had risen 
to 52% by 1976 and 52.4% by 1983. On the import side, the ratio had 
risen from 34% to 48% by 1976 and 50.5% by 1983. It was not surprising 
therefore that EEC member states, disregarding the conflicts and disputes 
among them, moved one step further to have monetary integration to shel-
ter the intra-Community trade from monetary disturbance. 
The superstructure of the three Communities also reflects the spiral 
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principle in the establishment of rules or in time for the pursuit of the goal. 
At the outset of the Community, instead of relinquishing all sovereignty 
overnight member states were asked to merely abandon the dogma of their 
indivisibility, i.e. to cede some of their national identity to the identity of 
the Community as a whole. The first step for the creation of the Common 
Market was to eliminate all the custom duties levied on imports and exports 
between the member states before the birth of the EEC. For the gradual 
dismantling of these internal duties the EEC Treaty laid down a fixed time-
table of 12 years - quite a long time to allow for adjustment. The 
Constitution of the EC provided reasonably detailed rules for the initial 
period of creating the Common Market yet left the subsequent problems as 
well as formation of some positive policies to be decided later. 
In the case of monetary integration, it is even more obvious that it 
evolved in a spiral way. 
The designers of the European Monetary System (EMS) must have 
learned well from past experience. The three main elements of the EMS 
have derived from its predecessors: First of all, the EMS on the whole was 
born on the "snake" exchange rate arrangement. When the original "snake" 
exchange rate system was broken down, as Italy, Denmark and the U.K 
were unable to keep parity with Germany, the new exchange rate 
mechanism came into being. Then the European Currency Unit (ECU) took 
the place of the European Unit of Account, which was introduced in the 
early 1960s to facilitate transactions within the EEC. As a means of 
settlement and exchange, the ECU is more advanced than the EUA. 
Thirdly, the European Monetary Co-operative Fund, which began opera-
tions in April 1973 was fundamentally reformed when each member 
offered 20% of its foreign exchange reserves and gold. As was proposed, 
the European Monetary Cooperative Fund will evolve into a European 
Monetary Fund (EMF) and ultimately into a regional Central Bank, though 
the real EMF has not yet taken shape for various reasons. The re-establish-
ment of the old system means a step further towards the ultimate goal. This 
is the way of integration and what we mean by "spiral progress". 
4.2 Joint Responsibility - Pooling of Effort 
European integration is firmly based on a concept of joint effort 
which allows for common action to perform common tasks, and which tries 
to find solutions to common problems. Moreover, integration is, in es-
sence, a pooling system, which implies that claims and compromises are 
usual. The major compromise in 1966, "the Luxembourg compromise" as 
it has been called, was an important event in the evolution of the EC. De 
Gaulle agreed that France should remain in the Community if she could be 
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compensated in the agricultural sector for what she expected to lose in 
industrial competition with Germany.24 As a matter of fact, integration 
needs a "package deal approach", involving a lot of "give and take". Joint 
responsibility is therefore a constant principle of integration. 
Joint responsibility is necessary, first of all, for common economic 
prosperity. In a Common Market there are underdeveloped areas where aid 
is needed for the improvement of infrastructure and for industrial develop-
ment. Such underdeveloped regions are likely to have structural deficits in 
their balances of payments when they are experiencing economic growth. 
In such a case, aid provided jointly to such regions in a common market 
will make a large contribution to solving problems of balance of payment. 
For integration to progress it is advisable to have some way of 
avoiding that some members will benefit too much from the integration 
scheme and others too little. For that purpose a regional policy has been 
established in the case of European integration. The regional policy 
empowers the Community to finance half of the cost of unemployment pay 
and of retraining for workers made redundant because of the establishment 
of the Common Market. At this point both the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund and the European Social Fund are worth mentioning here. 
The Regional Development Fund was established "to reduce the prin-
cipal regional imbalances within the Community by contributing to the 
development and structural adjustment of regions with a development lack 
and to the conversion of declining industrial regions." From 1985, all of 
the Regional Fund's resources are allocated on the basis of ranges of which 
the lower and upper limits are fixed for each member state. This Regional 
Fund also helps to finance Community programmes,25 and national pro-
grammes of Community interest The European Social Fund was esta-
blished to render the employment of workers easier and to increase their 
geographical and occupational mobility within the Community. The finan-
cial instruments mentioned so far are actually compensation or redistri-
bution measures for structural changes induced by economic integration. 
Behind them is the idea of sharing the responsibility for common develop-
ment. 
24
. The French found themselves in a minority on the Council and adopted the 
policy of the "empty chair" from June 1965 The compromise has been imposed ever 
since. 
25
 Community programmes are defined as a series of consistent multi-annual 
measures directly serving Community objectives and the implement- tation of 
Community policies. 
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In the EMS, the principle of joint responsibility is also reflected. The 
exchange rate arrangement within the EMS is different from that of the 
"snake". When intervention is needed, both sides (the weak currency and 
the strong currency) are involved. If there are two currencies, one strong 
(the German mark), the other weak (the French franc), then, under the 
parity arrangement in the EMS, once they drift beyond the permitted EMS 
limits in relation to each other, both the French and the German authorities 
are obliged to buy or sell currencies on the market to correct the situation. 
The obligation is shared by both countries rather than being the responsi-
bility of one individual country. Such mechanisms safeguard weaker mem-
bers from having to shoulder the burden of adjustment alone. 
The pooling of foreign reserves is another example of the principle 
of joint responsibility. Not all the countries will suffer a deficit at the same 
time. Those who do suffer may be helped by those who do not. 
Looking to the future, we can see that the internal market in Western 
Europe will be completed by 1992 according to the "Single Act". The 
economically underdeveloped regions may well be hurt by competition 
from the most productive industrial centres in the Community and they will 
no longer be able to rely on tariff or non-tariff barriers and competitive 
devaluation to protect themselves. The way in which the Community will 
react to a volume commensurate with the unbalanced development is of 
significance to the further development of the EC. It has been emphasized 
that some schemes of economic integration fail merely because of lack of 
equitable distribution of the benefits which the integration schemes yield. 
Integration is therefore a game the rules of which are that some are 
sometimes losers while others are winners, but no one can be the loser or 
the winner all the time. 
4.3 Flexibility 
The principle of flexibility is self-evident. The European Community 
- first six, later ten and now twelve - consists of countries of different 
national interest, having different motives for integration and different 
historical and cultural backgrounds. If not flexible, the engine of the 
Community can break down at any minute. 
The European Monetary System (EMS) - the arrangement for 
monetary integration in the EEC - has been flexible in many of its technical 
aspects. The failure of the Bretton Woods System as well as the "snake" 
system has shown that fixity of exchange rates cannot be the result of 
wishful thinking nor be brought about by legislation. Disparities of member 
countries have to be expressed in exchange rates because inflation rates 
which influence the exchange rate depend on many factors (on the political 
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power of the government, on government policy preferences, on national 
trends in productivity etc.). These factors vary from country to country. 
Moreover, the social and political obstacles and structural economic dif-
ferences are not easy to overcome. Therefore what cannot be cured must 
be endured. As the Commission pointed out wisely in terms of exchange 
rates, "success must not be confused with the absence of changes in central 
rates." Therefore instead of being rigidly fixed, parity changes were 
allowed and have occurred several times. The system also grants wider 
fluctuation margins (6%) around central rates for the member states that 
did not participate in the snake in 1978 such as Italy. This flexible ar-
rangement has smoothed the transition process of Italy from an outsider to 
EMS membership. Furthermore, instead of including all EC members at 
the very beginning, the EMS allowed Great Britain to have something of 
a partial membership and until recently, the U.K only took part in the 
credit mechanism and not in the exchange-rate mechanism. The experience 
of the past monetary system reminded the designers of the danger of laying 
down unalterable rules. Like the Constitution of the EEC, the wording of 
the Central Bank Agreement left room for further improvement in one way 
or another, to allow the system to evolve gradually as experience is gained. 
In some important aspects, the Agreement just outlined the system "in prin-
ciple", leaving freer choice on the basis of mutual agreement to handle 
future new problems. 
The idea of a "Europe of Two Speeds" also reflects the principle of 
flexibility. Since some member countries have closer relations than others, 
it is advisable to let some of the members move further in the integration 
scheme. All these flexible arrangements are important for the EC 
integration to progress and to be successful. The principle of flexibility will 
remain important when more countries join the EC integration scheme. 
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PART 2 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CHINA 

CHAPTERS 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CHINA: THE CONCEPTUAL 
BACKGROUND 
We have so far established the analytical framework of economic 
integration and have also described the process of economic integration in 
Western Europe. We will now focus on the issue of economic integration 
in China. 
5.1 China: The Hierarchy of the Economic System 
To many, at home or abroad, China is an integrated economy. The 
reasoning behind it is that China is a centrally planned economy with one 
central government and one currency in circulation, which is true. Eco-
nomic integration, however, should be carefully distinguished from "cen-
tralization". Centralization usually "pertains to the allocation of decision-
making authority or of command over information - not to the pattern of 
economic activity itself. In general, there is no necessary relationship 
between centralization and integration; a market economy is highly decen-
tralized, but this decentralization does not imply that a market economy is 
not integrated" (Lyons 1989). We can say it the other way round: a unified 
planned economy does not necessarily imply that the economy is 
integrated.26 
Given the fact that there are barriers to the mobility of goods and 
that there is a lack of economic cooperation and specialization, the national 
market of China is not an integrated market even though China is 
politically an integrated entity. We have already explained this, to some 
extent, in the Introduction. The administrative frontiers are, at the very 
least, economic frontiers which fragment the national market. The whole 
country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. 
Provinces and autonomous regions are further divided into autonomous 
prefectures, counties, autonomous counties and cities, and counties are 
divided into towns and townships. The following figure shows this 
hierarchy. 
26
.The concept is controversial even among the Chinese scholars: Wu Beilin, 
professor in Fudan University said that in an individual country, production factors 
can move freely. Thus it is not appropriate to use the term "integration" in a national 
context. See Research Papers on the Shanghai Economic Zone. Vol.3. 
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Table 5.1 The Regional Administrative Hierarchy in the People's Republic 
of China 
(Large administrative regions: formally m existence, 1949-54 and 1958-67) 
Provinces Autonomous Regions H u m c i p e l l t y 
1 1 
D i s t r i c t s 
(diqu) 
Autonomous D i s t r i c t s C i t i es 
Counties 
(xian) 
Autonomous 
Counties 
Hetropolitan 
Districts 
[Comiunes 1958-81] 
Villages 
Cxieng) 
Townships 
(zhen) 
For example, when it is difficult for infant consumer-goods industries 
to compete with the brand-name bicycles, watches, and televisions from 
major cities like Shanghai, the provincial authorities establish a local block-
ade or plead for official protection from the central government. In the 
early 1980s Anhui province even objected to an exhibition of Shanghai 
products held in Anhui province for the reason that Anhui was producing 
some of the products in its local factories. 
The sectoral planning hierarchy also fragments the market. All sec-
tors within the economy are organized into vertical national bureaucracies, 
headed by ministries located in Beijing. The ministers, representing the 
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interests of the ministries, have some decision-making power concerning 
the economic activities in the respective ministries. The importance of 
provincial boundaries as barriers depends on the relative importance of the 
provinces versus the ministries. For a long time China has such an 
administrative and sectoral planning hierarchy - the "dual leadership" 
system. A bicycle factory in Shanghai may be under the dual leadership of 
the municipal government and the light industry to which the factory 
belongs. Therefore there are both "territorial" and "sectoral" barriers which 
makes the movement of commodities and production factors difficult. Such 
a sectoral planning system cuts off the natural "horizontal links" and 
retards the free movement of products and factors of production. The 
economic activities are thus regulated according to the principle of ad-
ministrative and sectoral planning hierarchy, which is not necessarily 
consistent with the logic of economic activities. 
An important and distinctive feature of the Chinese economic system 
is this parallel hierarchy along sectoral and administrative (geographical) 
lines: both administrative and geographical criteria have been used to de-
fine economic units assigned to the various planning offices. As was 
mentioned earlier, "ministries" and "provinces" are expressions which are 
suggestive of a hierarchy in which the sectoral planning and the geogra-
phical planning offices are organizationally equivalent. Hence the ties along 
the sectoral line are described as vertical, whereas those along the 
geographical (administrative) line horizontal. 
In such a parallel hierarchy, below the central level are both mini-
stries and provincial planning authorities. Ministries are responsible for 
economic units defined primarily along sectoral lines, and provincial 
planning authorities allocate their agents among subdivisions. Primarily 
central industrial bureaus are responsible to ministries and provincial 
industrial bureaus and local planning offices are responsible to a provincial 
authority. Similarly, these subdivisions again are responsible for lower 
level units which are either sectorally or geographically defined. In the 
Chinese economy we have such terms as "kuai" and "tiao", with the 
former referring to the relationship between provinces and the latter 
referring to the relationship between ministries. Many enterprises are under 
the "dual leadership" of the provincial government and of the related 
ministry. A bicycle factory in Shanghai is, as was mentioned earlier, under 
the control of both the municipal government and the Ministry of Light 
Industry. 
As Thomas P. Lyons mentioned, this devolution process results in 
a finer partition of the hierarchy with each agent assigned directly to one 
planning office (which may be on any tier). The Chinese economy is thus 
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divided into two parts: central and non-central. The non-central part, like 
the central part, has decision-making power in terms of investment and 
production. This leads to the duplication which is so extensive in China. 
As far as the economic planning system is concerned, "central" and "non-
central" are basically defined along this parallel hierarchy: Agents in 
ministerial units are "central", and all others are "non-central". Among the 
non-central agents, those not assigned to local planning offices are 
"provincial", all others are "local". In such a hierarchical framework, 
provinces have been key spatial as well as political units for implementing 
(or to interpreting) state economic policy. 
Both the administrative (provincial) and the sectoral planning 
hierarchy have fragmented the market. "The Chinese superimpose this 
hierarchical model on a contrasting cellular model of separate, virtually 
self-contained industrial systems, in which centrally planned enterprises 
supply mainly other centrally planned enterprises, and municipal and other 
enterprises tend to relate in the same way at their respective levels. The 
Chinese system is thus an amalgam of the hierarchical and cellular planning 
models, supplemented, additionally, by markets" (World Bank, 1988, 
p.68). 
This cellular nature has been noticed to be the unique feature of the 
Chinese economy and it has minimized the necessary horizontal ties. As 
one foreign article commented correctly: 
"Before China's economic open door policy 
was adopted, the government was vertically orga-
nized, with almost no horizontal liaison. Each ad-
ministrative hierarchy of government formed its 
own world, almost completely exclusive of others 
and the whole was suffering from a sort of bu-
reaucratic atherosclerosis. There was little co-op-
eration among provinces or businesses and pro-
blems involving mutual interests were left unre-
solved for years."27 
Two characteristics can be distinguished under such a planning 
system. First of all, centrally controlled resources can be moved readily to 
centrally-owned plants in other major cities. For example, the centrally 
controlled Shanxi coal can be moved readily to plants in Beijing, Tianjin 
etc., which need coal as a raw material. Factor movement of such kind is 
27
. Special report of China Newsletter Nov.- Dec. 1987. 
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possible only under the condition that the central government wants it to 
happen, or at least allows it to happen. 
Secondly, each administrative entity - especially the provincial one -
is economically so independent that it is natural for them to argue for 
greater autonomy. This tendency has been reinforced by the locality's self-
sufficiency policy pursued in the past. Such a tendency encourages autarky, 
which leads to economic inefficiency for the country as a whole. 
Begun in the late 1970s, the economic reforms, especially the urban 
reforms, intended to at least weaken the vertical structure of this economic 
planning system. Some reform measures intended to reduce the rigidity of 
the planning process, which treated provinces as more or less sealed boxes 
acting as local components of the plan. In fact, there was little chance 
before reforms for cooperation between enterprises on different sides of a 
provincial border. They are now, after the reforms, permitted to find their 
own suppliers of raw materials and to sell at least part of their own output. 
This should have increased efficiency by encouraging spatial concentration 
and more competition. The situation seemed to change. The reform 
measures in general have brought more freedom for economic activities. 
But, as we will see later, the provinces have seized on their greater 
autonomy to build up their own power in various ways. 
5.2 China: A Fragmented Market 
The cellular nature of the Chinese economy described above 
naturally leads to various barriers which in turn fragment the national 
market. 
Table 5.2 Comparison of Barriers to Commodity Mobility in the EC and 
China 
Barriers 
technical standards 
administrative barriers 
frontier formalities 
freight transport barriers 
value-added tax differences 
capital markets control 
procurement restriction 
market-entry restrictions 
market-distorting practices 
EC 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
China 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
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We have already seen that there are various kind of barriers among 
countries as in the case of EC and tariffs is the most common one. There 
are also other barriers like different kind of restrictions, frontiers 
formalities, transportation barriers, tax differences, technical standards etc. 
It is interesting to notice that the barriers inside a country are 
sometimes similar to those among countries. In the survey undertaken for 
the present study, a rough comparison of trade barriers in the EC and in 
China was made and the results of the survey were presented in Table 5.2. 
The table is an effort to point out that the barriers existing in the national 
market of China are very similar to those in the EC. This comparison is 
based on the practice in the EC. 
In China, the barriers to trade can take different forms. Market-entry 
restriction is one of them. To restrict the establishment of agencies to 
handle commercial activities from other provinces is one kind of such 
barriers. Shanghai is an example. For quite a long time one province had 
been allowed to set up only one such agency in Shanghai although this 
regulation was to be changed later.28 In some municipalities and counties 
in Jilin, Liaoning, Hubei, Henan provinces, beer, wine, washing-powder 
(detergent) bicycles and colour TVs produced in other provinces were not 
allowed to enter local markets. One province in the southwest China 
reportedly announced a list of nineteen local products in November 1989 
to be protected. Purchase of these products from other provinces was 
restricted. Xinjiang was the most noteworthy of other provinces which 
followed the example and the list of protected products amounted to as 
many as forty-eight. 
Theoretically there are no tariff barriers within an individual country, 
but to make the price of products from other provinces uncompetitive is 
actually a kind of tariff. For some light industry products over which the 
government has less control such a barrier is more obvious. In some 
extreme cases, a "tax" can be levied on the products being "exported" to 
other provinces. Xinjiang, for example, placed a levy of 30 yuan per ton 
on "exported" raw wool.29 This also applied to relation between the 
counties and other administrative units within a province or region. 
. By the end of 1986, seventy-eight agencies had been established by provinces 
outside of Shanghai and 112 agencies had been established by other large and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
29
. More interesting examples were given in the article written by Beijing 
Agricultural College Research Group: "An Exploration of the Reform and the 
Improvement of China's System of Wool Circulation". 
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Direct administrative regulations to secure raw materials for local 
use are also very popular as barriers. Some local governments issue 
regulations to prohibit or to restrict some materials in local shortage from 
being exported to neighbouring provinces. The coal produced in Shanxi, 
the cotton produced in Xinjiang and Henan, the steel produced in Liaoning 
and the beans produced in Heilongjiang are all examples of raw materials 
under local protectionism. These provinces are reluctant to "export" these 
raw materials to other provinces unless the central government gives direct 
"orders". Some provinces even issued "licenses" for "exports" to avoid 
"smuggling". In some extreme cases, some local governments even sent 
police and the military to protect raw materials from export.30 A director 
of the Wuzhou Planning Committee of Zhejiang Province tried to stop 
Jiangsu buyers purchasing raw silk but he was beaten.31 In 1985 
Guangdong province signed a contract with Henan province, assisting the 
latter in exploring coal in Henan province. Henan province was to export 
coal in return. In 1988, however, Henan province claimed that the coal 
exported should be paid for at the negotiable price,32which was higher 
than the price mutually agreed upon. A report from Inner Mongolia in 
early 1988 quotes the leaders of a "banner"33 as telling the authorities 
from an Inner Mongolia city that they were determined not to sell their 
cashmere wool and would hold onto it for local processing: "Unless you 
sack us, you can't have it!"34 The first secretary of Zhejiang province 
reportedly blocked shipments to Shanghai on the grounds that "Zhejiang is 
not a colony of Shanghai."35 
. About such local protection practices, there were discussions in Hong 
Kong magazines, e.g. Contemporary in Hong Kong (September 1990), and 
Outlook (No.4, 1988). 
31
. The North-South Pole magazine published in Hong Kong has an article 
describing such phenomenon and claimed that this is the rivalry between 
provincial governments and such rivalry is a burden to the central government 
orto "Deng". 
32
. Ibid. 
33
. "Banner" is an administrative unit in Inner Mongolia which is equivalent 
to a "county". 
34
. This paragraph was quoted from The China Quarterly June 1989 p.235. 
35
. See Economic Integralion and Planning in Maoist China by Thomas P. 
Lyons p.235. 
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Market-distorting practices are also numerous. Changzhou, for 
example, produces good quality tractors. But some provinces will not allow 
Changzhou tractors to be registered and refuse to give gasoline for the trac­
tors because there is usually a rationing system for gasoline in China. 
Local peasants have to buy high price, low quality tractors which are 
locally produced. The bikes produced in Shanghai are of better quality but 
they are sold in other provinces on condition that the consumer buys other 
inferior quality products produced locally. 
Other local protectionist practices include priority for electricity 
supply and different quality criteria for products produced by other 
provinces. A very interesting case was quoted to show how the 
"administrative barriers" or the "frontiers formalities" retards the mobility 
of goods: 
"A member of a self-employed household -
in Sichuan who was asked to buy lumber for his 
township's mechanized brickyard. It took him 
fifty-four days and 1453 yuan for seven permits 
to transport thirteen cubic meters of used building 
materials, which he bought for 3300 yuan, a mere 
sixty kilometers"(World Bank, 1985, p.86). 
One relevant fact is that after the local budget contracting, which we 
will discuss in detail in Part 3, local governments in all areas began to 
invest in industries which increase the financial gains from processing local 
raw materials. They try to restrict the flow of those materials to other 
regions. 
In fact, the provincial authority itself is an agency of the provincial 
rather than national government. The provinces individually formulate 
policies and interpret policy instructions from the central level. Such a 
provincial dimension of the planning system reinforces the local incentives 
to pursue import-substitution strategies. "The behaviour of provincial levels 
frequently seems to reflect a regionalist perspective" (Thomas P.Lyons, 
p.235). Tao Zhu, who was Party secretary of Guangdong province, had 
reportedly said, "We must insist... that in future Guangdong's grain must 
fully supply this province, and only then can it be exported." Li 
Jingchuan, who was the first secretary of Sichuan province in the Cultural 
Revolution, said that he refused to transport Sichuan's food surplus to other 
provinces.36 
Э6
. This example was quoted in Thomas Lyons book, p.235. 
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The conclusion from the World Bank report is consistent with our 
foregoing analysis: 
"Both the hierarchical and cellular models 
have an inherent tendency toward autarky. In the 
hierarchical, centrally planned system, ministries 
strive individually for self-sufficiency; in the 
cellular system, each geographical planning unit 
tries to be self-contained. Ministrai autarky, or 
departmentalism, is a feature of most socialist 
economies, but the additional feature of 
regionalism appears to be a distinctively Chinese 
characteristic "(World Bank, 1988, p.68). 
5.3 The Spatial Aspect of Economic Integration 
Since the hypothesis that China is not economically integrated is 
very important for the present study, it is worth testing carefully, and Part 
3 will focus on that. Assuming that the argument is valid, then to integrate 
region by region would appear to be the most feasible way to change the 
situation. We will then naturally arrive at the conclusion that China should 
be divided into regions and integrated at the regional level. The discussion 
of China's economic integration is therefore first of all one of regionalizing 
the economy, i.e. subdividing the economy into geographical regions. 
The necessity for China to subdivide into geographical (economic) 
regions can be explained by the diversity in natural resources and in human 
(individual and social) conditions. Some Chinese geographers suggest two 
kinds of zoning at macro-level to analyze the spatial structure of China:37 
As for the natural environment, China could be divided into four regions. 
But on the basis of economic development levels and production type, 
China could be divided into three regions, or three geographical belts. 
Natural Environment and Human Conditions 
In the natural environment the climate can be a good way to see 
diversity. In fact there are five major climate zones - tropical, subtropical, 
warm-temperate, temperate and frigid-temperate. 
The endowment of natural resources also varies from province to 
province. Some are endowed with natural waterways, others not. In some 
provinces there are coal reserves or iron ores, in others not. Some are 
situated along the coast, others are landlocked. In terms of economic 
37
. See Yang Wuyuang and Liang Jinshe's article.p.98. 
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9999development some provinces have already well-developed industries, 
in other provinces, agriculture is predominant. There is also diversity in 
other aspects: in the density of population, in the availability of skilled 
labour, in the level of education, etc. Even the variation of language is 
impressive: people can find many closely related but mutually unintelligible 
dialects within the Chinese language group and each of these has a regional 
focus. All these factors directly or indirectly bring about differences in 
economic performance and hence in the patterns of economic activities. 
As was mentioned earlier, according to its natural endowment, China 
could be divided into four major areas: the South, the East, the Northwest 
and the Qing-Tibet Plateau. The East part is well-endowed with coal, oil 
etc. The South part has well-developed agriculture, water resources and 
minerals. The Northwest is characterized by agricultural and animal 
husbandry and the Qing-Tibet Plateau is basically a plateau area as the 
name implies. 
In his book Thomas P. Lyons has mentionedthe environmental 
factors of China: 
"Size and diversity are among the most 
important aspects of China's natural endowment. 
In terms of land area, China is the world's third 
largest country, extending more than 5000 kilo-
metres from east to west and more than 5500 
kilometres from north to south. Wide regional 
variations in industrial and agricultural potential 
occur within this vast territory. About 85 percent 
of China's coal reserves, for example, are located 
in the northern half of the country, with 60 
percent in Shanxi alone ... Iron, like coal, is 
more plentiful in the northern half of China, with 
one quarter of the country's reserves located in 
Liaomng. On the other hand, deposits of lead, 
zinc, manganese, copper, tungsten, and tin are 
concentrated south of the Yangtze River... Whe-
reas much of the north experiences an average 
frost-free period of less than 200 days and an 
average annual rainfall of less than 50 
centimetres, areas of the south are frost-free year-
round and receive more than 200 centimetres. 
Whereas the eastern half of China includes well-
watered lowlands and hills, the west is predomi-
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nantly a section of rugged uplands and arid or 
semiarid basins"(1988,p.23). 
Level of Economic Development 
Apart from natural environment and human conditions, the economic 
performance and the level of development vary greatly from area to area 
for some historical reasons: the coastal area is the most developed part of 
China and the level of development becomes lower in the west inland part. 
Therefore in terms of development level and production pattern, China can 
be divided into three basic geographical belts, namely, the western, 
intermediate (central) and eastern (coastal) belts. Such an overall situation 
is similar to that of the former Soviet Union where the most developed part 
is the west part and the development level becomes lower in the east part. 
In the case of the United States, the most developed part is in the northeast 
along the Atlantic Ocean. 
Table 5.3 Comparison of the Value of Production in Industry and 
Agriculture in China's Geographical Belts (1985) 
Region 
Coastal 
Central 
Western 
Total 
Source: 
Value of Industrial Output 
billions of yuan % 
56.64 
24.57 
11.34 
92.55 
Based on Beijing 
61.2% 
26.5% 
12.3% 
100.0% 
Rçvjçw 29, 
Value of Agricultural Output 
billions of yuan % 
12.62 
10.63 
5.87 
29.12 
49:8 December 1986. 
43.3% 
36.6% 
2.2% 
100.0% 
Table 5.3 gave a brief view of the differences of the three geo-
graphic belts, or three macro-regions as some foreign scholars have called 
them." 
The division of China into three geographical belts is only a very 
rough one, given their high degree of internal differentiation. But for the 
sake of simplification, such division is perhaps helpful and this division is 
3i
. Terry Cannon, for example, has called the three geographic belts as 
macro-regions in his paper Regions:spatial inequality and regional policy. 
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also relevant when referring to China's economic development plan The 
Seventh Five-Year Plan has used such division for analyzing the develop­
ment strategy 
The three-belt division is actually the result of historical develop­
ment. Before 1949 the Chinese economy was marked by a concentration 
of modem industry in a few industrial centres mostly in the coastal areas 
This was first of all because of the greater accessibility of the eastern 
provinces to the sea and the general east-west flow of the navigable rivers 
Such concentration was also due to the fact that foreign entrepreneurs and 
their Chinese counterparts had established various businesses in the coastal 
area after the Opium War These industrial centres included such large 
cities as Shanghai, Tianjm, Qingdao, most of which were ex-treaty ports 
and a few inland river ports and cities 
An industrial survey published in 1948 showed that the three major 
industrial centres, namely, Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao accounted for 
around 4/5 of the industry of the country as a whole 
Table 5 4 Industrial Share of Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao in 1948 
Motive Power Employment No of 
Factories 
Shanghai 57 7% 60 9% 60 4% 
Tjanjm 16 8% 9 9% 9 4% 
Qingdao 27 4% 4 7% 1 4% 
Source: Based on Yuan Li Wu The Spatial Economy of Communist 
China ρ 9 Hoover Institution Publication, 1960 
In the Northeast provinces, industrial development concentrated on 
raw material resources such as iron and coal and heavy industry, a result 
of Russian and Japanese colonization in that area In fact, the northeast 
provinces had a fairly well-developed transportation network together with 
the industrial development 
Developments in the first Five-Year Plan and later dispersed a 
significant amount of industrial capacity Of nearly 700 large-and medium-
scale projects of the First Five Year Plan, two-thirds were set up in the 
interior. After the first Five Year Plan, policy measures continued to 
stimulate a greater spread of economic activity through the country (Terry 
Cannon, 1990) Regional specialization on the basis of economic 
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consideration was not emphasized. 
This analysis of the environmental factors, both natural and 
economic, lends credence to the claim that China should have economic-
geographical subdivisions other than the administrative divisions. 
In fact the Chinese authorities must have been aware of the necessity 
of having economic subdivisions because there have been various efforts 
towards regionalization in the history of the People's Republic. The follow-
ing section will give a brief review of the earlier efforts at regionalization 
in China. 
5.4 Earlier Efforts towards Regionalization 
The efforts for regionalization can be traced back to the early 1950s. 
There were, for example, six administrative regions into which the 
People's Republic of China was initially divided. These regions were 
loosely based on the military division pattern. But the division of most 
interest to the present study is the division into the Seven Cooperative 
Areas, which was the first real effort towards regionalization. 
In 1949 the central administration of China was established with the 
independence of the People's Republic. In accordance with the Guidance 
of the Political Consultation Conference, both central and local government 
implemented democratic reforms to the Chinese economy. The government 
established a centralized system of managing the national economy and 
completed land reform. They started to co-ordinate the existing secondary 
and tertiary sectors, and carried out a general financial reform to rational-
ize the national fiscal system. By 1952, the rehabilitation of the national 
economy (from the civil war) was completed and the Chinese economy 
entered the era of socialist industrialization. In August 1953, Mao Zedong 
proposed the "General Line of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
Transition Period", and defined it as the industrialization of the national 
economy and the realization of the socialist reform. The most distinctive 
feature of the state mechanism defined in the Constitution at that time was 
the centralized authority of the government, although indispensable to a 
planned economy, it inevitably came to have defects stemming from the 
over-enlargement of the centralized power of the central government. In 
1955 the Communist party therefore announced three stipulations for the 
solution of this problem through the motivation of both the central and 
local government, and through the democratization of state control and 
management. For example, provinces and cities were granted the right to 
supervise and manage enterprises, and local government was allowed to 
keep 20 percent of profits made by the enterprises. Prior to this 
announcement, Mao made a speech entitled "On the Ten Major Relation-
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ships", in which strong emphasis was given to the autonomy of the local 
government and relations between the local areas. On the same line, Chen 
Yun, then the vice Chairman of the Party Committee and a senior leader 
in charge of economic affairs spoke of the Seven Cooperative Areas needed 
for the building up of a "well-balanced but independent" industrial system. 
The concept of the Seven Areas stemmed from the fact that China 
has a large territory and huge population, together with the dispersion of 
basic industries achieved by the first Five-Year Plan. 
The Seven Economic Cooperative Areas were the following: 
Northeast: Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang 
provinces; 
North: Hebei province, Shanxi province, 
Inner-Mongolia and Beijing; 
East: Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Jiangxi provinces and 
Shanghai; 
Middle: Henan, Hubei and Hunan provinces; 
South: Guangdong and Guangxi provinces; 
Southwest: Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces 
and Tibet; 
Northwest: Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai 
provinces and Xinjiang. 
The establishment of the Seven Cooperative Areas was therefore 
intended to motivate local government and to stimulate well-balanced 
development. It was also a reflection of the peoples' will to overcome the 
problem of poverty and backwardness. The Cultural Revolution, however, 
deterred the development of the co-operative areas. The idea was raised 
again in 1975 when Zhou Enlai, the then prime minister, clarified the idea 
of the two-step strategy for national development which had already been 
proposed by Mao Zedong in 1964. At one meeting discussing the National 
Development Plan, Yu Qiuli, chairman of the Planning Commission at that 
time and the official for economic development, said, "we should establish 
from 1976 to 1985 an independent but relatively balanced system of 
national economy and thereafter, based on this achievement, establish the 
Six Cooperative Areas, each of which is independent but competing and 
well-balanced as well." 
The division into the Six Cooperative Areas was mainly a modifica-
tion of the original seven Cooperative Areas, with the South China area 
merged into the Middle China area and hence re-named as Middle-South 
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Area. It was expected that the Six Areas scheme was to be implemented 
after the completion of the adjustment of the national economy. 
In 1977, Hua Guofong, the party chairman at that time, emphasized 
the importance of the motivation of both the central and local government 
for the successful socialist construction of the economy and the role of the 
Six Co-operative Areas. Based on his remark, the Outline of the Ten Year 
National Development Plan (1976-1985) was drafted which said that the 
Six-Area system should be implemented with the inland industrialization. 
5.5 Objectives of the Economic Cooperative Areas 
Historically, the Six Cooperative Areas have their origin in the Six 
Administrative Areas which were established with the birth of the People's 
Republic. For the further promotion of the revolution and building up the 
socialist national economy, the concept of the Six Administrative Areas 
was revived. The concept of the Seven Cooperative Areas was primarily 
intended to merely implement due industrial location in the Mainland. To 
reduce the disparity between the rural and urban areas of China, agrarian 
development initiated by the lower level of the administrative unit such as 
city and county was expected to play a significant role. Moreover, the 
cooperative relations among the areas were deemed important. The Six 
Areas should play an important role in coordinating co-operative relations 
among the lower (than central) level units of administration. From the point 
of view of industrial location, cooperation between the Areas was crucial, 
especially for an appropriate supply of energy. Political consideration such 
as the prosperity of ethnic minorities and the inland development for 
defensive reasons was also reflected in the idea of the Six Areas. Finally, 
the complementarity between the development at the national level and at 
the regional level should be noted. In this regard, too, the government's 
fundamental policy of motivating both the central and local initiative was 
considered extremely important in the concept of the Six Areas strategy. 
Neither the Seven Area Strategy nor the Six Area Strategy, however, have 
contributed much the economic development. There were various reasons, 
an important one being that these areas were established by administrative 
order and the partners did not show much interest in the cooperation 
schedule. As a result, the Six-Area scheme turned out to promote more 
administrative restrictions, because between the central and provincial level 
there was now an extra administrative level - the area administration. 
As a matter of fact, economic activities have their own logic. When 
economic zones are to be established, several important factors should be 
taken into consideration: the economic performance and the development 
level; the historical economic relations; the boundaries of economic zones 
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and their relevance to administrative boundaries etc. There are controver-
sial views on these issues which are not essential to the present study. They 
are mentioned here only to show that it is by no means easy to attempt 
economic subdivision. 
62 
CHAPTER б 
ECONOMIC ZONE: HORIZONTAL ECONOMIC TIES 
Our previous review shows that China's first zones set up in 1958 
and after did not give primary consideration to economic rationality. In 
fact, the course which China has taken since 1949 has been a continuous 
alternation between centralization and decentralization. In essence, the 
establishment of China's first zones reflected such a cyclical movement of 
changing authority to manage goods, money and people. These zones were 
basically nothing more than administrative entities for the convenience of 
the central and provincial governments for planning purposes rather than 
for the market - they were a kind of grouping of provinces. 
6.1 New Ideas about Economic Zones - A Repetition of History ? 
As late as 1978 when the historical third plenum of the 11th Party 
Central Committee approved the economic reform in China, no mention of 
economic zones was made. It was in 1979, when several Japanese econo­
mists visited China, that the idea of an economic zone was again brought 
to the attention. These Japanese economists suggested that there should be 
economic subdivisions in China other than the administrative subdivisions 
(provinces). They argued that because of the size of the country's territory 
and population, the economic performance of different regions within 
China varies considerably so that it would be easier and more efficient for 
the purpose of national management if there were economic zones. 
One article in a Japanese magazine mentioned the birth of the Shang­
hai Economic'Zone as follows: 
"The idea for the Shanghai Economic Zone 
had apparently long been brewing in China, but 
what finally led to its realization was a report by 
a Japanese mission sent to study the Shanghai 
economic region upon the request of the Chinese 
side. The conclusion of the report, dated March 
1982, was that Shanghai, with its limited facilities 
and overcrowding, had to be developed not in the 
urban regions but in a wider area including the 
suburbs and at least parts of the surrounding 
provinces. China's response was quick. With the 
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State Council's formal approval, the Shanghai 
Economic Zone was established at the end of 
1982. "39 
It seemed that whatever the cause, the issue of economic subdivision 
had been raised again. In fact, at the macro-level a proposal was mapped 
out for China's new economic regionalization.40 According to that propo-
sal, China was to be divided into ten economic zones. The following is the 
proposal of the ten economic subdivisions (Map 1): 
Table 6.1 Preliminary Plan for Regionalization,1982 
Name of the Zone Provinces included 
Northwest: 
Jing-jing: 
Jin-Shuan: 
Shangdong: 
Shanghai: 
Middle-south: 
Sichuan: 
Southeast: 
Southwest: 
Northwest: 
Liaoning.Jilin, Heilongjiang and part of Inner 
Mongolia; 
Beijing, Tianjing, Hebei and part of Inner Mon-
golia; 
Shanxi, Shuanxi and part of Inner Mongolia; 
Shangdong; 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi; 
Henan, Hubei and Hunan; 
Sichuan; 
Fujiang, Guangdong and Taiwan; 
Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou; 
Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet and 
part of Inner Mongolia 
Source: Yang and Liang A New Preliminary Plan of China's 
Economic Regionalization for Development Strategy p. 105. 
39
. Special Report by the JETRO Shanghai Office. See China Newsletter 
No.71. 
40
. Yang Wuyang and Liang Jinshe have given a detailed description in their 
article A New Preliminary Plan of China's Economic Regionalization for 
Development Strategy See "China's Economic Reforms" p.98. 
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Map 1. 
Preliminary Plan for China's 
Economic Regionalization 
We may notice from the table that each zone occupies a fair-sized 
area and population, but the natural resources, economic structure, deve-
lopment level and the strength of the energy base and the key (principal) 
city in the ten zones differ from one another. Moreover, administrative 
boundaries are not the most important considerations. Inner Mongolia, for 
example, belongs to several zones. 
While these economic zones have been proposed for further 
discussion, some economic zones were born in reality in the 1980s. To 
bypass administrative boundaries, twenty-four economic zones were in 
operation by 1988 (Map 2). These zones are in fact "inter-regional horizon-
tal economic networks", among which the Northeast China Economic Zone 
and the Shanghai Economic Zone are province-level economic zones. Other 
economic zones are inter-provincial zones of lower level authorities such 
as the Bohai Economic Zone (centred on Tianjin) and the Xuzhou 
Economic Zone. In the provincial and lower level economic zones, 
exchange of commodities (compensation trade in particular) between local 
authorities has been encouraged and agreements have been reached. 
Economic decisions are supposed to be gradually separated from adminis-
trative ones. Furthermore, these economic decisions are devolved 
increasingly to the enterprises themselves. 
What is interesting, therefore, is the question: are there any dif-
ferences between economic zones and economic cooperative areas? If the 
answer is "yes", then what are they? 
As Wang Lin, then the head of the Shanghai Economic Zone 
Planning Office, said: 
"The experience of co-operative areas 
reveals the fact that they are more of an adminis-
trative nature. As a result, major conflicts among 
provinces could not be resolved within the co-
operative areas while some minor conflicts could 
be resolved without the cooperative areas. The 
scheme turned out to be a failure.'"" 
The major efforts in the past had aimed at avoiding over-centraliza-
tion and at motivating local authorities. The economic zones were, how 
ever, inspired by other motives. 
41
. Wang Lin also mentioned the economic principle or the economic lever 
in coordinating the relation among provinces. See Preliminary Research on the 
Development Strategy of the Shanghai Economic Zone. 
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Map 2. 
Networks of Economic Zones Emerging 
in the 1980s 
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Let us now examine the Shanghai Economic Zone - the first 
economic zone in China - looking into the differences between economic 
zones and economic co-operative areas. 
6.2 The Shanghai Economic Zone: An Experiment in Economic 
Integration 
When the idea of economic zones resurfaced in the late 1970s, it was 
in a rather vague form. It was the State Council directive in July 1980 -
"Provisional Regulations on Promoting Economic Cooperation" - that 
spelled out the concept of economic zones.42 On December 22, 1982, the 
State Council issued a circular on the formation of a planning office for the 
Shanghai Economic Zone (Map 3). Originally the zone embraced Shanghai 
and nine medium-size cities, together with 54 counties in Jiangsu and Zhe-
jiang provinces. It has expanded later to include Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian 
provinces as well. 
What was under consideration in establishing economic zones was 
"to implement the horizontal policy and to break through the previous 
vertical organization".43 In fact this is an important part of economic 
reform in China. The original ten cities included in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone scheme were Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Shaoxin, 
Huzhou, Ningbo, Nanjin, Nantong and Jiaxin. The Zone, as was designed, 
is a network of cities open to the world outside the Zone. The Planning 
Office for the Shanghai Economic Zone was set up to serve as the official 
body for its management. The Office acts both as co-ordinator and 
organizer for the Zone. As we will see later, the function of the Office is 
very much like that of the Commission of the EC: Government departments 
represented in the office of the zone were the State Economic Commission, 
the Ministry of Machinery-Building Industry, the Ministry of Communi-
cations and six other ministries. 
Various kinds of economic links had existed between the above ten 
cities in the past. Yet, the demarcations mentioned earlier had impeded the 
development of closer economic links to a degree and thus impeded the 
development of productive forces. 
It is now not difficult to see the differences between the economic 
zones and the cooperative areas. First of all, the economic dimension is 
emphasized. The name "economic zones" itself implies that the purpose of 
establishing them is to realize the dual targets of promoting rational 
42
. China Economic Yearbook 1981 edition p.11-128. 
43
. See special report of JETRO, 1987. 
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division of labour and cooperation and increasing economic efficiency 
without running into the restrictions imposed by vertical administrative 
compartmentalization. Therefore a key task of the economic zone is to 
remove artificial economic barriers from a long-term perspective. Intra-
regional co-operation - popularly known in China as horizontal links -
would, as was hoped, improve economic efficiency and help to solve some 
major regional problems such as the problems of energy, transportation and 
external (foreign) trade. 
Secondly, the role cities are going to play is crucial. As the Shanghai 
Economic Zone is a metropolitan region,44 the cities chosen as centres of 
development are allowed to function beyond the normal administrative 
limits governing cities. Each city is permitted to enhance and promote its 
existing advantages. The network of the Shanghai Economic Zone is 
centred on Shanghai and is backed by numerous medium-size cities. Shen 
Jun-bo, a scholar in Shanghai Social Sciences Academy put forward a for-
mula which summarizes the nature of economic zones: Economic Zone = 
centre city + horizontal relations + division of labour.45 
Thirdly, the establishment of economic zones calls for economic co-
operation among regions with differences in natural resources, industrial 
structure and the availability of capital. Therefore it has more of a 
voluntary nature and a give-and-take approach is involved to form some 
sort of "common market". It facilitates joint production, the distribution of 
goods, financing, the exchange of scientific and technical information and 
personnel. This is very much alike to the EC Common Market, which has 
as a basic task to facilitate the movement of capital, commodity and per-
sons among the member countries. 
Fourthly, the entire idea of setting up economic zones is at the 
experimental stage. Each economic zone as an economic bloc is allowed 
to find its own way of development by trial and error. 
Ever since the birth of the Shanghai Economic Zone, there has been 
steady progress in regional integration, the co-financing of the project for 
electricity and the joint-effort in harnessing Tai Lake (Taihu) being two 
examples. In the sphere of sector integration the most successful examples 
are the integration in the machinery industry and in the bicycle industry, 
which will be discussed in detail in Part 3. 
44
. The idea behind the Shanghai Economic Zone was to ensure a sound 
functioning of Shanghai as a large city, as proposed by the Japanese economists. 
45
. See Research Papers on The Shanghai Economic Zone p.307 Depart-
ment of Economics, Jiangsu Social Sciences Academy. 
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The establishment of the Shanghai Economic Zone is therefore by no 
means the repetition of history, since it did not merely intend to have 
economic subdivisions. Rather, it aimed at regional integration in order to 
encourage the "market relations" or "horizontal ties" within the zone. This 
is indeed a new challenge. 
6.3 The Potential Gains from Regional Integration in the Shanghai 
Economic Zone 
Theoretically, the potential gains from regional integration in China, 
as in the EC, come from: economies of scale, the division of labour and 
enhanced competition. In this section the potential gains from economic 
integration will be examined in the Shanghai Economic Zone perspective. 
Economies of Scale 
Before the establishment of the Zone, each province pursued a "small 
but all embracing"46 policy to ensure self-sufficiency. There were more 
vertical links than horizontal links. As a result the processing industry 
dominated Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces as well as Shanghai. It was quite 
natural that most branches of industries were characterized by duplicate 
investment and low production, which we will discuss more later. 
In Part 1, some criteria of minimum economic efficiency have been 
mentioned. While these criteria may vary from country to country and 
from time to time, they can at least serve as a reference indicator. In the 
Shanghai Economic Zone, many provinces are producing products far 
below the efficient size. As long as the market is organized on a provincial 
or municipal base, it will be segmented so that it remains impossible to 
reap the benefits of economies of scale. There are great economic losses 
in terms of design, management and research for new product. 
Many of the major cities in the Shanghai Economic Zone are coastal 
cities. To choose one or two among these cities to be port(s) for exporta-
tion instead of constructing several ports is also important in terms of eco-
nomies of scale. Gains may also be obtained from co-operation in the 
chemical industry, cement or glass industry etc., which show a tendency 
for economies of scale, especially in those cities where waterways are 
available for transportation, so that the gains from economies of scale will 
not be totally offset by transportation costs. 
46
. "Small but all embracing" means that the economy has established all the 
essential industries, such as food, machinery, chemical fertilizer and textile 
industries. 
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The Division of Labour 
Specialization should be the major feature of the Shanghai Economic 
Zone. The policy of establishing economic zones is actually a policy of 
regional comparative advantage: particular areas are thought to be more 
efficient than others in producing some products so they should specialize 
by exploiting their cost advantage. Several specialization patterns can be 
envisaged in the Shanghai Economic Zone: 
1.Specialization for the Zone as a whole 
Comparatively speaking, the Shanghai Economic Zone, especially the 
original two provinces (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) and Shanghai, all of which 
are located in the coastal (eastern) area, is the "developed" part of China. 
It has a relatively long history and therefore a solid foundation for 
industries. The comparative advantage lies in the processing industry, 
shipping industry, electronic industry and machinery industry. The 
Shanghai Economic Zone is also a relatively strong area with regard to 
foreign trade, with Shanghai Port, Zhangjiakou Port, Nantong Port and 
Beilun Port (under construction) for exportation. In terms of regional 
development strategy, emphasis should be given to these fields for the 
Shanghai Economic Zone as a whole. According to the recent report 
compiled by the state Planning Commission, the Yangtze River Delta 
Economic Zone, into which the Shanghai Economic Zone has changed,47 
will focus on "high technology and processing industry." 
2.Specialization for some areas within the Zone 
Due to the lack of energy resources but having comparative 
advantage in technology and easier access to transportation, Shanghai and 
some other cities in Jiangsu province (Wuxi, Nanjing etc.) have been 
centres for processing industries. This is a consequence of historical 
development. Being located near the sea, the coastal cities like Shanghai 
have comparative advantage in transportation. Shanghai and other coastal 
cities may therefore be able to specialize in the processing industry. The 
north part of Anhui province is rich in coal. An energy base for the Zone 
may develop there. Since Jiangxi province is abundant in minerals, it may 
specialize in the exploitation of these minerals. In other words, it is 
feasible to have some sub-economic zones within the framework of the 
whole Zone for the purpose of specialization. 
47
. The Yangtze River Delta Economic Zone consists of all provinces of the 
Shanghai Economic Zone except Fujian province. 
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3.Specialization for individual cities 
Traditionally, some cities have some comparative advantages, to 
mention just a few: 
Hangzhou - light industry, especially silk industry; 
Wuxi - electronic industry; 
Suzhou - textile industry, especially silk industry; 
Nantong - light industry, port; 
Ningbo - light industry, port; 
Changzhou - electronic industry. 
These traditions make specialization at the level of individual cities 
possible. On the other hand, it is understandable that due to huge 
investments in immovable plant and to the difficulty of retro-fitting, the 
geographical pattern of industrial production oñen shows considerable 
inertia. Differentiation of products is therefore a very attractive form of 
specialization. For several cities which have the advantage of having a 
developing textile industry, such as Suzhou, Changzhou, Wuxi, division of 
labour is possible with each city specializing in one kind of textile: wool, 
cotton etc. - specialization by differentiation of products. All these 
comparative advantages have existed as a result of historical development 
and natural endowment. To exploit these advantages is the target of 
regional development strategy. 
Competition 
The theory of economic integration tells us that the removal of 
barriers to trade will increase the number of potential competitors; a wider 
market sustains a greater number of efficient production units; free 
movement of factors of production will enlarge both the output market and 
the input market; and economic integration extends the openness of the 
competition in the market. 
For regional integration in China, these four arguments still hold 
true. As a matter of fact, the importance of competition in promoting 
efficiency has been recognized. "An essential policy for promoting 
competition is allowing free entry into all kinds of economic activities. 
Enterprises should be given the right and, indeed, be encouraged to enter 
new kinds of activities if they have the capacity to do so, and to withdraw 
from activities that are no longer wanted by the market or where they 
cannot compete with more efficient enterprises" (World Bank, 1985, 
p. 166). 
Early at the beginning of the economic reform, provisional regula-
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lions were adopted by the executive meeting of the State Council to "de­
velop and protect the socialist competition".48 It is interesting to notice 
that the importance of the autonomy of the enterprises was mentioned: 
"To develop competition, an enterprise 
must be granted greater power to make its own 
decisions and its status as a relatively independent 
commodity producer should be respected."49 
Indeed this is the basis for economic integration. 
Another important point was also mentioned, i.e. the price mechan­
ism as a signal for competition. "To develop competition, irrational prices 
must be readjusted gradually."50 
Undoubtedly market information is the precondition for successful 
competition. When the economic integration progresses, enterprises are no 
longer protected by the administration as in the past. They now have to 
stand on their own two feet. Market information is therefore of crucial 
significance. Economic integration should provide more information for 
competition. In the Shanghai Economic Zone most industries are now 
convening joint conferences to exchange market information. Joint 
conferences have been held in the fields of chemical industry, statistics, 
banking, spinning, metallurgy, transportation, electronics, light industry 
and tourism. 
Trading fairs are another form of opening the market to transcend 
the old barriers. In June 1985, the Trading Fair for Light Industry Products 
of the Shanghai Economic Zone was held in Beijing. There were 345 
visitors (companies, enterprises, etc.) to this Fair and 87 contracts were 
signed. In April 1986, the Exhibition for Textile Products of the Shanghai 
Economic Zone was held in the Shanghai Exhibition Centre, with 3000 
visitors and total transactions amounting to 210 million yuan.51 At the 
" , The full title of the regulations is Provisional Regulations concerning the 
Development and Protection of Socialist Competition .See Xue Muo Qiao 
Almanac of China's Economy Eurasia Press 1981. 
49
. Ibid. Article 2. 
Μ
. Ibid. Article 5. 
51
. Speech at the Theoretical Seminar for the Shanghai Economic Zone 
Wang Ling. See World Economic Herald No.304 September 1 1986. 
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same time, a data network has been set up to meet the needs of the 
different industries. "Striking effects have already been obtained in 
exchanges of information and experience, procurement of commodities, 
preparation of plans and so on."52 
6.4 Motives of Integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
At this stage it is worth glancing over the motivation for integration 
in the Shanghai Economic Zone. The following is a summary of various 
motives for integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone: 
Table 6.2 Motives for Integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
Political Economic 
1. Management convenience 1. Allocative efficiency 
2. Motivation for localities 2. Economic cooperation 
3. External catalyst 3. Technology diffusion 
4. Balanced development 4. Common problems 
In terms of management convenience it has already beenmentioned 
that different zones which suit different national and regional targets will 
improve regional efficiency. Being given more autonomy at zone level, the 
localities will be more motivated to solve regional problems which the 
national authorities cannot or will not solve. In the past there was little 
cooperation among provinces and some problems involving mutual interests 
were left unsolved for years. In the Shanghai Economic Zone the project 
of Lake Taihu has been one of such examples. Although facing constant 
danger of flooding, the provinces had not been able to co-operate to 
manage the lake. Lake Taihu is also the biggest water and fishery resource 
in all South China. But the development plan for Lake Taihu was hardly 
able to progress. 
The external catalyst, in the case of the Shanghai Economic Zone, 
refers to the determination of central government to break through the 
previous "vertical" hierarchy and to transcend the horizontal restrictions 
which had long plagued attempts to do business across the boundaries of 
cities and provinces. This has been reflected in the various kinds of 
". China Newsletter No.71 1987 p.14. 
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directives issued by the State Council, including provisions to promote 
"horizontal economic ties". 
Allocative efficiency has been the basic theme of economic inte-
gration. In general, economic integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
will enable the provinces located in the coastal region to develop their 
advantages and Shanghai may have more opportunity to be involved in 
precision-industry, finance etc., and shift some industries which should be 
closer to the source of raw material supply and more suitable to other 
cities. For Jiangxi and Anhui province, their motivation for joining the 
Shanghai Economic Zone scheme is to have more technology and capital 
for their own development. Ni Xuan-ce, the head of Jiangxi province has 
reportedly said "To attract investment from other provinces in the country, 
we are ready to give up some of our profits and pursue a policy which is 
favourable to investors from other provinces."53 He even gave details of 
such favourable treatment of external investments: for investment from 
other provinces (outside of the Shanghai Economic Zone), Jiangxi would 
consider 4:6 division of the profits, which implies that the other provinces 
could get 10% more. For investment from provinces in the Shanghai 
Economic Zone, Jiangxi province would consider another 10% concession 
based on the 4:6 profit division ratio.54 
6.5 Economic Zones: Possible Problems 
Having discussed the advantages of establishing an economic zone, 
the other side of the story, the possible problems will be considered as 
well. 
We already mentioned that one of the probable effects of the free 
movement of factors of production, according to the growth-pole theory, 
is that economic activities will be attracted to one or a few centres which 
have easier communication, better infrastructure and the availability of 
skilled labour and expertise or other advantages. This is also true of the 
Shanghai Economic Zone. It is a well-known fact to the Chinese and to 
foreigners that Shanghai is over-crowded to an explosive extent. The four 
cities in Jiangsu Province - Suzhou, Changzhou, Wuxi and Nantong - are 
also overcrowded, population density in these four cities being more than 
4000 per square kilometre. While there are potential gains from regional 
economic integration, the problem of congestion will tend to become more 
serious and this could partially offset the gains if no appropriate policy is 
" . See Theoretical Issues of the Shanghai Economic Zone p.76. 
54
. Ibid. 
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adopted. 
The location of industries can be an issue of importance too. 
Economic integration will enable some large enterprises to become more 
profitable due to economies of scale, and this is economically justifiable. 
But for some industries - the bicycle industry for example - production 
should probably be concentrated more in small rather than large cities. This 
is because the economic costs of labour, land, materials and transport are 
much higher in larger cities, and enterprises producing a standard product 
(such as bicycles) are "unlikely to justify paying such additional costs" 
(World Bank 1988, p.81). In the World Bank report's estimation, the 
economic costs of production for the Shanghai bicycle factory in its present 
location are at least 10-20 yuan per bicycle greater than if it remained 
under the same excellent management but was located in a nearby medium-
size city. 
Another possible problem related to the congestion problem in large 
cities in China is further urbanization. In the past several decades, urba­
nization has been under the control of the central government. In the period 
from 1949 to 1960, when the level of urbanization doubled from "just over 
10 percent to just 20 percent",55 some measures were taken to stop the 
influx of rural migrants. From 1961 to 1976, the urban population 
decreased from 130 million to 112 million,56 and the level of China's 
urbanization declined from over 19 percent to 10 percent. But from 1977 
onwards, the urbanization process has regained its vitality, and the level of 
China's urbanization was estimated in 1984 at 20 percent.5 7 The official 
policy of the national government is to attempt to divert the rising wave of 
rural-urban migration to the big cities. In the Economic Zone scheme 
policy measures should be taken accordingly. The development of 
medium-size towns and township enterprises to absorb the surplus of labour 
due to integration and industrial adjustment could be a possible solution. 
There are more issues thai should come into consideration one of 
which is the disparity of income. Though economic integration as a whole 
may bring gains, some of the participants may benefit more than others. In 
China, the officials and some people in the west region now feel that their 
region is being left behind. In the Shanghai Economic Zone, Jiangsu 
. This figure was quoted from С. C. Lau in his article Urban China in 
Transition - The Impact of Economic Reforms. 
5 6
. Ibid.p.ll l . 
5 7
. See Shen Pai-xin's article in Preliminary research on the Development 
Strategy of the Shanghai Economic Zone, p.118. 
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province shows its concern if Shanghai benefits too much from the 
economic zone scheme. Policies have to be formulated to deal with such 
problems. For example, the policy to encourage enterprises from the 
"developed" part to participate in joint ventures or encourage direct 
investment is one of such policies.5' 
In China areas are defined as being below the poverty line if the 
income per person is less than 200 yuan and the grain per person 200 kg 
per year. At national level, a budget allocation of 500 million yuan per 
year has been made since 1980 to these areas. Apart from such a budget 
allocation, there are also favourable policies such as tax exemptions for 
rural industries and lower interest rates for infrastructure loans. The eco-
nomic zone scheme should include some further measures to help the 
backward areas, including defining the poverty line in the zone. 
Furthermore, the price of some raw materials will also be the focus of the 
distribution of benefits. 
The important role Shanghai has played within the Zone cannot be 
ignored. According to Huzhou's statistics, of the water transport in that 
city, 74% is from Shanghai and 71% goes to Shanghai, whereas Jiangsu 
accounts for 24% and the goods from Hangzhou, the provincial capital, ac-
counts for only 5%. Another sample survey in Shenzhi township Jiangsu 
province covering 112 households indicates that among the durable goods 
used in the households in the township 42% of wristwatches, 32% of 
sewing-machines, 20% of TVs came from Shanghai. The future integration 
may largely depend upon how much Shanghai is willing to cooperate, or 
put it in a different way, how much Shanghai may get in return from the 
integrative scheme. 
Over the long-term a further problem may be the lack of an effective 
political administrative structure to deal with the problems arising in the 
zones. The Shanghai Economic Zone has outgrown the existing political 
structures. Whether there should be some administrative changes according-
ly will be a question in due course, if the economic zone scheme makes 
real progress. 
58
. There are several (inter)national joint venture projects in Xinjiang 
including fruit canning and other food processing, a truck assembly plant and a 
textile factory. Shanghai has sent its delegation to Xinjiang to negotiate for 
projects. Shanghai will provide capital and technology to Xinjiang and get raw 
material supplied from Xinjiang. 
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CHAPTER? 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: MECHANISMS AND PRINCIPLES 
FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN CHINA 
In order to have economic integration and to establish an unimpeded 
national market in China, two steps have to be taken: first to decentralize 
the vertically organized economy and then to integrate step by step. The 
principles which have been proved effective in promoting progress in the 
EC integration can be applied as well to the development of economic 
zones in China, too. In this chapter we will discuss some policy 
implications derived from the EC integration experience could be relevant 
for regional economic integration in China. 
7.1 Negative Integration versus Positive Integration 
It has been shown that the Chinese economy has been organized on 
an administrative basis and the national management system was basically 
copied from the Soviet Union. Past experience has revealed many defects 
in this highly-centralized and vertically organized economic management: 
enterprises have become mere appendages of administrative organs at 
different levels; they were less motivated; by managing the economy 
through administrative systems and divisions, the natural "market" relations 
within the economy have been cut off; the circulation of commodities has 
been impeded and capital from central government, if unused, has to go 
back to where it came from. 
To encourage horizontal links, nationwide decentralization is 
therefore necessary because it is indispensable for the regional integration 
later. 
We have already mentioned that "centralization" does not necessarily 
mean "integration". "Decentralization" therefore intends to eliminate the 
restrictions to economic cooperation. Individual enterprises have to be 
motivated by being given more autonomy and thus have more freedom for 
"trade". We may regard decentralization as "negative integration" because 
negative integration is, by definition, "removal of impediments on trade" 
and "the elimination of any restrictions on the process of trade 
liberalization." 
The "impediments" here do not refer to tariffs because there are 
normally no direct tariffs for mutual trade within a nation. Yet there are 
"administrative tariffs", i.e. barriers which restrict the movement of 
production factors. The provincial self-sufficiency tendency and the sectoral 
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planning fragmentation - vertical management system - has impeded the 
process of regional integration. 
In China, negative integration may imply the following: 
- the elimination of restrictions on the independence of manage ment 
for enterprises (the authority of lower level should receive more 
decision-power than before) so that the enterprises will be 
responsible for their own profits and losses, and will "behave like 
enterprises in a market economy" and have the incentive to 
exchange their products, which is the basis for integration. 
- reduction of the scope of uniform price set by the state. The 
uniform price acts sometimes like a tariff which discourages the 
movement of commodities. If, for example, the bicycles produced 
in Shanghai are of better quality but of the same price as those 
bicycles produced in other cities, there is less incentive for the 
bicycle-producers in Shanghai to transport their products to other 
provinces. This is simply because they could have more profits if 
they would be able to raise the price. 
- the removal of barriers not only to the free movement of goods, 
but also to that of capital (funds) and persons within and between 
sectors. 
Economic reform in China has so far achieved some of these ends. 
In fact the state now permits enterprises and administrative units to invest 
in each other. This has broken the geographical ties on industry and 
enables enterprises to seek their own sources of raw materials as well as 
profitable markets for products. The vertical system in which individual 
production companies were enmeshed has been reformed, giving them a 
wider range of autonomy. The autonomous authority was granted to the 
economic units through such means as the "Provisional Regulations for 
Increasing the Autonomy of State-run Manufacturing Enterprises" (May 
1984), the "Provisional Regulations for the Improvement of the Planning 
System" (October 1984) and the second step of the profit-tumover-to-
taxation reform.59 Some of the barriers which divided individual com-
panies from each other along vertical lines have been removed. Since 
. The profit-turnover-to-taxation reform refers to measures to change the 
profits of individual enterprises into taxation so that enterprises are more 
motivated. 
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enterprises, as reforms promise, are becoming more autonomous than they 
used to be, they are supposed to take their own decisions about production 
and investment. A firm's output is therefore no longer subject to planning 
quotas and profit targets rather than physical output criteria are stressed. 
The relationship between the enterprise and government authorities takes 
the form of a contract. A semi-commercial relationship has thus been 
emphasized. 
For integration to be realized, especially integration through market 
forces, the key point is enterprise autonomy, meaning that enterprises must 
have some autonomy. In a market economy, this is not a problem. But 
what about the situation in the Chinese economy after all these measures? 
The following is a survey of the enterprise autonomy in Shanghai: 
Table 7.1 Autonomy in Enterprises in Shanghai Municipality 
Complete Partial None 
autonomy autonomy 
Planning authority 
Authority to manage production 
Authority in personnel matters 
Appointment/dismissal of executives 
Dismissal of workers 
Financial authority 
Authority to set product prices 
Authority to sell products 
21.9% 
66.2% 
17.3% 
17.3% 
12.3% 
11.9% 
11.0% 
44.5% 
64.6% 
32.8% 
70.2% 
70.2% 
37.7% 
77.1% 
57.6% 
49.6% 
13.4% 
1.0% 
12.4% 
12.4% 
50.8% 
11.0% 
29.4% 
5.7% 
Source: Jingji Yanjiu Economic Research No.4 1988. 
The above table shows that more than half of the enterprises in 
Shanghai have the authority to manage production and nearly half of them 
have authority to sell products. These facts are important for integration. 
In general, "Shanghai's traditional economic forte, light industry, 
meant that the city's economy would - and did - come under more stringent 
Beijing control than that of any other provincial-level in China" (Lynn 
T.White III, 1990 p.31). In some other places such as the special economic 
zones, enterprises are granted more autonomy than Shanghai. Hence the 
autonomy in enterprises in Shanghai, as shown, is not an exception in the 
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national context 
The question is how will such a trend develop? 
It is a little bit difficult to predict, because China ever since 1949 has 
experienced several cyclical movements of centralization and decentrali-
zation. The answer to this question depends mostly on the policy for the 
economy as a whole Negative integration will nevertheless progress with 
the measures for decentralization On the other hand, economic integration 
will not achieve much if there are no schemes for facilitating the mechan-
isms for integration Put another way, to remove impediments and to 
eliminate restrictions is not enough. Something else should be done to 
promote integration - that is the "introduction of co-operation" or "positive 
integration". 
In terms of positive integration, we may again pick up the Shanghai 
Economic Zone as an example The task for the Planning Office for 
Shanghai Economic Zone is to 'work out" an economic co-operation 
scheme. This is in fact a task of positive integration, as we will see later. 
7.2 Integration through Market Forces versus Integration through 
Policy Measures 
As in the case of the European economic integration, economic 
integration in China is also a process of both integration through market 
forces and integration through policy measures, or simply, both "private" 
integration and "official" integration Generally, at the outset, policy 
induced integration is more significant Yet integration through market 
forces must grow later 
Integration through policy measures 
For positive integration, other measures are relevant among which 
consultation comes first - that is, a discussion or an exchange of views on 
joint economic development The ultimate aim is to create the necessary 
conditions and prerequisites for promoting economic ties among the 
members of regional integration schemes in such spheres as production, 
technology and investment 
The practice of the Shanghai Economic Zone shows that the first step 
toward positive integration was the set-up of an information exchange 
network within the Shanghai Economic Zone. It was the easiest step 
because it was intended to benefit all concerned. Co-operation is one step 
further Here the concept of "a partial customs union cum investment plan" 
seems quite relevant to regional integration in China Some projects for 
exploration of natural resources and projects for infrastructure are usually 
the candidates for such investment plans and therefore should be taken into 
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consideration when outlining the development strategy for the economic 
zone. This is because the task of regional integration is not only just 
concerned with the operation of production facilities but also with all new 
investments so as to avoid duplication and to ensure that the investments 
take into consideration the principle of both scale and division of labour. 
Cooperation among the integration participants will enable them to extend 
the scope of planning solutions for the key regional economic problems 
which are of great significance to further regional economic development. 
Integration through market forces 
As integration through market forces and integration through policy 
measures are inter-dependent, integration through market forces will be 
induced by the progress of integration through policy measures. This is a 
point proved in EC integration and has also been proved in the case of the 
Shanghai Economic Zone. While the official policy measures were being 
taken and integration was progressing slowly in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone, the possibilities of private market integration seemed quite real. Take 
Wuxi county as an example. Among the 2295 enterprises in Wuxi county, 
728 had "private" trading links on a voluntary basis with other 7 cities 
within the Shanghai Economic Zone by the end of 1983. Wuxi county 
alone had created 400 million yuan's value of production as compared with 
the level without integration. Employment improved too.60 
The case of Wuxi county is in fact typical for integration through 
market forces. The Wuxi region, including Wuxi city (Wuxi D.C.) and 
three other counties - Wuxi, Yixing and Jiangyin - has witnessed rapid 
market integration. As one foreign article pointed out: enterprises "have 
transferred part of the production process to rural households and have 
integrated with enterprises in other cities in exchange for energy and raw 
materials (for which the Wuxi region is so desperate). In other words, the 
cities in the Wuxi region in the mid-1980s developed to such an extent that 
these were not only the passive recipients of economic integration but also 
active initiators. Furthermore, some of the effects of industrial restructuring 
in Shanghai under the economic reforms have led to more development in 
the Wuxi region than would have been expected, and this has been 
especially the case since the establishment of the Shanghai Economic 
Region in 1982 (Terry Cannon et.al.1990 p.222). 
It is worthwhile to study further why integration through market 
forces has developed faster than integration through policy measures. One 
*. Yu qian in his article Views on Rural Urban Integration of the Shanghai 
economic Zone gives some more examples in this regard. 
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reason is that integration through market forces is on a voluntary basis. 
This kind of integration through market forces has been so thriving just 
because it is of mutual benefit. It is therefore more flexible and easier to 
adjust. 
In fact economic integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone implies 
increased inter- and/or intra-regional trade. By exploiting their cost 
advantage, each province is supposed to specialize in some products, and 
the surplus and deficits for the different products of each should thus be 
equalized. Moreover, economic integration implies more effective supply-
demand relations both in the input and output market 
The concept of the "Market" used to be taboo in China. Almost 
everything was "planned". Private economic links were even not allowed. 
The policy of the central government to introduce market elements into the 
economy has encouraged horizontal links in general and therefore has 
fostered integration from below. This is of great significance to the 
development of the economic zones. It is here that the economic zones are 
fundamentally different from the economic cooperative areas. There are 
reasons to expect "integration through market forces" to be more effective 
and more significant, as is the case with the EC. 
7.3 Constitutional Arrangements and Institutional Arrangements 
As in the case of European economic integration, the successful rea-
lization of regional integration in China also implies the existence of a 
well-developed system of institutional arrangements and a corresponding 
set of regulations and rules. Hence both the constitutional and the institu-
tional arrangements of China's regional integration will be discussed in this 
section. 
Institutional Arrangements 
The experience of the Shanghai Economic Zone over the past few 
years has already shown that it is advisable and beneficial for the interested 
provinces and cities (together with the surrounding rural areas) to pool 
their efforts within the framework of various types of regional organiza-
tions. One of the tasks of these institutions is to improve the existing 
activities and to establish new inter-city (provincial) and regional economic 
agencies capable of co-ordinating and/or directly guiding the co-operation 
of the participants in the most important and promising sectors. When we 
look back to the institutional arrangements of the EC with the Commission 
as the "motor" and which represents the interests of the whole Community, 
the Council of Ministers as the decision-maker and the European Invest-
ment Bank as the financial institution for borrowing and lending, a similar 
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institutional arrangement should also be made as functional agencies to 
facilitate the integration process: 
1. The Joint Meeting of the Administrative Heads (regional 
decision-making body); 
2. The Bureau for Coordinating and Programming (regional 
executive agency); this agency, directly responsible to State 
Council, is also the "motor" of the economic zone. Its 
tasks are: 
- to make to the Joint Meeting of Administrative 
Heads proposals likely to stimulate economic 
integration; 
- to manage the daily operation of the economic 
zone; 
- to act as an intermediary between the central 
government and the participants of the economic 
zone. 
3. The Regional Investment Bank (financial infrastructure of 
the zone). 
The function of the "Bureau for Coordinating and Programming" 
should be highlighted here. It is important that the personnel of the Bureau 
act only in the interests of the zone. They should be independent, 
theoretically at least, of the influence from the authority of individual 
provinces. The chairman of the bureau could be appointed by central 
government, but the personnel of the Bureau, who could be called co-
ordinators, should be persons from the individual participating provinces 
or cities to ensure that the interests of the zone as a whole are represented. 
On the other hand, the personnel of the Bureau should have individual 
responsibility for particular fields. Like the Commission in the EC, the 
Bureau should also act both as an initiator of proposals and as the exponent 
of the zone's interests. 
Under the present administrative system in China, the rural areas are 
subordinate to the central cities with respect to administrative management. 
The Joint Meeting of the Administrative Heads should consist of "heads" 
of the participating provinces or cities. 
Under the leadership of the central government, the Joint Meeting 
should therefore have some decision-making power at regional level on 
matters concerning the zone just as the Council of the EC. Each individual 
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head of the participating province or city could act in rotation as chairman 
for a period of time. Unlike the Council of the EC, there would be no need 
to have the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
The experience of institutional arrangements for the EC is of 
particular relevance to China. This is because the arrangements are 
concerned with the co-ordination of the interests of the individual economy 
and that of the whole. The most sensitive part here is the decision-making 
procedure. Again the key principle would be to "ensure that decisions are 
supported by a wide spectrum of opinion", and "to avoid the bigger 
ignoring the smaller, or the smaller holding up the whole". 
One major difference between the situation in Europe and the 
situation in China is that China has a unitary central government which has 
final decision-making power. If there is any conflict of opinion, the central 
government will have the last say. However, discussion in depth at regional 
level is necessary and intervention should remain as little as possible 
otherwise the zone would only be a zone "on paper" where everything was 
decided by central government. This is obviously not the point for 
establishing economic zones. Again it is here that the economic zone is 
different from the Economic Cooperative Areas, because economic zone 
is intended to use "economic means" and the "economic lever" to promote 
economic development. For integration to progress, the more voluntarily 
the decision is made and accepted, the more successful it will be and the 
longer the integration scheme will last. The administrative directive of the 
central government should therefore be the last resort. 
The experience of European economic integration also tells us that 
economic interdependence as a result of economic integration makes finan-
cial integration inevitable. As a matter of fact, financial integration is a 
catalyst to economic integration and further economic integration requires 
a higher level of financial integration. Therefore, for regional integration 
to take place in China, there would have to be some financial co-operation 
in order to foster economic links. In this sense a regional bank is desirable. 
However, the regional bank is not easy to take shape. In the transition 
period, a Regional Investment Bank should be established for regional 
economic integration. This is because not all the projects for the economic 
zone can be financed by the central government and, since some projects 
concern with the benefits of the economic zone as a whole (for example, 
building a highway to connect two ports - Shanghai and Ningbo) rather 
than those of individual economies, it is only natural to find that none of 
these provinces (cities) concerned is willing to shoulder the entire financial 
burden. 
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Constitutional Arrangements 
"The Treaty of Rome" is the well-known constitution for the EC 
integration. Regional economic integration in China is, of course, under the 
supervision of the central government and economic zones are in some 
sense economic subdivisions within a sovereign country. Is there still any 
need for some kind of "constitution"? The answer is "yes". Some 
fundamental norms for economic activities within the economic zone are 
obviously necessary.There are not any "treaties" for regional integration in 
China, the more so as the economic zones are still at an experimental 
stage. Instead, there should be some documents to state explicitly the objec-
tives and measures to be taken for the economic zones. In this regard, the 
case of the Shanghai Economic Zone is quite interesting. In June 1986, the 
Seminar for Theoretical Issues in the Shanghai Economic Zone discussed 
and agreed in principle "the Preliminary Outline for the Development of 
the Shanghai Economic Zone", and there are many similarities between the 
"Treaty of Rome" and the "Outline": 
Like "The Treaty of Rome", the "Outline" spelled out the main 
objective of the establishment of the Zone: to reinforce the multifunc-
tionality of the cities as centres in order to facilitate "horizontal links" and 
gradually integrate the whole zone. The ultimate purpose is to enhance 
productive forces by improving efficiency. 
Like the "Treaty of Rome", the "Outline" pointed out the potential 
spheres for co-operation in the Shanghai Economic Zone: foreign trade, the 
energy industry, transportation, new industries, river-harnessing etc. 
Like the "Treaty of Rome", the "Outline" also mentioned the institu-
tional arrangement for the Shanghai Economic Zone: the Joint Meeting of 
the Administrative Heads, the Planning Office, the Investment Bank of the 
Zone, the advisory Committee etc. 
Like the "Treaty of Rome", the "Outline" is more or less of a 
preliminary nature because it does not have any compulsory force. The 
"Outline" has once more confirmed the characteristics of the Shanghai 
Economic Zone - it is an open, multilevel and net-like economic zone. It 
has also emphasized that for the Zone as a whole, technology is the most 
prominent factor for cooperation. 
It seems that in the "Outline" one important point has been neglected 
- competition as a dynamic effect to enhance efficiency. The "Outline" 
emphasized coordination more than competition, because "competition" to 
enhance efficiency was not mentioned explicitly. 
Apparently, the designers of the Shanghai Economic Zone have 
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thought of the EC economic co-operation model as a reference.61 
7.4 The Principles of Economic Integration in China 
This section is related to the interesting questions: do the principles 
of EC integration apply only to the European Community, or do they read 
across to the integration in China as well? What policy recommendations 
can we get to apply these principles? 
Spiral Progress 
As the economic integration in China confronts similarly the difficult 
task of serving the interests of individual localities and those of the whole 
region, integration can not be realized at once. "Step by step" has to be the 
first principle. 
In China the case of the Shanghai Economic Zone - the first 
economic zone in China - may serve as a first step for regional economic 
integration. As the Shanghai Economic Zone is more of an experimental 
nature, the achievements and problems of the Shanghai Economic Zone 
should be examined with discretion before more economic zones are es-
tablished. This is "spiral progress" at the national level. 
The principle of spiral progress can also be applied at the regional 
(economic zone) level. There could be integration first in the sphere of 
cooperative production, to better utilize existing production facilities. After 
that progress could be expected in exchange of the products, namely, trade 
within the region. Then the movement of funds and labour should be 
encouraged to facilitate the co-operative production and regional trade. In 
the Shanghai Economic Zone, there has been sectoral integration in the 
sewing machine industry, bicycle industry etc. China's regional integration 
may begin with sectoral integration where the advantages of economies of 
scale and division of labour are more obvious and where the willingness 
to integrate is stronger. This is "spiral progres at the "zone" level. 
The principle of spiral progress is also applicable to integration in 
each sector. Let us take the integration of the banking sector as an 
example. 
For the purpose of coordination in financial matters, a regional 
investment bank should be established in one of the centres of the economic 
zone. Ultimately it may be transformed into something like a regional 
bank. Such a regional financial authority, however, cannot stand by itself 
overnight. It has to grow step by step. 
".The former Primer Zhao Zi-yang has reportedly said that the Shanghai 
Economic Zone should at least be an organization like the EC. 
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The first step could be the establishment of a Council of chair 
persons who come from different provincial branch banks in the economic 
zone. They could become responsible for the trans-provincial banking 
activities within the zone. At the initial stage, the Council could also 
arrange the exchange of information, which was what had happened in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone. In addition the Council can arrange research 
activities. Finally the Council could help to establish the Regional Invest-
ment Bank to finance regional projects. The Regional Investment Bank 
would then expand its business and become involved in trans-provincial 
transaction settlements and in distributing funds from central authority. 
Gradually it could evolve into a Regional Bank which would be the 
financial authority of the zone. This is "spiral progress" at the sector level. 
With respect to the mobility of labour, a more practical approach 
should first begin with the mobility of specialists and skilled labour in 
order to avoid cities being overcrowded. One article pointed out that the 
mobility of people could be realized according to the administrative level: 
people in big cities could move to other big cities and people in medium-
size cities could move to other medium-size cities etc. This is a good 
suggestion to reduce the possible negative effects of integration62 because 
in this way economic efficiency can be improved while urbanization 
remains at a manageable level. 
Joint Responsibility 
The principle of joint responsibility is meant to guarantee a just and 
equal distribution of the benefits and costs of integration, so that prosperity 
for the integrated region as a whole will be achieved. This is because 
equity is important for the integration to progress smoothly. 
In the economic zones in China, some compensation mechanism, if 
not a regional policy, will be inevitable in order to facilitate the integration 
process. Some regional arrangement is therefore important in building up 
the infrastructure and in energy distribution. Enhanced competition in the 
economic zone could cause marginal enterprises to suffer if not disappear. 
For such enterprises, great care should be exercised when abolishing 
subsidies to ensure that integration will not be a sudden disaster to them -
62
. Details of the suggestions can be found in Shen Pai-xin's article:Research 
Essays on the Shanghai Economic Zone p.72. 
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this is "parachute effect",63 which means that while competition is 
encouraged, the weakest should be taken care of and aid should be 
withdrawn only gradually. 
For joint responsibility, it would be necessary to establish some 
"regional funds" or to pool some of the funds which were previously under 
the control of individual provinces, because this would not only enhance 
willingness to integrate but also stabilize the compensation measures to ease 
the structural adjustment due to economic integration. The Regional In-
vestment Bank as proposed could assume the responsibility of managing the 
"regional funds". Some special funds, as in the case of the EC, could serve 
specific aims - the Energy Fund could help to develop the energy sector of 
the zone, the Development Fund could improve transportation and support 
schemes for the modernization and conversion of enterprises, while the 
Social Fund may help solve the regional re-structuring problem etc. The 
establishment of these funds would reinforce the interdependence of the 
individual provincial economies and enable them to stick to the integration 
scheme. 
The principle of joint responsibility can also be reflected in the 
coordination for relations among provinces.In the case of the Shanghai 
Economic Zone the developed part and the underdeveloped part are easily 
distinguished. Shanghai and Jiangsu, Zhejiang provinces which are located 
in the coastal region, are the "core" part of the zone; while Jiangxi, Fujian 
and Anhui provinces, located in the central region, are the peripheral and 
predominately agricultural areas. It is to be expected that there is a lack of 
funds, skilled labour, technology in Jiangxi, Fujian and Anhui province. 
On the other hand, there is shortage of energy in the industrialized core 
area of the Zone. The patterns of specialization induced by the regional 
integration scheme should take into consideration the principle of joint 
responsibility to avoid by all means further depressing the underdeveloped 
area of the Zone. 
Flexibility 
The integration scheme should be flexible to encourage the partici-
pants - this is also true of China's regional integration. The principle of 
flexibility has in fact been reflected in the case of the Shanghai Economic 
Zone. 
We mentioned that earlier efforts for subdivision of the nation in the 
1950s and later failed, because the subdivision turned out to create an 
. Professor H. W. Lambers in Erasmus University emphasized this in his 
interview with the author in April, 1987. 
90 
additional administrative level which only increased the administrative 
expenses and delayed the implementation of decisions. Bearing this in 
mind, the designers of the Shanghai Economic Zone tried to avoid fixing 
the model of the Zone, leaving freer choice to deal with future problems. 
The "Outline" of the Shanghai Economic Zone just sketched out the 
development of the Zone in principle instead of providing a detailed 
programme for integration so that there is room for future adjustment. It 
spelled out the objective but left the means of achieving the objectives 
flexible. As a matter of fact the central authorities have as yet set no 
specific rules, apparently content to allow the economic zone to find its 
own path of development through trial and error. 
The principle of flexibility can be brought into practice in many 
ways. The membership of an economic zone for example should be 
flexible. Since there is still uncertainty about the ideal "boundary" of 
economic zones, it would be better to integrate some provinces to see if the 
integration scheme serves them well. 
Flexibility is also necessary in the forms of economic integration. 
For the members of an economic zone, various forms of economic co-
operation both inside and outside the Zone should be allowed. Individual 
cities of the Zone could have co-operative arrangements to exchange 
commodities with cities outside the Zone. The economic zone would 
therefore not merely be an exclusive regional bloc. Within the Zone, the 
principle of flexibility is also useful. Economic performance varies from 
province to province and so do historic relationships. The original ten cities 
in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai have, in general, closer economic 
relations. It is advisable therefore to have flexible arrangement for 
integration. The original two provinces (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) plus 
Shanghai could be more closely integrated than other provinces. Two-speed 
integration, with the original two provinces plus Shanghai as the core is a 
possibility, provided that regional disparity is maintained at a reasonable 
level to keep all the provinces of the Zone in the integration scheme. This 
would be similar to the Benelux countries: they have a closer relationship 
and have moved further towards integration, but they are still members of 
the EC Community. 
The establishment of economic zones is to encourage economic 
cooperation by promoting the division of labour and competition. It 
therefore has a long-term target. In that sense the boundary of an economic 
zone should be flexible. Periodic adjustment of the boundaries of economic 
zones is unavoidable. As some scholars have suggested, "In different 
periods, there can be different boundaries for these economic zones. This 
is because with economic development, there are structural changes in 
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industries which could result in different spatial relations for the individual 
provinces. These changes can hardly be foreseen. If the boundaries for 
economic zones can last for five to twenty years, some minor adjustment 
every five years is possible."64 
M
. See Liang et.al. p. 103. The Yangtse River Delta Economic Zone has 
taken the place of the Shanghai Economic Zone and excludes Fujian province. 
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PART 3 
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
- THE SHANGHAI ECONOMIC ZONE AND OTHER PARTS OF 
CHINA (1982-1988) 

CHAPTERS 
THE SCHEME OF THE EMPIRICAL TEST 
- METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The hypothesis throughout the present study has been that, until 
recently, China has not been integrated economically and this has led to 
economic losses in terms of the division of labour, economies of scale and 
competitiveness. 
The objective of this part, which is the important part of the study, 
is to test the hypothesis by examining the reality. 
8.1 Research Questions 
As a matter of fact, foreign scholarly interest in issue of economic 
integration in China can be traced back to early 1972 when Audrey Donni-
thorne (1972,p.605) described the Chinese economy particularly at the 
period after the "Cultural Revolution" as "cellular," "composed of a 
myriad of small discrete units." In some sense the Chinese economy could 
well be conceptualized as a being collection of provincial economies that 
are highly independent in terms of economic activity.65 
Among the China specialists and those economists who are interested 
in China's development and who have made efforts to identify the cellular 
nature of the Chinese economy, Lardy finds in the agriculture sector 
decreasing regional specialization and interregional trade relative to output 
and increasing allocational inefficiency (1983,pp.48-88). Thomas P.Lyons 
(1985,pp. 134-139), as was mentioned in the Introduction, finds that in the 
industry sector transportation of important fuels and materials did not keep 
pace with production. He has investigated Audrey Donnithorne's 
proposition. The focus of his research was on the Maoist period which was 
defined as the period from the beginning of the Great Leap Forward (late 
ts
. Nicholas Lardy (1975, p.95), however, argued that economic develop-
ment in China since the decentralization in 1958 has not been characterized by 
a strong pattern of regional self-sufficiency. This was the so called Donnithorne-
Lardy debate. This debate has led to some further research which suggests that 
at least in some spheres of economic activity, Donnithorne's fragmentation 
hypothesis may be more consistent with the evidence. See Thomas P. Lyons' 
article "Explaining Economic Fragmentation in China: A Systems Approach" 
1986, p.209. 
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1957) until the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
(December 1978) when economic reforms started. He reached the 
conclusion that, during the Maoist period, local and provincial authorities 
responded favourably to Mao's repeated calls for self-reliance. After 
analyzing China's planning organization and its procedures, he showed that 
the structure of China's planning system has not facilitated cooperation 
among localities. This explains the observed pattern of a tendency toward 
fragmentation. The cellular nature of the Chinese economy is actually due 
to the tendency towards provincial or even lower level isolationism, 
encouraged by the principle of "self-sufficiency". Because of the promotion 
of "independent industrial systems" at the provincial or lower level, 
provincial and local plants have been protected by barriers to trade raised 
by the provincial and/or local governments which we have discussed in 
Part 2. 
This integration issue of China has also drawn the attention of 
World Bank economists. In the report of a mission sent to China by the 
World Bank (1985) - "China, Long-Term Development Issues and 
Options", a special chapter has been devoted to "Spatial Issues", where the 
following conclusion was mentioned: 
" . . . there is an urgent need for measures 
to reduce the present conflict between what seems 
rational for a particular locality and what is 
rational for the whole economy" (World Bank 
1985,p.78). 
While there is considerable interest in the topic, empirical efforts in 
this regard are still relatively few. A lot of foreign scholarly literature has 
been devoted to the economic reforms in general whereas very few have 
researched the unique characteristics of the Chinese economy:local 
protectionism and autarky. Thomas P.Lyons' research is important along 
this line. His conclusion, however, is confined to the Maoist period. People 
will ask: what about economic integration in the post-Мао period which is 
the period for market-oriented economic reforms? 
The present part will systematically investigate the integration issue 
in the post-Мао period with focus on the Shanghai Economic Zone. It 
intends to answer such questions as the following: has the cellular nature 
of the Chinese economy changed in the post-Мао period? What was, or is, 
the situation of factor and commodity mobility in China before and after 
the economic reforms? How can we understand the situation of local 
protectionism and autarky when the self-sufficiency policy is not encour-
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aged at all? What is the cost of local protectionism which fragments the 
national market? In sum, the present part will re-examine the integration 
issue with particular emphasis on the period from 1982 onwards, when the 
Shanghai Economic Zone was established. 
One difference, among others, between this empirical part and the 
study of Lyons' is that, instead of examining China as a whole, it will first 
investigate the Shanghai Economic Zone and then relate the Shanghai 
Economic Zone to China as a whole. 
8.2 Research Limitations: the Method and the Data 
Once we begin to answer the questions mentioned above, two issues 
will come up for our consideration: the research method and the data. 
According to Peter Robson,66 there are several approaches to 
estimating the effects of integration. One approach is to estimate them by 
relying on a specified analytical model, the parameters of which are 
estimated from the data available using standard statistical techniques. A 
second approach estimates the effects of integration indirectly by means of 
residual imputation procedures. "Residual models have the characteristics 
that they seek to quantify, by reference to a variety of explanatory factors, 
the development that the economies in question could be expected to have 
experienced in the absence of integration. The impact of integration is then 
taken to be the unexplained residual that is obtained by subtracting the 
projections so arrived at for the past period from the actually recorded 
magnitudes for the same period" (p.238). This method is weak because all 
deviations of the model are presumed to be attributable to integration while 
normally such deviations would also occur even without integration. A 
third approach, less formal and less aggregative in practice, is the survey 
method which rests on surveys of particular sectors and industries and 
interviews with those involved in the integration process. Given the fact 
that the data available for integration in China are sometimes fragmentary 
and less homogeneous, a specified analytical model or a residual model can 
hardly be used for this study. Hence the present research relies heavily on 
the survey method due to China's particular situation as well as to the 
specific case of integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone. 
66
. For the issue of integration, Peter Robson has a detailed discussion in his 
book The Economics of International Integration. 3rd ed. 1987 pp.233-259. The 
approach he used in the book is in the international setting. But a careful reading 
of the book will show that it is relevant as long as integration is understood as 
being economic co-operation, commodity trade and specialization within a 
national context. 
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In fact, the present part of study combines two complementary types 
of empirical analysis: qualitative assessment and quantitative description. 
Chapter 9 examines the factor (commodity) mobility situation by both 
providing an interpretation of some statistical data and providing some 
qualitative background. Chapter 10 investigates the duplication pattern of 
industrial activities and the cost of it. Chapter 11 offers cases to show 
integration progress in the Shanghai Economic Zone: cases in the bicycle 
industry, textile industry, machinery industry and the financial sector. 
Qualitative assessment and quantitative description have been brought 
together to reach some systematic conclusions. 
As far as the issue of data is concerned, there are some basic 
considerations facing any researcher of China studies: China's national 
income is measured as the material product system for five broad sectors 
(agriculture, industry, construction, transport and commerce) and there are 
two expenditure categories (consumption and accumulation); the Chinese 
industrial sectoral classification is different from the UN International 
Standard Industrial Classification etc. Moreover, it is virtually impossible 
to get the data about detailed production costs, and detailed statistics of in-
dustrial production are available only in terms of gross output value. On 
the other hand, provincial data in general is available and relatively reliable 
in China. Anecdotal data, though scattered, is relatively easier to get. 
Bearing these considerations in mind we have designed our empirical test. 
Table 8.1 Indicators of Economic Integration 
- their availability and suitability for a study of integra-
tion in China. 
Indicators 
a. price 
b. price index 
c. domestic trade flows 
d. cost of production 
e. migration of people 
f. interest rate change 
g. similarity of 
industrial structure 
Availability 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Suitability 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
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From the table we can find that some indicators for the integration 
issue have been either difficult to get or have not been relevant in the case 
of China. Moreover, with respect to data, there are several limitations 
worth noticing. These limitations, which are to be discussed later, are 
partly due to the special nature of the Chinese economy and partly due to 
the availability and suitability of the data for this study. Apart from that, 
an important point in testing economic integration in China (as well as in 
other countries) is that the concept of economic integration cannot be 
reduced to any single dimension. Any methodology for analyzing economic 
integration must, in fact, take into account several relevant elements. We 
are now to discuss these indicators individually. 
Obviously factor mobility is an important indicator in testing the 
integration hypothesis about China. We can not say that an economy is 
integrated if mobility of production factors is retarded. In the case of 
China, however, production factors may be readily moved from one 
province to another according to administrative order, not to economic 
principle. Mobility of production factors, if it exists, is centrally controlled. 
Decisions are based more on administrative and political considerations 
rather than on economic criteria. 
Trade flow is another indicator for testing the hypothesis about 
integration in China and for examining the interdependence of the 
economies involved. To some extent an impression might be gained about 
imports and exports per sector per province from the provincial output 
minus provincial consumption per sector, though these data are not readily 
available. But there are hardly published data for the direction of 
commodity flows, or the data for inter-provincial trade flows, which 
makes the case different from the case of commodity flows between in-
dividual countries which can largely be found in international trade 
statistics. Therefore trade creation and trade diversion - the effects of 
integration - cannot be observed directly within China. One can easily 
show to which countries and in what volume the exports of Japan flow. But 
reliable and accurate data showing the commodity flows from Shanghai is 
hardly available. 
If we look at "price" as an indicator for economic integration, it is 
even more complicated. In general, price is anyway the most essential in-
dicator for economic integration as far as commodity mobility is con-
cerned. The benefits of a Common Market of Europe in 1992 are 
expressed in the convergence of some prices as a result of market 
integration. This is the same for wages - the price of labour, and for 
interest rates - the price of capital. The convergence of relative prices 
across economic units usually demonstrates a process of integration. If 
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there is a convergence of, say, bicycle prices among provinces due to the 
mobility of bicycle products, it may imply that there is a tendency towards 
integration in the bicycle market. Similarly, if there is mobility of labour 
in the labour market, the wage level, generally speaking, tends to be 
equalized. 
However, problems emerge due to the specific price structure in 
China. First of all, the wages and interest rate are basically set by either 
the central or the local government. Recently there has been some freedom 
for local government or individual enterprises to make "adjustments". The 
"adjustment" for wage is often reflected in a "bonus" or other forms of 
welfare, details of which are not available for systematic research. 
Secondly, the price data for commodities is subject, in varying degrees, to 
certain inherent problems: the prices of raw materials, for example, may 
be either "official prices", which are set by the government, or "negotiable 
prices", which are to some extent based on supply and demand but 
government may intervene.67 
Whatever these problems are, one basic difficulty is that reliable and 
precise data concerning prices for individual commodities is not available. 
What is available in the official statistics is the data of the price index, i.e. 
the indication of general price level. 
The significance of any index data lies in the fact that it demonstrates 
the direction of change as well as the volume of change. But suppose there 
is convergence or divergence of the price index during the period between 
1982 and 1987, can we make the assumption, if not conclusion, that during 
the period between 1982 and 1987, China is, or is not significantly frag-
mented? The direct answer will be "no". Because statistical data of this sort 
are not so easy to interpret. First, the Chinese economy is more 
complicated than it seems at first glance. To say that the Chinese economy 
is a centrally planned economy is sometimes oversimplified or even 
misleading. As a matter of fact, the whole Chinese economy can be divided 
into planned and unplanned subeconomies. This division "not only simpli-
fies the planning problem but, in some respects, facilitates plan fulfilment" 
. The exchange rate, the price for foreign currency, may serve as an 
example. The government has official rates for foreign currencies. But there are 
official "trading centres" to deal with foreign exchange transactions. At these 
"trading centres", the negotiable rate is set within a range. Not everyone can get 
access to these "trading centres". There are of course "black markets" where 
foreign exchange transactions take place "illegally". 
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(Lyons, 1988).68 Secondly, given the fact that the Chinese economy can 
be divided into planned and unplanned subeconomies the commodity 
mobility has a different scenario. The flow of some commodities such as 
lumber, finished steel, motor vehicles and nonferrous metals is basically 
controlled by the central authorities while that of others such as light 
industrial products is not.69 Thirdly, as we know, there has been an 
expanding private sector ever since the economic reforms began. The 
influence of the private sector on the general price level is not very clear. 
Of course China has not given - and in the near future will not be likely to 
give - total freedom to price for responsiveness to supply and demand. 
In fact, the price system in China now is a multi-price system: the 
state sets the prices of those goods that are essential to the economy or to 
the people, and, apart from those of products under state unified purchase, 
potential buyers and sellers can negotiate prices. Sometimes the state either 
sets up a ceiling below which prices are allowed to fluctuate or let prices 
float within certain limits. The price levels vary with the government's 
standard price as the lowest and the market price as the highest. The 
"Temporary Provisions Regarding the Further Expansion of Self-Manage-
ment of State-Run Industrial Enterprises", issued by the State Council on 
May 10, 1984, permitted the independent sale of a portion of the produc-
tion goods produced by state-run enterprises, which meant that the already 
existing multiple price system was formally recognized. Up to 20 per cent 
variations in prices were allowed for "excess production" of finished steel, 
pig iron, copper, aluminum, lead, zinc, tin, coal, cement, sulfuric acid, 
caustic soda, refined soda rubber etc., and for 2 per cent of the planned 
6e
. Thomas P.Lyons has further explained the division of the economy: From 
the planners' point of view, the unplanned subeconomies constitute a reserve pool 
of materials and labour which can be requisitioned to prevent imbalances from 
reverberating through the planned economy and threatening the attainment of 
targets. On the other hand, the unplanned subeconomy provides a residual 
claimant, ready to employ any excess supplies vented to it (p. 115). 
69
. The output shares allocated by central planners belong to "category 1" 
(output subject to central allocation). The shares may fluctuate from year to year. 
In the 1950s, the number of materials allocated by the central authorities was 115 
in 1953 and increased to 532 in 1957. Things have changed since the economic 
reform. In 1979, for example, the number was 256. The central share percentage 
for commodities also changes from time to time. In 1978, the central for 
commodities was as follows: lumber 81%, Finished steel 80%, motor vehicles 
75%, chemicals 75%, nonferrous metals 64%, electric power 55%, coal 54%, 
cement 36%, light industry products 0%. 
101 
production of finished steel. In 1985 the government removed the 20 per 
cent restriction. In 1989, the government extended this multiple price 
system to include such goods as primary and secondary energy, petroleum 
products, coke, lumber, metal materials, sheet glass and mineral products. 
Hence the price system is quite complicated. Take cement as an example. 
The portion of cement distributed by the central government has changed 
gradually. In 1982, it accounted for no more than 1/4 of the total 
production volume. At the end of 1985, however, the ratio of the volume 
of cement sold under the three prices was 1:1.5:2.5. At the end of 
September 1986, the ratio had shifted to 1:1.24:1.6. 
This brief description of the multi-price system suggests that in the 
context of China, price cannot be used as an indication of integration and 
the general price index is not so precise as an indicator of market integra-
tion. Therefore, some other data has been selected to provide further 
analysis of the integration issue. To the present study, the most relevant 
ones are as follows: 
- mobility of production factors; 
- commodity mobility and trade; 
- specialization and co-operation. 
The most important data is those related to mobility of factors and 
the duplication of industrial systems. 
As can be understood, mobility of production factors and goods is 
an important dimension of integration. On the other hand, cooperation, 
specialization and exchange are also dimensions of economic integration. 
We have defined "integration" specifically at the very beginning, "the 
formation of some cooperation arrangement on a sufficient scale to ensure 
major economic and welfare objectives" is an important aspect of 
integration. In the case of China, therefore, an important indicator for the 
lack of economic integration is the duplication of production at the 
provincial or lower level. Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 will follow this line 
to examine the mobility of production factors and commodities, as well as 
the duplication of industrial systems in the Chinese economy. 
8.3 The Scheme and its Guiding Principles 
Given the fact that there are problems to any attempt at studying the 
integration issue in China, the present empirical test emphasizes the multi-
plicity of tests and, correspondingly, of methods in order to minimize the 
potential faulty inferences and misinterpretations. 
In general, the test can be divided into two parts: first, a qualitative 
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assessment of mobility of production factors and commodities as a basic 
indicator of integration and second, a quantitative description of duplication 
of industrial activities in different provinces as an indirect indicator. The 
reason for doing so is that some anecdotal data and statistical data for 
mobility of production factors and commodities are available. On the other 
hand, provincial data on industrial output is available to examine the 
duplication of industrial systems. In this way quantitative description is 
combined with qualitative assessment. Different dimensions of integration 
can thus be examined and cross-checked. 
In order to investigate the progress of integration in the Shanghai 
Economic Zone, some cases will be examined. The emphasis is on the 
cause-effect analysis to show the general implications rather than 
quantifying the concrete benefits. This is because economic integration in 
China is only at an initial and experimental stage. Investigating the benefits 
for integration can only be done by looking at specific cases. Again, 
multiple cases are investigated in order to check whether these cases 
display similar results as predicted by the integration theory. In the whole 
empirical part, anecdotal evidence will be found extensively in the text. 
Anecdotal evidence is sometimes imprecise, and the representativeness of 
the cases cited cannot be easily established. Nevertheless, if used carefully 
and unbiasedly, evidence of this sort doesconstitute an important resource 
in the case of China. Moreover, attention has been paid to the use of 
multiple-sources of evidence: evidence from Chinese sources, from 
Japanese sources and from those of the World Bank. 
It should be noted that data for the study of social sciences in China 
is notoriously difficult to obtain and to check. The researcher has to piece 
together painstakingly the little data available to reach a conclusion. No 
public data bank exists in China similar to those to which Western 
researchers are accustomed. Therefore, with the limited and fragmentary 
data available, efforts have been made to find the converging evidence with 
regard to the research questions and to see whether one can check the 
conclusion that integration is necessary to reap economic benefits. 
In the present test it is not my purpose - and furthermore not possible 
- to analyze the extent of economic integration in the whole of China as 
such. Instead, my interest is in studying the general characteristics of 
economic integration covered by the concept "the Shanghai Economic 
Zone". The time period for the test is between 1982, when the Shanghai 
Economic Zone was established, and 1989, when some political changes 
occurred. Because the Shanghai Economic Zone is the focus for our 
discussion throughout this research, the test of the integration hypothesis 
is, in most cases, set in the regional (zone) perspective. The provinces 
103 
concerned in the Shanghai Economic Zone are therefore to be examined. 
Not only is the data at the Zone level to be used but also that at the 
municipal and even county level has been selected wherever possible. In 
the last section of Chapter 10 the relevance of the conclusion from the 
Shanghai Economic Zone to China as a whole will be discussed. This will 
make the conclusion from our investigation in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
more convincing and will give it a wider application. 
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CHAPTER 9 
LACK OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A GENERAL SURVEY 
This chapter will give some qualitative analysis on the mobility of 
production factors and the mobility of commodities in China. 
As we have discussed in Chapter 1, the mobility of production 
factors and commodities is an important dimension of the integration issue. 
Any survey of economic integration can therefore hardly ignore this aspect. 
In the Chinese economy, which has a strong regional character, regional 
governments allocate substantial production resources. Mobility of 
production factors and commodities therefore has a regional character. 
The survey presented here covers labour mobility, commodity 
mobility and, to some extent, capital mobility. The technique used in this 
chapter is that, while some statistical data is being examined, some institu-
tional background related to the statistical data will be provided in parallel. 
By covering the mobility of labour, capital and commodities and by 
assessing the changes in terms of factor mobility after economic reforms, 
a wide net is knit both in the extent of the data examined and in the depth 
of the understanding of the data. 
9.1 Labour Mobility 
For a long time there had been little labour mobility in China. This 
is evidenced by two institutional facts: first, in China the place of residence 
has been administratively controlled and second, there has been an unified 
employment assignment system. 
Under the residence-permit system for cities and towns, citizens are 
required to register with the local police station ("peicushu" in Chinese) 
and are not allowed to change their place of residence without prior 
permission. This residence-permit system in cities and towns has been 
reinforced by the rationing system in China: basic consumer goods (grain, 
sugar, meat etc.) have been rationed in urban areas since 1953 and an 
urban ration card with which one can buy the basic consumer goods is 
available only to permitted urban residents. Rationing has therefore been 
used in China not only to ensure the provision of basic consumption goods 
at a low price but also to regulate mobility from rural to urban areas. Food 
rationing is now regarded more as an emergency measure than a permanent 
arrangement. Migration, however, still remains subject to strict control and 
is likely to remain so. 
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Table 9.1, which was made public only recently, shows the statistical 
data for migration in Shanghai: 
Table 9.1 Net Population Immigration to Shanghai Municipality 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Source: 
Immigration 
7,900 
67,000 
264,900 
76,700 
44,100 
38,000 
36,000 
21,700 
53,000 
62,700 
67,700 
50,900 
% of total pre 
Based on the Shanghai Statistical Year Book 
0.071 
0.544 
2.341 
0.673 
0.382 
0.324 
0.303 
0.181 
0.438 
0.512 
0.546 
0.416 
p.119. 
The total population of Shanghai is 12 million (1988) but the percen-
tage of immigration is around 0.5 %, with the exception of 1979. The 
reason for greater immigration in 1979 is that in that year many people 
who had been forced to leave Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution 
were allowed to return. This kind of mobility is really exceptional. The 
cause of it was a political rather than an economic one. 
Shanghai is by no means unique in terms of population migration. If 
we look further at the other provinces in the Shanghai Economic Zone, we 
will find that the immigration percentage (immigration as % of total 
population) is even lower. 
The figures in Table 9.2 indicate that, as in the case of Shanghai, 
migration into the other provinces has been maintained at a very low level 
- lower than that of Shanghai: the highest migration percentage in each 
province is 0.265% in Jiangsu; 0.209% in Anhui; 0.100% in Fujian; 
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0.486% in Jiangxi and 0.263% in Zhejiang. Apparently, migration, where 
it occurs, is dominated by the administrative hierarchy: mobility is most 
possible or relatively easier within cities or towns than between cities and 
towns. The residence-permit system in towns and cities, while successful 
in preventing migration to the larger cities, retards the mobility of labor 
necessary for economic efficiency. 
Table 9.2 Immigration in the Five Provinces in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone (% of total population) 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Source: 
Jiangsu 
0.265 
0.155 
0.168 
0.179 
0.162 
0.223 
Anhui 
0.202 
0.082 
0.164 
0.198 
0.209 
0.207 
Zhejiang 
0.127 
0.101 
0.263 
0.263 
0.128 
0.165 
China Population Statistics. 
Fujian 
0.037 
0.058 
0.028 
0.074 
0.052 
0.100 
Jiangxi 
0.019 
0.179 
0.140 
0.314 
0.456 
0.486 
The "unified employment assignment" system, on the other hand, 
retards the mobility of labour from one enterprise to the other. Until 
recently all young people were administratively assigned to particular jobs. 
For a long time such an assignment was for life: workers could not move 
from one enterprise to another. Refusal to obey allocation to one's first job 
assignment could be interpreted as "disloyalty to the nation". 
Such strict control on labour mobility is quite unique even among 
"socialist countries". In the USSR, for example, there existed a relatively 
free urban labour market although "moving to closed cities such as 
Moscow is difficult and not to work in the state or collective sector is in 
general illegal"(Michael Ellman, 1989, p.69). 
Both the residence-permit system and the unified employment assign-
ment system are based on the administrative hierarchy with the provincial 
(municipal) government as the core. Labour mobility has been controlled 
by the relevant administrative authorities. Sometimes labour mobility is 
difficult even within the administrative "cells" - provinces, cities, counties 
and towns. 
There have been some changes since the economic reform. Measures 
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have been taken to allow some mobility for "skilled labour" in order to 
utilize their "skills".70 There have been discussions on the necessity for 
a "labour market".71 One article in the People's Daily "On a Unified 
Market" mentioned that mobility of production factors including labour is 
a requirement of economic development. This was a taboo in the past 
because, according to classic Marxism, the existence of a labour market is 
a defining characteristic of capitalism. 
A report entitled "Strategic Issues in Human Resource Planning in 
the People's Republic of China", which was sponsored by ILO-UNDP, 
mentioned the "functioning of the labour market": 
"For economic efficiency in enterprises, the 
staff must be reduced and skills must be allowed 
to be transferred. The labour market provides 
such people with the space and mechanism to 
bring about this transfer. "7-
Article 23 of "the Guidelines for the Development of the Shanghai 
Economic Zone", prepared in 1985, proposed establishing the "exchange 
centre" and "training centre" for expertise in the Zone. According to the 
Article, policies should be adopted "to encourage the rational movement of 
expertise, to make good use of the elite including the old experts, scholars 
and skilled labour". For that purpose, the residence-permit system should 
be modified: some of the people could have a double permit to live in two 
places (for example, Shanghai and Suzhou); and more should be paid to 
those who have to or wish to go to the underdeveloped part of the Zone 
(mountain area etc.).73 In the Shanghai Economic Zone there are some 
70
. Measures taken include the establishment of centres for personnel 
exchange where graduates of universities or other persons trained in one field or 
another may apply for changing job. As a go-between, the centre will contact the 
relevant companies, factories and universities. Once in a while there have been 
some labour "exhibits" where the persons who want to employ and persons who 
want to be employed may meet and negotiate with each other. 
71
. See People's Daily September 16 1988. 
72
. Working papers of UNDP & IDO, International Labour Organization 
Geneva, 1990. p.6. See footnote 5. 
73
. See The Development Guidelines of the Shanghai Economic Zone, third 
edition, p.6 Article 23. 
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official organizations now responsible for professionals, like the "talent 
interflow centres", "exchange centres" and "(personnel) trading centres". 
In some large and medium-size cities such as Shenyang and Chengdu, "job 
recommendation offices" which function as bridges between employers and 
employees have been set up. Moreover, temporary migrants have been 
more or less accepted. Rural labourers are now permitted to "leave the land 
but not the countryside". They can take up work if their families can 
supply them with grain, because the permission of private business has 
meant that people can find food and clothing without recourse to the state 
rationing system, and this expansion of collective and private sectors makes 
it feasible to live "illegally" in cities and towns. A survey of Shanghai in 
1985 indicated that in Shanghai around 1.6 million people were such 
"temporary" residents. 
There are two considerations that should be borne in mind before we 
assess these developments. The first is that these changes are still marginal. 
According to the project by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and International Labour Organization Asian Employment Pro-
gramme, in the "talent interflow centre" in Beijing, there were about 7200 
people in specific fields registered from 1984 to August 1987 and about 
2000 of them have realized their "mobility".7'1 While the level of 
personnel mobility is low, it is largely restricted to inter-province level and 
is taking place within the provincial boundary. As of today, the function 
of these "centres" is to encourage the mobility of labour within provinces 
rather than between provinces and, at present, the mobility of labour is 
more or less organized: mobility is under the direction of the state plan and 
is led or controlled by government departments. The central government 
has not taken new policy measures for free migration and the residence-
permit system remains in force. Some regulations have been issued, but 
they seem to rectify what has already taken place. 
The second consideration is that, among changes after the economic 
reforms, temporary migrants are spatially concentrated in rural areas near 
the larger and more prosperous cities such as in Shanghai as we mentioned 
earlier. Guangzhou is also "famous" for temporary residents who intend to 
find jobs in the city. There are also cases in Beijing of free interaction 
between employers and employees for householdhelps. Among 50,000 
74
.These figures are provided by International Labour Organization Working 
Papers. See Strategic Issues in Human Resource Planning in the People's 
Republic of China April, 1990, UNDP Press, p.6. 
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househelps 4/5 are employed through free transaction.75 However, this 
kind of migration is temporary and does not influence the industrial 
structure. Moreover, the data available in this regard is very limited. 
Understandably, in examining the integration of the labour market, 
in addition to the numbers of workers moved in the labour market, the 
change of price for labour (wage) is of interest to us. But as mentioned in 
our earlier discussion, the wage system in China is such that the data about 
wages cannot be used to reflect the costs of labour. 
As additional evidence, labour productivity, the output value in terms 
of the local currency Renminbi(RMB) per unit of labour, might be of more 
relevance to us. The following table shows the overall labour productivity 
in the six regions (Shanghai + 5 provinces) in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone. 
Table 9.3 Overall Labour Productivity in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Source: 
1985 
31483 
18759 
17941 
13980 
13036 
10531 
1986 
32306 
19807 
18754 
14147 
13428 
10884 
China's Statistical Yearbook. 1987. 
1986 as % of 1985 
102.61% 
103.17% 
104.53% 
101.19% 
103.01 % 
103.35% 
While the improvement in labour productivity for the six 
regions(provinces) is around 3%, apart from Anhui which is 1%, the 
labour productivity of Shanghai is more than three times than that of 
Jiangxi. 
There are various explanatory factors for this discrepancy: the 
educational level of the labour force, the investment in the productive 
capacity as well as the technological level may play their roles respectively. 
But one factor responsible for it may be the low mobility of the labour 
force: if the labour force could have moved freely, there would not have 
75 Ibid. 
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been so large a gap in terms of labour productivity. 
In fact, labour mobility is a complicated issue in China. One Chinese 
economist commented:76 
"The risk we run in allowing a marginal 
flow of the work force lies in the fact that a few 
people who are lucky enough to move may be 
rewarded by particularly high compensation, thus 
creating a strong contrast and social repercussions 
and amplifying the adverse effects of mobility." 
Apart from the general discrepancy in income, the question of the 
mobility of the urban work force within the urban economy also presents 
certain specific difficulties. As investigations show, those who have greater 
mobility in society are either skilled workers and specialists, or unskilled 
workers of low social status. As for intermediate-level employees who are 
numerous and have a weak tendency to move, they can only be "forced" 
into mobility by a mandatory reduction of employment. This can be done 
only when an integrated labour insurance system has been established. The 
solution to this problem is to "implement a short-term contract system for 
hiring new employees in the cities, gradually reduce the number of 
permanent employees and eventually turn them into contract workers",77 
because the labour contract system thus designed will change the "iron 
rice-bowl" - life-long employment system, and only then the mobility of 
the labour force can be a reality. Nevertheless it is by no means an easy 
job. As Gordon White commented, the difficulty in implementing such a 
labour contract system is that, apart from "the considerable disagreement 
among policy makers and their advisers about how to proceed", there is 
also resistance from the workers, "so long as there is a significant level of 
urban unemployment and the rewards for non-state employment remain 
inferior "(Gordon White, 1988, p.7). 
9.2 Mobility of Commodities 
The role of commodity markets in the Chinese economy was limited 
in the past, given the nature of a centrally planned economy. But it was by 
no means nonexistent even in the period before reform. "Some links 
7é
. Hua Sheng et. al. Restructuring the Macroeconomic Base "Chinese 
Economic Studies" Winter 1988-1989. 
77
. Ibid. 
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between the different self-contained systems were market or quasi-market 
transactions. For example, provinces traded products, and centrally planned 
enterprises bought coal from locally controlled mines "(World Bank II 
1988). But the flow of goods in the pre-reform periods was basically 
controlled by the planning centre. Horizontal relations were very few if not 
exceptional, although there were several experiments in improving such a 
system even before the reform of late 1970s.78 
As of today the goods produced in China have been divided into 
several categories. Category I products like lumber, finished steel, 
chemicals etc. are subject to balancing by the State Planning Commission 
and to allocation by the State Material Supply Bureau. Category II products 
are under the control of designated industrial ministries. But not all goods 
in both categories are allocated under central control. Locally controlled 
enterprises are also producing goods in Category I and Category II. 
According to the Chinese management system, in most cases either 
ownership (state, collective and private) or administrative (provincial, 
municipal etc.) control of an enterprise confers the right to allocate its 
output. For example, if a watch factory belongs to Jiangsu province, the 
watches produced in that factory are subject to allocation by Jiangsu 
province. On the other hand, the products of a central-government-owned 
steel plant will generally be at the disposal of the state. At least the 
movement of some Category I and Category II goods is related to the 
administrative domain, as in the case with Category III goods, which have 
been under the control of local government.79 This regional character of 
the Chinese economy indicates that local governments have control on the 
production and therefore on the products. 
The finding of Christine P.W.Wong's study shows that among 
437,200 enterprises, which is an extremely large number compared to 
socialist economies in Eastern Europe, there are quite a lot which have 
been controlled by local government. According to Christine Wong, local 
government controls "nearly half of total industrial output" (Christine 
78
. In 1963, Jiangsu was divided into 12 small economic zones and the 
commodity mobility changed. The transportation costs saved were 2.73 million 
yuan. For details see Contemporary Economic Reform in China chapter 9 p.509. 
7
'. In 1980, 46% of coal output, 42% of steel, 36% of non-ferrous metals, 
18 % of lumber and 71 % of cement were subjected to local control. Therefore the 
Chinese economic system differed markedly from other traditional centrally 
planned economies even before the reforms. In the Soviet Union, for example, 
the production of Category I and Category II goods is completely under central 
control. 
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P.W. Wong, p.95, 1987). This implies that provincial or lower level local 
governments will have the incentive and potential for local protectionism. 
The local control on enterprises does not necessarily mean that the 
central government cannot influence local enterprises by means of taxation, 
raw material allocation, price regulation and so on. But a large share of 
local control of enterprises will mean that, as far as commodity mobility 
is concerned, local influence is important. Furthermore, the extent of 
allocation through the market has expanded significantly since the economic 
reforms. The number of centrally allocated producer goods fell from 837 
in 1980 to 23 in 1985. The reforms in 1984 and 1985 have led to a further 
substantial increase in direct enterprise sales of their products and the share 
of output allocated according to plans has been declining correspondingly. 
These changes were intended to help to improve the vertical mobility 
model and to enhance economic integration. 
Local government control on the enterprises can be seen if we have 
a look at the hierarchy of enterprises in China. The enterprises in China 
are divided into two major categories according to the ownership of the 
enterprises. The distribution of the enterprises in these two categories is 
presented here: 
Table 9.4 The Estimated Distribution of Enterprises by Ownership in 
China 
State Collective 
2500 large enterprises 
centrally controlled 
30,000 - 40,000 
small medium size enterprises 
locally controlled (provincial or city) 
40,000 - 50,000 
locally controlled (county & prefecture) 
100,000 
large and small urban 
collectives 
20,000 - 25,000 (collective) 
186,000 (township & village! 
Source: Adapted from Christine P.W. Wong,1987, p.98. 
While the intention of central government was to enhance the market 
allocation of commodities, the reality, however, is that local governments 
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build up barriers to protect their own market Therefore the market for 
commodities, in general, has not been an "unimpeded national market", 
and "there has been a continuing tendency of provinces and localities to 
'protect' their own respective enterprises" (World Bank, 1988, ρ 88) 
Central government has become aware of the negative effect of such 
kind of local protectionism, as was evidenced by numerous central 
government documents prohibiting such activities and encouraging 
"horizontal economic relations" The reforms were to be achieved basically 
"by encouraging the development of independent co-operative and private 
trading concerns, by allowing enterprises to market a portion of their 
output directly and by organizing the flow of commodities according to 
natural marketing systems, bypassing the bureaucratic network of state 
wholesale stations "(White et al,1988,p 18) But the barriers, especially the 
administrative barriers, procurement restrictions, market entry restrictions 
and market-distorting practices etc are still there In Part 2 we have 
already given a full description of these barriers and compared them with 
barriers existing in the EC We will soon find, in our analysis of capital 
mobility in China, that, while some old barriers, particularly sectoral 
(ministry) barriers, have been dismantled, new ones, especially provincial 
barriers, have in fact been reinforced by the revenue-sharing scheme, 
which is going to be discussed in the coming section 
9.3 Capital Mobility 
Quantitative data concerning capital mobility are hardly available for 
systematic examination However, some qualitative data do exist which will 
provide some understanding of capital mobility in China We start with an 
overview of the money flows in China 
The money flow in China is basically vertical the People's Bank 
serves as a centre for cash, credit and settlements "It is a centre of cash 
because it is responsible for currency issues, and because all cash held by 
government organs and state enterprises in excess of the small amounts 
necessary for current expenditure must be deposited in the People's Bank. 
It is a centre for credit because indebtedness between units within the state 
sector is forbidden, so that loans to state units originate from the bank 
alone... the People's Bank is also a centre of settlements because all 
payments above a minimum amount within the public sector must be 
'settled' through bank account transfers" ^ 
Apart from that, the pattern of capital resource flows is through a 
8 0
 See Money and Banking in the Chinese Mainland For changes after the 
economic reforms see Byrd Financial Reform in China 
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vertical fiscal system. Up to 1979 profitable industries, mainly in the 
coastal regions, subsidized the development of new inland enterprises not 
through joint venture, direct investment etc., but through the tax/profit 
system. This implies that the profitable industries handed in their 
profits(tax) to finance government expenditure, which in turn subsidized the 
inland enterprises. 
As in the other fields, there have been some changes in capital 
mobility since 1979, and reforms set out to "redefine the process of capital 
aggregation and circulation, specifically to diversify sources of capital 
provision and redefine the terms on which capital is allocated" 
(White,1988, p.10). But the reform measures have a lot of problems and 
suffer under the rhythm of stop-go financial policy changes: financial 
decentralization followed by overheating followed by government's 
attempts to restore controls. On the other hand, the introduction of 
financial contracting down to county level after 1980 gave the provincial 
and lower level authorities more control over revenues collected locally, 
some of which are sufficient to cover expenditure. The main part of the 
central government's funds now consists of sums transferred from the 
provinces. A minority of poor and/or strategically important provinces 
normally receive grants from central government. All revenues at 
provincial level are divided between the centre and the provinces in a fixed 
ratio established separately and the ratios or amounts are subject to periodic 
negotiation. After such decentralization measures, the provinces also share 
in any increase in revenues or benefits from economizing on expenditures. 
The provinces, in turn, share their revenues with the county-level 
government, which, in many ways, can be compared with that of the 
centre-province relationship. This implies that provincial governments have 
more or less the same revenue sharing scheme with their lower level 
governments. 
Table 9.5 shows the data for central-provincial revenue-sharing in 
the Shanghai Economic Zone. This system has been called the system of 
"eating out of separate kitchens". 
This kind of set-up of differential revenue-sharing rates with 
individual provinces, whilst successful in stimulating the initiative of 
localities in undertaking development projects by giving them authority to 
have their own financial revenues at their disposal, reinforces the 
disintegrative tendency. 
Although the following table concerning central-provincial revenue-
sharing covers only the Shanghai Economic Zone, it is representative in the 
sense that the three major categories of revenue-sharing are included: 
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a. Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui have fixed percentages 
of total own and shared revenue retained by the province, the 
remainder being remitted to the centre; 
b. Jiangxi retains all its own revenue and receives a fixed amount 
from the centre; 
с Fujian fixed its contributions to the centre in money terms 
from 1985 onwards. It retains its own and shared revenue and 
pays a fixed amount to the centre. 
It should be noted that the responsibilities of provincial and lower-
level authorities include their own investment projects apart from their 
public expenditures. 
Table 9.5 Central-Provincial Revenue-sharing in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone (1980-1985) 
Shanghai 
Zhejiang 
Jiangsu 
Anhui 
Jiangxi 
Fujian 
Source: 
1980 
8.6% 
13.0% 
39.0% 
58.1% 
138 
150 
Data for 
1981 
8.46% 
13.0% 
37.0% 
58.1% 
138 
150 
1982 
10.51% 
56.0% 
38.0% 
77.0% 
138 
150 
1980-1983 from 
1983 
n.a 
51.8% 
35.7% 
76.15% 
n.a 
n.a 
1984 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
Lynn T.White III: 
1985 
26.0% 
55.0% 
39.0% 
80.1% 
239 
-235 
Shangh; 
Shanghaied p.44, data for 1985 from the World Bank Report 
Investment and Finance 
Notes: a. The arrangements for 1985 were to govern revenue sharing 
between the central and local governments for five years 
beginning in 1985; data for 1984 is not available but 
absence of it does not affect the whole nature of the system 
because changes were only in percentage and not in the 
basic principle. 
b. For Jiangxi & Fujian province the figures given refer to the 
amount in terms of thousands of yuan transferred from and 
to (with -) the central government. 
с The percentage in the table refers to the centre-province 
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division ratio, i.e., the share of the total revenue the 
provincial govern ments have at their own disposal. 
To assess the pros and cons of this fiscal system is beyond the scope 
of this study. Several observations are, however, relevant for our present 
study. 
One of the characteristics of such a system is that there is still a 
vertical balance. Of the large share of revenues collected by the provinces, 
a disproportionate amount is raised by the richer ones. If a local govern-
ment is able to generate additional revenue outside the contract, this is 
shared with its next superior level at an agreed ratio. The centre extracts 
some of this and a smaller proportion of the revenue raised by middle-
income provinces and transfers some of these as subsidies to the poorest 
regions. The poorest provinces such as Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Gansu, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi etc. are, however, permitted to retain all their 
revenues and to receive central subsidies as well, such as Jiangxi in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone. The mobility is thus centre-province and each 
administrative "cell" is active. 
Moreover, with such revenue-sharing proportions, which are based 
on 1979 realized revenue and expenditure figures, provincial budgets are 
no longer tied completely to the national budget. Provinces have their own 
sources of funds with some freedom to expand in the future. Lower level 
governments have a strong incentive to promote local investment since this 
will lead to rapid growth in their income. The economic interests of 
government at each level are sharply identified, and each level's govern-
ment tries to ensure that the returns are maximized. 
During the reformist era of the 1980s when Zhao Ziyang was prime 
minister, the central government increasingly relinquished control over 
budgets to the provinces. Although Zhao was dismissed, his legacy has 
survived: economically successful coastal areas such as Guangdong now 
pass on ever smaller portions of their earnings to the central government 
and they are not likely to give in. More than ever before, the localities 
manage the capital movement to their own benefit. This explains why the 
local governments are interested in their own raw materials. These raw 
materials, if processed locally, will give extra revenue to the local budget. 
This may likely lead to duplication of investment and production - a topic 
we will discuss in detail later. "Eating from separate kitchens" gives the 
freedom to "cook separate (and duplicated) dishes". The result has been 
"the emergence of a succession of 'commodity wars' over such things as 
wool, silk and cotton, whereby local governments, production units and 
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merchants competed for supplies."81 The national market is "one where 
the feudal lords contend, regions put up blockades, trades practice 
monopolies and the wars are ceaseless....".82 As Audrey Donnithorne said 
when she was analyzing the cellular nature of the Chinese economy in the 
1970s (Audrey Donnithorne, p.18): 
"In so far as funds for investment come out 
of the budget of the controlling local authority, 
local boundaries are also barriers to the move-
ment of capital". 
9.4 Some Conclusions 
The previous analysis on factors and goods mobility suggests that the 
Chinese economy is in effect "a collection of provincial economies". 
Administrative boundaries are quite important in the Chinese economy and 
the vertical planning hierarchy still has much influence despite recent 
reforms. 
Of course our analysis cannol be considered complete. For one thing, 
generally provinces were taken as the units of analysis. The analysis could 
be pushed down to the lower administrative level. But there is no particular 
reason to conclude that the scenario given in our analysis does not reflect 
the characteristics of the factor (commodity) mobility mode in China, 
especially the vertical nature of capital mobility. Although cast largely in 
terms of factor and commodity mobility, the lack-of-integration hypothesis 
has been tested, partially at least. We can see that the Chinese economy is 
"fragmented" by its administrative boundaries and that provincial 
economies are influential and relatively independent with respect to the 
allocation of production factors and commodities. 
gl
. See China Quarterly. 23 August 1988. 
i2
. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 10 
LACK OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: DUPLICATION OF 
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES 
If we were to stop at the qualitative assessment of the integration 
issue (mobility of production factors and commodities), the observation of 
a lack of integration in China would be imcomplete. For one thing, 
mobility of production factors and commodities is, after all, only one 
dimension of integration. 
For this purpose, this chapter intends to have an investigation of 
industrial activities in China. In fact, data pertaining to industrial system 
duplication constitutes an additional body of evidence that can be brought 
to bear upon the "lack-of-integration" hypothesis. 
10.1 Autarky: Similarity of Industrial Structure 
Before we look into details of the ten important industries in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone, a basic analysis of the six regions of the Zone 
is necessary. According to Chinese statistical data, national income 
accounts are limited to the net material product at current prices of five 
broad sectors: agriculture, industry, construction, transportation and 
commerce. The following table shows the composition of national income 
by province in the Shanghai Economic Zone: 
Table 10.1 Composition of National Income by Province in the Shanghai 
Economic Zone (1985) 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Agriculture 
4.5 
32.6 
33.3 
50.3 
40.9 
47.6 
Industry 
73.1 
51.7 
47.4 
33.8 
36.5 
33.7 
Construction 
3.4 
6.1 
5.5 
5.9 
7.9 
7.3 
Transport 
4.0 
2.8 
3.5 
3.4 
4.4 
4.2 
Comm 
erce 
15.0 
6.8 
10.3 
6.6 
10.3 
7.2 
Source: Statistical Year Book for the Shanghai Economic Zone 1986, 
pp.67-69. 
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It is not difficult to see that within the Shanghai Economic Zone the 
development level varies. Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang which are 
located in China's coastal area are industry-oriented regions while the rest 
are more or less agriculture-oriented regions. Shanghai is the most 
advanced region among the six in terms of industrial capacity. However, 
the snapshot of the ten important industries in the six regions of the Zone 
suggests that all the six regions have their industrial production systems and 
the promotion of self-sufficiency at provincial and lower levels extends to 
a variety of products. 
Table 10.2 Output of Major Industrial Products (1986) 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Electric 
fans 
349.90 
556.26 
438.00 
69.44 
49.81 
55.92 
Sewing 
Machines 
313.18 
82.75 
64.45 
15.50 
17.32 
10.82 
T.V. 
342.31 
258.06 
79.52 
26.64 
37.75 
9.57 
Bikes 
634.76 
419.04 
191.09 
112.99 
64.39 
39.17 
Steel 
801.40 
114.95 
46.23 
202.14 
34.42 
91.71 
Wrist 
watches 
1199.75 
466.97 
80.00 
81.43 
36.34 
85.00 
Cement 
227.28 
1329.40 
998.00 
679.55 
321.76 
400.35 
Trucks 
2677 
17479 
2669 
2240 
801 
2284 
Chemical 
Fertilizer 
24.25 
122.42 
59.75 
76.14 
32.89 
24.21 
Motor 
vehicles 
(incl. 
trucks) 
15147 
22323 
5699 
2765 
870 
5319 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1987 p.252. 
Note: the unit for the products is 10 thousand. For steel, cement and 
chemical fertilizer the unit is 10 thousand ton 
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The dispersion of production activities in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone shown above demonstrates that the five provinces and Shanghai were 
producing all these products. 
In general, the more specialized each economy is, the more likely 
they will have commodity exchange. Or, to put it in another way, the more 
self-sufficiency-oriented, the less likely for them to be motivated to have 
commodity exchange. Such duplication of industrial activities may also be 
identified by comparing the industrial production structure. 
We chose five industries as a yardstick to show duplication: the 
machinery industry, the textile industry, the food(processing) industry, the 
chemical industry and the metallurgy industry. This is because among 
thirty-two industries these five industries are leading ones. The production 
value of the five industries is nearly 50% of total industrial production 
value in China. In 1986, for example, the share of these five industries was 
46.41%. 
Table 10.3 Share of the Five Leading Industries per Province in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone (1987) 
Province Percentage 
Shanghai 51.97 
Jiangsu 52.97 
Zhejiang 48.86 
Anhui 46.30 
Jiangxi 43.12 
Fujian 38.93 
Source: Compiled from Wu Shi-quan On the Similarity of Industrial 
Structure Management of Industrial Economics 1987 p.52. 
This investigation of the Shanghai Economic Zone indicates that the 
shares of the five leading industries are very near (43%-51%) for the five 
provinces in the Zone, with Fujian province being a little lower. The share 
for Fujian is different from the other provinces because Fujian had to face 
long-term military confrontations with Taiwan. As a result the economy in 
its coastal areas remained underdeveloped. 
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After reviewing all these facts, the situation of industrial duplication 
can be seen. One question that arises is can we then reach the conclusion 
that duplication as such in China is negative? 
Undoubtedly, to conclude that duplication of production is in general 
inefficient is too superficial. To use the duplication of industrial production 
as an indirect indicator for the lack-of-integration hypothesis, some 
meticulous efforts are indispensable. It is therefore necessary to address at 
least the following essential issues: 
a. Is the duplication of production limited either to some prod­
ucts, or to some levels? Some duplication is acceptable, or 
even necessary anyway. 
b. Is there great demand for the products or can the products be 
sold? Duplication, even though extensive, could be positive if 
the products would meet local demand. 
с Are the factories producing similar or identical products? 
Sometimes a category of production may cover a wide range 
of products so that a textile sector in province A may 
specialize in totally different products than the same sector in 
province B. 
d. Is the duplication due to some similarity of development level 
or resources endowment etc.? Duplication could be a result 
of similar resource endowment, or similar development level. 
a. Extent of duplication 
To start with, we need to see the extent of the duplication. The 
above snapshot can thus be supplemented by calculating the range of prod­
ucts in the Shanghai Economic Zone the production of which the provinces 
are involved in (see Table 10.4). 
Some significant findings can be summed up from Table 10.2, Table 
10.3 and Table 10.4. An important one, among others, is that the 
dispersion covers quite a range of products including both light and heavy 
industry products. According to the Chinese Statistical system, "heavy 
industry" primarily refers to industry producing producer goods, such as 
metals, electric power, coal and coke, building materials, timber and 
machines for use in production. The first five items selected in Table 10.4 
belong to heavy industry. "Light industry", on the other hand, refers 
primarily to consumer goods such as foodstuffs, textiles, paper and metal 
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products for daily use. 
Another finding is that the tendency to duplication is surprisingly 
constant. At least in the range of the products concerned, the geographical 
dispersion in industries has had hardly any change at all for seven years 
(1982-1988). Instead, for some consumer goods, viz., refrigerators, 
recorders, T.V.s etc., there is a new tendency to produce these products 
in all provinces of the Zone. Some of the industries developed rapidly in 
the mid-1980s so that until 1985 no statistical data were available simply 
because these industries did not exist or were at least negligible. This 
appears to suggest that, for some reasons which we will discuss later, 
duplication extends in the years of economic reforms, and the familiar 
desire of self-sufficiency in the past still has influence. Recent reforms, 
while have improved the situation, have not yet stopped the trend. 
Table 10.4 Number of Provinces involved in various Production Activities 
in the Shanghai Economic Zone (1982-1988) 
(out of 6) 
Product 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Coal 
Cement 
Pig iron 
Steel 
Motor Vehicles 
Fertilizer 
Clothth 
Bicycles 
Sewing-machines 
Watches 
T.V's 
Refrigerators 
Washingmachines 
Recorders 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
n.a 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
n.a n.a n.a 
n.a n.a 6 
n.a n.a n.a 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Source: China Statistical Year Books and World Bank: China Long 
Term Development Issues and Options p.73. 
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In fact, the duplication pattern of production can be examined at 
three administrative levels: not only at provincial level, but also at 
municipal level and county level. While the data at provincial level is 
readily available, data at municipal and county level is derived from 
various sources including fieldwork.83 
The following is the result of an investigation into three cities in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone, viz., Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou. The 
percentage in the table is the share of each industry as of total industrial 
production value. 
Table 10.5 The Industrial Structure of Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou 
» 
Cities 
Changzhou 
Suzhou 
Wuxi 
Textile 
26% 
20% 
22% 
Industrial Structure (%) 
Food 
3.6% 
3.5% 
2.3% 
Chemical 
5.6% 
8% 
5% 
Machinery 
16% 
11% 
14% 
Source: provided to the author. 
These three cities are very close to each other. The industrial 
structure, however, is surprisingly similar and duplication of production 
can be seen. If these cities could have specialized in one or two of the 
industries and then exchange their products, it would have been economi-
cally more profitable because the transportation cost involved would be less 
than that with remote provinces. Let it be noted that the sizes of the three 
cities, especially Suzhou and Wuxi, judged by population, are similsr the 
same: the population of Changzhou is 0.66 million, Suzhou is 0.84 million 
and Wuxi is 0.91 million (1989). 
Another set of empirical data for the ten important cities in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone (Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Nantong, 
Hanzhou, Jiaxin, Huzhou, Ningbo and Saoxin) provided a conclusion 
broadly consistent with the results of our previous investigation: the share 
of textile, machinery, chemical industries is around 50%. The detailed 
industrial structure in 1986 for these ten cities, which have been divided 
83
. The help the author has got from the Shanghai Statistical Bureau is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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into А, В, С, D four groups, is as follows: 
Table 10.6 The Industrial Structure of the Ten Important Cities in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone 
Textile Machinery Chemistry Total 
A 16.5% 17.1% 17.1% 50.7% 
В 29.2% 14.4% 13.5% 57.1% 
С 26.4% 19.3% 10.4% 56.1% 
D 30.6% 14.0% 8.6% 53.2% 
Note: A=Shanghai, B=Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Nantong, 
C = Hanzhou, Jiaxin, Huzhou D = Ningbo, Saoxin 
Source: Based on New Problems. New Proposals No.63 p. 10. 
Shanghai Social Sciences Academy,1988. 
Table 10.7 The Industrial Structure of Seven Counties in Zhejiang 1987 
County Machinery Chemistry Textile Food Building 
Material 
Yuhang 23.14% 14.22% 21.00% 15.25% 12.26% 
Jiande 23.00% 19.00% n.a 12.50% n.a 
Tonglu 
Chuñan 
Xiasan 
Linan 
Fuyan 
30.54% 
n.a 
25.94% 
25.67% 
26.67% 
8.80% 
14.35% 
10.82% 
13.64% 
9.7% 
14.38% 
n.a 
20.87% 
n.a 
19.34% 
16.00% 
36.00% 
13.72% 
26.24% 
23.42% 
8.12% 
8.30% 
10.46% 
10.90% 
n.a 
Source: provided to the author. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
While there is provincial data on the theme of industrial duplication, 
reliable and systematic county level data is not so easy to get access to. But 
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an investigation of seven counties in Zhejiang province, the results of 
which were presented in Table 10.7, greatly confirms our thesis that 
duplication pattern was quite normal until recently. 
The World Bank research provided similar evidence in its investiga-
tion in Jiangsu, a province in the Shanghai Economic Zone. The investiga-
tion covered quite a number of production actiities:coal, cement, pig iron, 
steel, fertilizers, bicycles, machine tools etc. 
As we will see from Table 10.8, more than two-thirds of the 14 
prefectures or municipalities investigated were involved in production 
activities for the same products. 
Indeed, the objection to the duplication of industrial activities is not 
simply that there is duplication but rather that it occurs so widely: 
duplication exists not only at the provincial level but also at the lower 
level. 
Table 10.8 Dispersion of Production Activities in Jiangsu (1982) 
Product Number of prefectures or 
municipalities involved (Out of 14) 
Coal 
Cement 
Pig iron 
Steel 
Fertilizers 
Machine tools 
Cloth 
Bicycles 
Sewing machines 
Watches 
9 
14 
9 
13 
14 
13 
14 
12 
12 
11 
Source: Compiled on World Bank China Long-Term Development 
Issues and Options p.73. Table 5.1. 
b. The demand for the products 
The extent of the duplication having been investigated, the second 
issue that should be addressed is related to the demand for the products. 
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The comments of Xue Muqiao, a famous Chinese economist, is relevant in 
this regard: 
"We obviously do not need this many, but 
these plants belong to different ministries, prov-
inces and counties. In view of the profits these 
plants can make, no unit wants to disown 
them...There are almost 1000 municipalities and 
counties wishing to produce refrigerators, electric 
fans, washing-machines, recorders and many 
other products this year (1980). If all rush to set 
up factories at the same time, many will be 
forced to stop or delay their construction when 
half-done."84 
According to the China Daily." due to the independent production 
system for each province, 70 million watches were made in 1986 but only 
40 million were sold. Another article also mentioned the over-production 
in wrist-watches, bicycles and sewing machines: the production of wrist 
watches in the first three months of 1987 was 29.7% higher than in the 
corresponding period in 1986." The bike industry produced 35.7 million 
bicycles in 1986, 10.6 % more than 1985, but sales remained at the 20.22 
million figure. The output of sewing machines was 9.26 million in 1986, 
roughly the same as in 1985, but unsold stocks increased by 15.2% to total 
2.65 million.87 More recent reports show that there are a lot of unwanted 
products. One report says that of 650 products distributed by the Ministry 
of Commerce, at least 25% are virtually unsaleable. Chief among the 
unwanted items are textile goods and clothes, black-and-white TVs, 
M
. This comment is quoted from Carl Riskin's The Political Economy of 
China. See p.217 of that book. 
". China Daily 20. February, 1987. 
M
. China Daily 20 May 1987. 
". Paul Bowles and Gordon White Contradictions in China's Financial 
Reforms : the relationship between banks and enterprises Cambridge Journal of 
Economics Vol. XIII p.481-495. 
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refrigerators and bicycles.88 Such anecdotal evidence appears to suggest 
that as a result of blind duplication and without taking into account the end-
users' demand, many are "left on the shelf" and the stockpile increases. As 
we will see later (Table 10.11), some provinces have to withdraw from the 
"duplication competition" in some production. 
с The variety of products 
It is hardly possible to examine every sector to see the variety of 
products. We may, however, pick up the textile industry as an example. 
In the ten important cities in the Shanghai Economic Zone investigated in 
Table 10.6, the duplication is such that almost all of the ten cities have 
cotton, linen, silk, wool and synthetic production; and among the ten cities 
there are nine cities produce similar bikes, seven produce similar type 
sewing-machines, six produce similar watches! Table 10.8 already showed 
that in Jiangsu province the duplication of specific products is extensive. 
Of course the municipal and county level investigation indicates that, 
given the limited resources, the degree of similarity of industrial structure 
is not as large as that at the provincial level. But it still can be identified: 
"Each provincial and municipal planning 
bureau accordingly continues to emphasize the 
development of a wide range of industrial activ­
ities on a scale tailored to local needs, rather than 
concentrating its resources on a large-scale 
low-cost production of a narrow range of com­
modities for export to other localities" (World 
Bank, 1988, pp.99-100). 
d. Natural resources and the development level 
The last issue that needs to be addressed is, can such extensive 
duplication be explained by natural endowments and development level? 
We have already demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter that 
the development level varies in the Shanghai Economic Zone. Sometimes 
duplication is understandable if the economies involved have more or less 
the same resources or development levels. It is not surprising for OPEC 
countries to have oil production duplication in their individual countries. 
But in the Shanghai Economic Zone this is not the case. Our analysis of the 
. See "Left on the Shelf' Far Eastern Economic Review 1 August, 1991, 
p.49. 
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percentage of national income for each region (Table 10.1) has already 
confirmed this. Within the Zone are relatively developed and developing 
provinces as well. In terms of industrial capacity and other aspects, 
Shanghai is one of the most advanced parts of China whereas Jiangxi is one 
of the least developed ones. Let it be noted, as we have illustrated in Part 
2, that industrial concentration and specialization did exist before the 
1940s. The industrial survey mentioned in Chapter 5 showed that the three 
major industrial centers, namely, Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao had 
around 4/5 of the share of the country as a whole (see Table 5.3). Our 
analysis thus supports the following essential conclusion: duplication, 
which occurs so widely, can only be explained by the fact that it is a result 
of some kind of policy pursued after the Communist takeover in 1949. 
10.2 The Economic Cost of Duplication 
The economic inefficiency of such dispersion of industrial activities 
is difficult to calculate precisely. The present complicated price structure 
in China adds to the complexity to quantify the production cost curves in 
different industries of different provinces. This, however, does not imply 
that in the dearth of meaningful price signals, any empirical attempt will 
be impossible to identify the costs imposed upon such a production pattern. 
There are some studies which will show how the duplicative pattern 
of production appears to be inefficient. For example, to compare the 
dispersion of production activities on the one hand, with the size of 
production output on the other, will surely throw light on the theme of 
economic inefficiency, because dispersion of industrial activities is not 
efficient if it is accompanied by a low level of production volume. 
Table 10.9 shows that for the cloth and steel industries, the 
percentage for Shanghai plus Jiangsu is above 50%, whereas for Fujian 
plus Jiangxi it is lower than 10%. 
The data for these two industries is not exceptional. A close 
inspection of the production volumes of each province reveals that in 
almost all cases for the industries examined, Shanghai and Jiangsu 
contribute around 50% of total output, with cement and fertilizer a little bit 
lower but still higher than 40%. 
In the consumer goods industries such as the sewing-machines, the 
bike industry, the watch industry and the colour TV industry etc., the 
percentage for Shanghai is always half of the total, whereas the percentage 
for Jiangxi plus Fujian is, in all cases, around 10%. In the watch industry, 
Fujian province only produced 400 watches in 1983! 
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Table 10.9 The Percentage of Production Volume of Steel and Cloth in 
the Shanghai Economic Zone (1983-1987) 
Steel 
Region 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Zone 
Cloth 
Region 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Zone 
1983 
58.4% 
8.3% 
5.0% 
20.1% 
2.7% 
5.4% 
100% 
1983 
31.2% 
38.2% 
12.1% 
10.6% 
2.6% 
5.3% 
100% 
1984 
56.7% 
8.6% 
5.4% 
19.8% 
3.2% 
6.3% 
100% 
1984 
30.4% 
39.1% 
14.2% 
8.8% 
2.7% 
4.7% 
100% 
1985 
55.2% 
9.5% 
5.4% 
19% 
3.2% 
7.7% 
100% 
1985 
• 27.6% 
38.6% 
16.25% 
10% 
2.7% 
4.9% 
100% 
1986 
61.7% 
8.9% 
3.9% 
15.7% 
2.8% 
7.3% 
100% 
1986 
24.6% 
38.8% 
18.2% 
10.5% 
2.9% 
5.0% 
100% 
1987 
61.2% 
9.5% 
4% 
14.9% 
2.9% 
7.5% 
100% 
1987 
23.2% 
39.9% 
17.7% 
10.7% 
3.2% 
5.3% 
100% 
Source: calculated from the individual provincial statistical data in the 
China Statistical Year Books. 
As a result of extensive (or excessive) duplication, there is storage 
of unsold (perhaps never to be sold) products in some places and there is 
shortage of raw materials in others which have high production capacity. 
One typical case to illustrate the economic cost of excessive duplication is 
the case of Shanghai. Our previous investigation (Table 9.3) has shown that 
the labour productivity in Shanghai is the highest among the six regions in 
the Shanghai Economic Zone. Commodities produced in Shanghai have in 
fact brought the state a lot of sales tax. In the mid-1980s, the average sales 
tax on Shanghai goods was 21 percent whereas for Wuxi and Suzhou the 
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average sales tax was only 13 and 12 percent respectively (Lynn T.White, 
1989, p. 19). But Table 10.10 shows that shortages of materials are serious 
in Shanghai city which brings a lot of revenue to the state. 
Table 10.10 Shortages of Raw Materials in Shanghai, 1985 
Cement 
Steel 
Lumber 
Ferrous metals 
Chemical 
Source: 
inputs 
Lynn 
Requirements 
3.5 
2.43 
1.5 
0.21 
3.04 
T. White III Shan 
Planned allocation 
(m.metric tons) 
ghaiS 
51 
60 
60 
69 
76 
hanghsietl p.66. 
Shortage % 
of Plan 
49 
40 
40 
31 
24 
Table 9. 
Many of the most efficient and modern factories in Shanghai cannot 
develop their potential due to the improper protectionism on raw materials 
from other localities. The materials are allocated inefficiently! 
Duplication is inefficient if the production volume is low. Table 10.2 
at the beginning of the chapter has already demonstrated the production 
volume for each province. In most cases there are understandably more 
than one factory in one province. We need more data to see economies of 
scale or dis-economies of scale in some provinces. Nevertheless the 
production volume in some province(s) is even lower than the empirical 
criteria for an individual enterprise. For example, the steel production 
volume for Fujian is 344,200 tons whereas the criteria for economies of 
scale is set at 1-3 million tons.89 
10.3 From the Shanghai Economic Zone to China 
Up to now our analysis of the duplication of industrial activities has 
been confined to the six provinces of the Shanghai Economic Zone. Can 
it, however, be established that the conclusion so far reached is also 
applicable to other Chinese provinces? In other words, is the phenomenon 
examined so far typical for the Chinese economy as a whole? 
At least two questions should be explored before a more general 
89
. For the criteria of economies of scale, see Chapter 2. 
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conclusion can be drawn. 
First of all, is the Shanghai Economic Zone a special case so that the 
economic development pattern is different from other regions? 
In fact, there are several special economic zones in China to which 
the central government does have pursued a special policy.90 The 
Shanghai Economic Zone is, however, not a "special" zone at all. Our 
description of the background of the Shanghai Economic Zone has 
demonstrated that the Shanghai Economic Zone is not a special case from 
the policy perspective. It has never been the intention of the central 
government to have the Shanghai Economic Zone as a zone of production 
duplication. 
Secondly, is the development pattern in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
due to its specific conditions such as transportation facilities etc.? In some 
cases, due to a backward transportation system raw materials can only be 
transported costly to the neighboring locality and so do final products. 
Duplication is thus one of the solutions to the survival of localities. 
It was illustrated already that the development level and natural 
resources vary in the Shanghai Economic Zone. The duplication is by no 
means the result of similar natural resources nor of the similar development 
level. In terms of transportation facilities, it can in fact be argued that, if 
anything, fragmentation should be expected to be lower in the Shanghai 
Economic Zone than in the rest of China, or the integration should be 
expected to be higher. For one thing, historically Shanghai has been the 
heart of industrial China even before 1949, and the Shanghai Economic 
Zone as a whole is one of the developed areas in the national context. One 
would therefore expect Shanghai and its surrounding areas to have the most 
highly developed transportation system in China, which will be relatively 
easy ( in comparison with other areas) to stimulate economic integration. 
Moreover, because of the relative administrative independence of Shanghai 
and the heavy concentration of heavy industry in the Shanghai area, one 
might well expect to find the Shanghai Economic Zone one of the most 
integrated or least fragmented areas of the country because specialization 
would be more likely to be acceptable as a result of historical development. 
It was probably one of the reasons for the central authority to choose the 
Shanghai Economic Zone as a zone for economic integration. The other 
provinces must be less integrated if the Shanghai Economic Zone is not 
integrated at all. 
Apparently, given the scope of this study, it will not be feasible to 
90
. The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is one, among others, of such 
"special" zones where there is more flexibility in taxes, wage systems etc. 
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investigate in detail the whole development pattern of the Chinese 
economy, to cross-check whether our conclusion from the Shanghai 
Economic Zone is correct or not. However, we may well amplify two of 
our previous analyses to the Chinese economy as a whole: the dispersion 
of industrial activities and the comparison with the concentration of 
industrial production volume. 
Table 10.11 The Dispersion of Various Production Activities among 29 
Provinces in China (1982-1988) 
Production Number of provinces involved in activity (from 1982-1988) 
activity 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Coal 
Cement 
Pig iron 
Steel 
Fertilizers 
Cloth 
Bicycles 
Sewing machines 
Watches 
T.Vs 
Refrigerators 
Washing-machines 
Motor vehicles 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
28 
26 
24 
24 
26 
n.a 
28 
26 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
28 
26 
24 
24 
26 
n.a 
28 
26 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
28 
26 
24 
24 
26 
n.a 
28 
26 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
28 
24 
22 
24 
26 
n.a 
28 
24 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
27 
24 
21 
23 
26 
20 
28 
25 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
27 
24 
21 
23 
26 
22 
28 
25 
27 
27 
27 
28 
28 
27 
24 
21 
23 
26 
22 
28 
25 
Source: See Table 10.6 
There are altogether twenty-six provinces and three provincial level 
municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin)." The numbers in the table 
refer to the provinces involved in the various production activities out of 
the total of twenty-nine provinces and municipalities in total, and the data 
91
. Provinces here refer also to autonomous areas. Heinan province was 
established only recently, and Taiwan, though regarded as one province of China, 
has understandably separate statistical data. 
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is also presented in time series to demonstrate the trend. 
Table 10.11 shows that the situation as a whole is a somewhat 
different from that in the Shanghai Economic Zone. A declining trend in 
the dispersion of production activities can be found in the bike industry, 
sewing machine industry etc. In the bike industry, for example, three 
provinces, namely, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Gansu have "withdrawn" 
from the "duplication competition". This can be partly explained by the 
fact that since the early 1980s, the central government, realizing the 
inefficiency of such a situation, started to emphasize more on specializ-
ation. Yet the duplication is still striking, especially in the consumer goods: 
the number of provinces involved in TV production has actually been 
constant and the number of provinces involved in producing refrigerators 
has been on the increase. 
Another indicator which is of interest for us to analyze is the 
"Hofman Ratio" - the ratio of total light industry production value vs.total 
heavy industry production value. 
Table 10.12 The Hofman Ratio per Province in China, 1986 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Mongolia 
Liaoning 
Jilin 
0.779 
1.200 
0.866 
0.392 
0.768 
0.484 
0.729 
Heilongjiang 0.518 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Source: 
1.218 
1.326 
Based on China's 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Shangdong 
Henan 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
1.802 
1.212 
1.565 
0.878 
1.179 
0.978 
0.955 
0.856 
2.122 
1.405 
Sichuan 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 
; Statistical Yearbook 1987. 
0.86 
9 
0.65 
0 
0.91 
4 
0.68 
4 
0.39 
2 
0.34 
9 
0.65 
5 
0.48 
1 
0.89 
0 
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Those provinces which have ratios larger than one are light-industry 
oriented provinces, while those which have ratios lower than one are heavy 
industry-oriented. Table 10.12 shows clearly that the heavy industry-
oriented provinces are such as Gansu, Shanxi, Liaoning, Ningxia, 
Heilongjiang etc., because their Hofman ratios are about O.S. Guangdong, 
Zhejiang, Fujian etc. are more light-industry-oriented, because their 
Hofman ratios are more about 1.5. But many of the provinces in China 
have ratios near to one. This indicates a high degree of similarity in 
heavy/light industry structure. 
The dispersion of industrial activities may again be compared with 
the concentration of product volume: 
Table 10.13 The Distribution of the Volume of Production (1982) 
Region & 
City 
Three cities 
Bejing 
Tianjin 
Shanghai 
Other 
Provinces 
National 
Gross Industrial output 
Total Heavy 
19.3% 
3.9% 
3.7% 
9.0% 
80.7% 
100% 
17.8% 
4.3% 
3.2% 
8.0% 
82.2% 
100% 
: shares 
Light 
20.8% 
3.4% 
4.2% 
10.0% 
79.2% 
100% 
Output/ 
population 
6.9 
7.8 
7.4 
15.0 
0.8 
Source: Based on data from the World Bank: China Long-Term 
Development Issues and Options p.74. 
A few explanations are useful to interpret the above table. One may 
notice that the figures for the three cities as a whole is not the total sum of 
individual cities: while the share for Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai was 
3.9%, 3.7% and 9.0% respectively, the share of industrial output for the 
three cities should be 15.6%, instead of 19.3%, of the total output in 
China. The reason for the deviation is that the figure for the three cities 
includes some rural counties surrounding the cities whereas the figures for 
individual cities exclude the rural counties. 
Moreover, since the three municipalities accounted for 19.3% of 
total output and the output/population ratio was 6.9, their total population 
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must represent nearly 3% of the total. Similarly, since the out-
put/population ratio for Shanghai is 15, as the table showed, the industrial 
output is quite concentrated in Shanghai: 0.6 (9/15) % of the population is 
producing 9% of the total of industrial products! 
The lower level data (municipal and county level) shows that the 
dispersion of industrial activities varies from province to province and 
varies from product to product. The World Bank study has chosen two 
provinces, both of which belong to non-Shanghai Economic Zone 
provinces, for their investigation, and the results are presented here: 
Table 10.14 The Dispersion of Production Activities in Hubei and Gansu 
Product Number of prefectures or municipalities 
involved in the production 
Hubei Gansu 
Coal 
Cement 
Pig iron 
Steel 
Steel products 
Fertilizers 
Machine tools 
Cloth 
Bicycles 
Sewing machines 
Watches 
Source: Based on data 
Term DeveloD! 
7 
14 
3 
8 
14 
12 
9 
14 
6 
8 
n.a 
in World Bank 
ment Issues and 
n.a 
13 
2 
4 
7 
6 
2 
4 
1 
0 
0 
Countrv Report: China Long 
Options p.73. 
In general, the lower data for the two provinces selected still 
confirm the findings in the Shanghai Economic Zone: there is dispersion 
of the production in steel, cement etc. But the data for Gansu province 
showed some differences when compared with the data at the same level 
for Hubei province. How can we interpret the data? Does the data from the 
World Bank contradict our previous conclusion? 
Further investigation shows that Gansu province is a different case 
in the sense that heavy industry has been stimulated in this province by the 
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central planner and the share of heavy industry has increased sharply: it 
was 22% in 1949, but in 1972 it was 82%. In 1984 and 1985 it was 77% 
and 75% respectively (World Bank,1988,p.212). A Hofman ratio analysis 
showed that the light/heavy ratio for Gansu is 0.349, the lowest among all 
provinces in China. Nevertheless duplication can still be found in this 
province: "One plant was built in Jiuquan in northwest Gansu near iron ore 
and coal deposits to produce only pig iron, while another plant was built 
1000 km away in Lanzhou to produce only steel but no pig iron. The first 
plant was under national government control and the other was provincially 
owned and controlled.... This lack of co-ordination along with the 
construction of several other uneconomical, small plants, led to heavy 
financial losses in the iron and steel industry in Gansu province, and 
economic losses were even greater"(World Bank, 1988, p.212). 
Indeed, the costs for failure to achieve economic integration are 
substantial because it retards the exploitation of comparative advantages 
and economies of scale. Some of the industries which have scale-factors 
involved like large size cement, steel, chemical products and trucks,92 
have been operating without considering the economies of scale. 
Take the iron and steel industry for example. China's iron and steel 
industry, consists of 1800 mills, dispersed throughout all provinces except 
Xizang (Tibet) and Qinghai which produce only pig iron, and all except 
Xizang (Tibet) which only produces crude steel and steel products. Small 
iron and steel enterprises at the county level produce less than 5000 tons 
of steel per year. The production costs also vary greatly. According to the 
World Bank estimation (World Bank, 1988, p.80), the production costs for 
large size enterprises are 138 yuan per bicycle, for medium size enterprises 
192 yuan and for small enterprises 304 yuan. Obviously the small 
enterprises are in most cases operating with economic losses, especially 
those far away from the source of raw materials. The automobile industry 
is another example. Although the country produces about 100,000 cars 
each year, there are over one hundred automobile plants. Some of the 
plants are so small that they each assemble no more than one or two 
hundred cars per year. There are even a few each assembling only a few 
dozen cars a year. A small car plant in Guizhou province used to assemble 
only 200 to 300 cars a year. 
According to the 1989 statistical data, there were typical examples 
of production volume lower than the economies of scale criteria even if the 
provincial production volume is regarded as the level for one enterprise. 
In fact, there are about 130 automobile factories located in twenty-six 
. For details see the chapters in Part 1 on Economics of Integration 
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provinces. Among these 130 factories, more than 110 factories have the 
production scale as 1000 per year. 17 factories have production capacity 
as 100 cars per year. A few have production scale as several cars per year. 
The production costs could be as high as 20-30 thousands yuan, two or 
three times higher than the production costs in No.l Automobile Factory, 
China's largest automobile factory." 
Table 10.15 Automobile Production in China and the Scale Factor 
Production Scale Provinces 
lower than 10000 units Hebei, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan, 
Hunan, Guizhou Yunnan, Qinghai, Shaanxi. 
lower than 1000 units Shanxi (800). 
lower than 100 units Gansu (2), Inner Mongolia (30) 
Source: China's Industrial Statistics 1989. 
Note: the figures in the parentheses indicate the number of automo-
biles produced. 
For industries producing bikes, electric fans, TVs etc., the costs are 
reflected not only as forgone output but also as excessive duplication in 
investment and production, underutilization, non-standardization and 
inferior quality. Large quantity of these products have to be stored since 
they cannot be sold, as was mentioned earlier. 
Seichi Nakajima, a Japanese scholar, has written a special report on 
China's building materials industry. In this report he mentioned that "the 
problem (for cement production) is that the equipment of small factories is 
antiquated and production technology out of date in most cases. The 
cement produced at these factories is therefore poor in quality."94 Apart 
from quality, designs also vary considerably and are constrained by lack 
of local technological capacity and insufficient local sources of material. 
w
. This example is quoted in Hu Bo-chun's book China: Problem. Dilemma 
and Painstaking Selection p.7. Our example of the bicycle industry which will be 
discussed as a case study reflects the same rationality: industrial location is 
important for economic efficiency. 
94
. See China Newsletter No. 78 Jan.-Feb. 1989, p. 17. 
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Parts are usually not interchangeable. 
Typically, when some localities are trying to have independent indus-
trial systems despite the limited capacity they have, they will face a few 
pressing problems and difficulties. Sources of energy and raw materials are 
not well planned so that some of these factories frequently have to suspend 
production; there is a shortage of technicians and skilled personnel; 
environmental pollution is not well controlled and labor protection is 
lacking. As might be expected, the endeavour for the development of all 
kinds of industrial products results in intensive conflicts among the 
localities which seek for investment funds, raw materials, equipment, and 
energy resources. This has a clearly adverse impact on the allocation of 
resources. 
The costs of the barriers can also be examined from the consumers' 
point of view, as in the case of the EC market.95 Firstly , the frictions to 
transferring goods decrease the variety of goods available for consumption. 
The example of the tractor has already been mentioned: the peasants in 
Guizhou cannot buy tractors produced in Changzhou due to registration 
barriers. They have to buy low-quality products, locally produced, which 
is to them an economic cost. Secondly, in theory at least, efficiency 
requires that all consumers pay the same price for the same goods, 
allowing for necessary transport costs. In the case of China where the price 
is set by the state, consumers often pay the same price for different goods 
due to the fact that they are not able to get access to better quality goods 
under the regional protectionism. 
The costs of barriers may also be reflected in terms of production. 
By relocating the production of particular goods to the places in which they 
are produced most cheaply, it could increase the supply of all goods. 
Admittedly the analysis presented so far constitutes only an approxi-
mation of the lack-of-integration pattern of Chinese economy. For one 
thing, we cannot assert that the products in the sample, although it includes 
both heavy and light industries, constitute the whole coverage. Secondly, 
output values themselves are not convincingly sufficient to show that there 
is a lack of specialization. But duplication does occur in the leading 
industries which have been investigated. 
Incidentally, duplication is not limited to industrial activities: 
"Research and development have become highly fragmented, with 
. The methodology used in the EC Commission's Assessment of Economic 
Effects of Completing the Internal Market - The Economics of 1992 is quite 
relevant to the present study. See The Economics of 1992 by Michael Emerson 
et.al. 
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excessive replication and non-cooperation among research units under 
different authorities" (Thomas Lyon,p.272). 
This brief analysis of the situation in China as a whole, as compared 
with that in the Shanghai Economic Zone, indicates that the degree of 
duplication does not vary significantly in China. At the lower level, the 
coverage of the investigation (two provinces) is not yet enough to reach a 
general conclusion. But there is no evidence to show that the lack-of-
integration hypothesis is not valid at least at the provincial level. As was 
emphasized earlier, the focal point is not simply that duplication occurs in 
China, but rather that it occurs so widely. In this sense, the next section 
which intends to dig up the historical development of such extensive 
duplication will be an important complementary part to this section. 
10.4 Explanations of the Lack of Integration 
Having considered the duplication of industrial activities in China, 
it is now necessary at this stage to introduce a historical perspective 
because our analysis so far describes the final situation but more or less 
ignores the development period and the conditions affecting this 
development process. Put in another way, we need to find some structural 
explanations of the phenomenon. 
In fact, as we pointed out earlier, one explanation of the strong 
dispersion of industrial activities is actually the self-sufficiency policy 
pursued in the past. The advocacy of self-sufficiency was not a coinci-
dence. "The resource-ailocative dimension of self-reliance was the Maoist 
answer to the problem of allocation sans market or large planning 
apparatus"(Riskin Carl, 1985, p.206). Its purpose was to simplify co-
ordinative requirements in the economy and to minimize external links. 
Mao's comments on the Soviet textbook Political Economy rejected 
explicitly the principle of a division of labor - a principle for economic 
efficiency: 
"This is not a good idea. We do not sug-
gest this even with respect to our own provinces. 
We advocate all-round development and do not 
think that each province need not produce goods 
which other provinces could supply. We want the 
various provinces to develop a variety of produc-
tion to the fullest extent... The correct method is 
each doing the utmost for itself as a means 
toward self-reliance for new growth, working 
independently to the greatest possible extent, 
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making a principle of not relying on others... "^ 
The principle of "self-sufficiency" had, in fact, long been 
emphasized. The phrase "self-reliance" is derived from "self-sufficiency": 
a locality must be self-sufficient in order to be self-reliant. For a long time 
"self-reliant" had been a catchword (or a slogan) for every administrative 
"cell", be it a province, a municipality or a county. Indeed the principle of 
self-reliance can be traced back to the difficult days of the 1930s and 
1940s, "when the Chinese Communist Party had no choice but to make do 
with the limited resources and backward technology of the guerrilla base 
areas." In the 1930s and the 1940s, the phrase acquired two different 
interpretations. When used at local level, self-reliance meant that localities 
should strive for self-sufficiency in agriculture and in industry. At national 
level self-reliance meant that the nation as a whole should rely on its own 
for economic growth instead of relying on external aids or external 
exchange. To encourage the dispersion of industrial activities, Mao, for 
example, called upon all provinces "to do as much as possible in develop­
ing all kinds of production, so long as they do not militate against the 
overall situation."'7 In 1958 Mao even called for large enterprises like the 
Wuhan Steel Works to operate their own machinery, chemical, and 
construction establishments and to engage in agriculture, commerce, 
education, military activities in addition to industry (Stephen 
Andors,p.l58). 
This principle was strengthened by the Sino-Soviet Rift. As described 
by Terry Cannon (1990,p.38), between 1965 and the mid-1970s, around 
2000 factories were set up in the "third front" (as opposed to the coastal 
"first front" and Jiangxi and Anhui the "second front") area: Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi and western Henan, Hubei and Hunan. Sichuan 
province was the core province with its rich agricultural land, fuel supply 
and mountainous surroundings. These "third front" plants were military-
oriented, producing products of aerospace, electronics etc. A policy to 
duplicate some industrial enterprises and research establishments into the 
interior inland in the southeast was the answer to the threat of attack from 
either or both the USA and USSR. Over a seven-year period there were 
massive and secret investments in the "third front" area, which was thought 
safest from bombing. Such a policy and the associated transfers of 
personnel have effects on the location of industries, and the effects are 
. Mao, 1977, с 102-3. This paragraph was quoted from Riskin Carl. 
97
. John G. Gurley The Dialectics of Development p. 132. 
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likely to be felt even when the military invasion is not a serious threat at 
all as provincial and local governments since then have sought to build and 
operate their own diversified industrial systems and to build autarkic 
"kingdoms". In the late 1970s each rural county ("xian" or "hsien" in 
Chinese) set up and expanded small and medium-scale factories when 
essential materials and markets were available locally. The counties were 
given great freedom in establishing enterprises. The "five small industries" 
(cement, chemical fertilizer, machinery, power, and iron and steel) formed 
the basis of the comprehensive local systems of the Cultural Revolution 
years. The production capacity of small nitrogenous fertilizer plants, for 
example, grew five times between 1965 and 1969, and their share of 
national fertilizer output increased from 12 per cent in 1965 to 60 per cent 
in 1971. In 1965 there were only about 200 small cement plants, but by 
1973 the number had grown to 2800, which produced about half of this 
cement. By 1971 local small and medium size factories were responsible 
for one-fifth of the national production of pig iron. These small and 
medium size factories played an important role in the political economy of 
self-reliance. 
In Audrey Donnithorne's article, a vivid picture was given describing 
the self-sufficiency situation in the 1970s: 
"Self-sufficiency, another of the economic 
watch-words of present day China, is a corollary 
of self-reliance. Self-sufficiency may be within an 
enterprise, a unit of local administration or a 
commune. Even individual 'hsien' (counties) and 
municipalities have been urged to build a 'small 
but complete local industrial system by self-re-
liance.' In the words of the Shansi provincial 
radio service 'to battle hard for one or two years 
and achieve provincial self-sufficiency in light 
industry products is the glorious battle task of the 
workers, technicians and revolutionary cadres on 
the front of light industry.' In keeping with this 
policy an index figure often quoted when discuss-
ing the economic performance of a locality is its 
percentage of self-sufficiency for a commodity or 
commodities. For example, towards the end of 
1970 the province of Kirin (Jilin) claimed to 
produce 47.9 percent (neither more nor less) of 
the light industrial goods its inhabitants needed, 
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compared with 30 per cent in 1969. In the prov-
incial capital, the Changchun Number One De-
partment Store 'now exclusively sells light indus-
try products made in the province.' The munici-
pality of Wuhan congratulated itself that in the 
first half of 1970 'the ratio of self-sufficiency in 
making equipment for industrial production 
showed an overall improvement.' Self-sufficiency 
in equipment for producing chemical fertilizer 
was 'completely achieved' while the ratio of 
self-sufficiency in equipment for motor vehicles 
and bicycles reached more than 95 percent. 
Nanking, however, deplored the fact that 'After 
a comparison with some advanced places it 
appeared that our rate of self-sufficiency in light 
industrial products was not high.' A meeting was 
summoned to discuss the situation and 'the rate of 
self-sufficiency in light industrial goods very 
quickly rose from 70 per cent to about 90 per 
cent.' Even in the case of smaller cities the same 
policy was followed. For example, Nanchang 
(population around 500,000), the capital of 
Jiangxi, was reported late in 1970 to be '80 per 
cent sufficient in the main products' of light 
industry whilst the smaller town of Kochiu, in 
Yunnan apparently claimed complete self-suf-
ficiency in light industrial and handicraft goods" 
(Audrey Donnithorne p.609). 
In her words: "The picture given is of a large number of highly 
protectionist states each minimizing its imports while trying to push its 
exports." 
In the same article, Audrey Donnithorne analyzes the rationale for 
such a policy: 
"The advantages of the policy of self-suffi-
ciency within administrative units are primarily 
those of administrative convenience and local 
initiative. Self-sufficiency gives rise to a clear 
chain of command with those controlling a local 
administrative unit for a large proportion of its 
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raw materials and other supplies" (pp 611-612) 
Needless to say, the situation has changed greatly in the post-Mao 
period However, the problem of the "territoriality" of economic activity 
created in the past by the administrative boundaries of ministries and local-
ities remains unsolved and the vested interests that administrative divisions 
fostered reinforce such a tendency One example was once mentioned to 
explain how four separate and comprehensive iron and steel mills came to 
be built in the medium-sized city of Huangshi9* Even though the city 
already had the Daye Iron and Steel Mill, a large-scale centrally adminis-
tered enterprise, the Hubei provincial authorities built their own Xialu Steel 
Works in Huangshi for the reason that "all the profits of Daye were handed 
over to the state and the locality did not gain any benefits " Likewise, the 
province kept all output produced in Xialu Therefore the municipal 
government set up its own steel works near tothe national and provincial 
steel mills That was not the end of the story Since the municipal 
authorities did not care about the interests of suburban counties and only 
300 tons of pig iron were allocated out of 3000 tons needed annually, Daye 
county also built its own iron and steel mill In this way, redundant 
construction has occurred and the local government operated their own iron 
and steel works even though they knew this would incur losses Similar 
duplication prevailed in other industries in Huangshi Aside from the 
Huaxin Cement Works, a large central enterprise, there were twenty-three 
other cement plants operated by the provincial, municipal, county or even 
lower level authorities Obviously the various administrative bodies 
operating their own enterprises have been preoccupied with their own 
benefits and do not consider the interests of various other parties Such 
examples are not exceptional In Liaoning province, central government 
invested to establish four big steel mills but the provincial government 
invested seventy million yuan to build four small-scale steel mills In Jinan 
municipality, Shangdong province, four steel mills were built belonging to 
two provincial, one municipal and one county level authority respectively. 
The local people said humorously "the grandfather, father and son do not 
belong to the same family", meaning that the four mills have different 
ownership though they were producing the same product - steel One 
extreme case was once mentioned to show the economic loss due to lack 
of economic co-operation There are sixteen chemical factories in Beijing 
Ding Hua A Basic Cause of Poor Results of Investments Lies in the 
Economic Management System - An Investigation of Iron and Steel Works of the 
Municipality of Huangshi Economic Management Magazine No 3, 1984 
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area eight of which produce oxygen while letting off nitrogen and the other 
eight produce nitrogen while letting off oxygen!99 
An editorial in the People's Daily suggested that "comprehensive 
factories" would enable local cadres and officials to have at their disposal 
products manufactured in their domain, regardless of cost, labor and econ­
omic efficiency.100 Local governments, worrying about their own 
interests, often try to restrict competition between regions and even to deny 
market access to outsiders. In many cases, enterprises have been prohibited 
from purchasing better and less expensive goods produced elsewhere. 
The central authorities became aware of such kind of economic inef­
ficiency in the late 1970s. Hu, former head of China Social Sciences 
Academy, commented: 
"Substituting administrative boundaries for 
natural economic boundaries not only disrupts the 
flow of materials and products and induces ex­
cessive stockpiling, but sometimes also cuts off 
rational economic co-operation, creates artificial 
economic separation and isolationism and blocks 
commodity circulation and material allocation, 
impeding normal development of the economy." 
He Jianzhang in his article The Current Economic Policies of China "" 
pointed out more explicitly: 
"One of the principal errors of our econ­
omic policy in the past was to neglect developing 
a commodity economy. Every locality sought 
after autarky, and, as a result, there was little 
inter-regional trade. This is a petty producer's 
outlook of a natural economy. It has gravely 
inhibited the division of labor, the development of 
a commodity economy, and the exploration of 
99
. Such examples are numerous and T h e History of Economic Reform has 
mentioned some of them (pp. 176-177). 
100
. See Overcome the Mentality of Small Producers . Improve Specialized 
Cooperation People ' s Daily 14 October 1987. p . l . 
101
. This article is included in the book edited and translated by George С 
Wang Economic Reform in the PRC Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1982. 
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comparative advantages between areas, thus 
impeding foreign trade." 
A lot of effort has been made to improve efficiency by encouraging 
enterprises and local authorities to deal directly across provincial 
boundaries. The establishment of the intra-provincial economic zones as 
well as inter-provincial economic zones is actually one of such efforts. 
One question will probably be asked: how can it be explained that 
lack-of-integration is still a persistent phenomenon in the Chinese economy, 
as was shown in our empirical test, if the central government has already 
realized the importance of curbing the local protectionism? 
Apart from the self-sufficiency policy pursued in the past which we 
have given full consideration in our previous analysis, transportation 
problems are also one of the possible causes of fragmentation and 
duplication. For a long time there had been a lack of investment because 
transport has been seen as a "non-productive" sector according to the 
Marxist ideology and has not been placed high on the list of priorities for 
investment. 
In China railways account for nearly two-thirds of the freight traffic. 
Furthermore most railroads seem to have been established to serve the 
needs of individual provinces because they radiate from provincial capitals 
and form separate networks with few interconnections. Such province-
centered transportation systems reinforce the cellular character of the 
economy, and rails are still the only effective link between provinces. In 
1984, it was estimated that 27.8 percent of all production brigades were not 
physically accessible by truck (Terry Cannon, 1990, p. 150). In much of the 
hinterland, it has been excessively costly to transport locally available raw 
materials to centralized urban factories and the products of the latter back 
to the villages. A delegation of rural industry specialists found in 1975 that 
in one county the price of coal rose 50% if it was moved 25 miles. Obvi-
ously, the savings in transport costs of producing locally a bulky item such 
as cement could easily exceed the added cost of using small-scale or 
backward technology. A rational response (of course, from their point of 
view) of local governments and individual departments was therefore to 
minimize transport needs by locating plants to their convenience and 
benefits. "Comprehensive enterprises" were one of the possible ways to 
organize production. 
Apart from these long-term explanatory factors, another important 
explanation is that the profit-and revenue-sharing system introduced in the 
earlier stage of the reforms motivates the local governments, especially the 
provincial ones, to undertake their own investment initiatives. Local 
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governments frequently seek to invest in sectors where high rates of 
profitability are expected. This is particularly obvious in the processing 
industry and the consumer goods industry. Those provinces which earlier 
had sent their raw materials to major industrial cities such as Shanghai now 
establish their own production facilities. This understandably leads to 
excess capacity in the existing centers due both to shortage of raw materials 
and to continuous "wars" among localities for raw materials such as silk, 
cotton etc. 
Undoubtedly, the question why the Chinese economy has such a 
cellular nature deserves a long answer. Some scholars have even referred 
the lack-of-integration phenomenon to some historical factors. They hold 
that the Great Wall was not one massive undertaking but initially a series 
of individual state's walls and China has a tradition as being divided into 
regions which were self-sustaining and independent of each other.102 Such 
an argument needs further research to test. Apart from the influence of the 
self-sufficiency policy pursued in the past, which is still important even 
today, lack of the development of a transportation system, the decentralized 
revenue sharing system described earlier, absence of market price signals 
are all explanations that are relevant to the question asked. In addition, "the 
accustomed modes of thought and vested interests of provincial and local 
leaders who wield considerable authority in economic affairs create an 
inertia that the national leadership may find difficult to overcome" (Thomas 
P. Lyon). In September 1990, for example, when the Eighth-Five Year 
Plan was unveiled in Beijing in which there was a calling for a bigger 
share of provincial revenues for Beijing, the influential provincial leader 
of Guangdong, Ye Xuanping, reportedly rebelled and the Mayor of 
Shanghai Zhu Rongji and a number of other local leaders have followed 
Ye.103 
. In 1934 Chi-Chao-ting put forward an economically and geographically 
oriented theory of key economic areas in Chinese history. He saw traditional 
China as divided into regions.For details see The Geography of Contemporary 
China p.70: Richard Lous Edwards "History:Historical Perspective on the 
Current Geography of China". 
103
. See Newsweek November 26, 1990. p.37. 
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CHAPTER 11 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE SHANGHAI ECONOMIC 
ZONE - PROGRESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
As was noted in Part 2 the establishment of the Shanghai Economic 
Zone is in fact an institutional innovation with respect to the integration 
issue. Progress in economic integration and its implications are therefore 
interesting to the whole study, particularly when the negative effects on 
lack-of-integration have been identified. The benefits of the integration 
scheme, if any, are important to justify the policy of integration in the form 
of the Shanghai Economic Zone. 
As a matter of fact, study of economic benefits from integration is 
a subject of fascination and difficulty. The cases in this chapter are only 
attempts to cover a small piece of this difficult ground. 
11.1 Progress of Integration and Benefits 
As was mentioned, the present chapter intends to answer two 
questions:what is the progress in the Shanghai Economic Zone, and, are 
there any benefits? Once we start to review some of the cases for progress 
in the economic zone, we have to bear in mind that the investigation of the 
benefits from integration presents more problems than those involved in 
examining the lack-of-integration hypothesis for at least the following 
reasons: 
1. Almost all direct data relevant to this topic is not 
readily available. Quantitative indicators are even less. 
2. Given the experimental nature of the integration in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone, some benefits are still mar-
ginal and the outcome of some integration schemes 
remains to be seen. 
3. Some of the benefits can hardly be expressed in 
physical or money terms. 
It is important to note these limitations mentioned, which will affect 
the research design and make the present chapter different from the 
previous chapter both in terms of evidence examined and techniques used. 
As quantitative data is so little, the present chapter intends to provide 
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an analysis of the implications of the cases presented as far as they are 
expected to be of a more general nature. Specifically, the emphasis of the 
present chapter is on unfolding the institutional aspect of some integration 
schemes to see how the lack-of-integration situation is being broken down. 
The objective of this chapter is therefore not to quantify the benefits as 
such but rather to assess the significant structural changes of integration in 
these cases which will lead to more integration. Some of the cases 
presented here may not provide concrete indicators of economic benefits, 
but they should indicate a situation in which a positive effect of economic 
integration can be expected which is still marginal but important. 
We will consider several cases in this chapter among which the first 
one is so systematic and can be regarded as a case study in the proper 
sense. 
Generally speaking, a case study approach has some advantages, one 
of which is that the opportunity to use multiple sources of evidence 
(documentation, interviews, direct observation etc.) far exceeds that in 
other research strategies such as experiments, surveys or histories. It also 
puts flesh to inferences and gives a vivid scenario to theoretical reasoning. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from case studies are, however, some-
times less systematic. It is often the case that several cases are therefore to 
reach more generally valid conclusions.104 
The cases of integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone discussed 
here cover the bicycle industry, the textile industry, the machinery industry 
as well as the financial sector. These cases are chosen because of their 
representativeness. Naturally the availability of data stemming from the 
opportunity to collect data on the spot was also one of the considerations. 
To every case a special title has been added in order to highlight a special 
feature of that case. 
Integration in the bike industry is typical in the sense that, the 
success of it has been regarded as one of the achievements of the Shanghai 
Economic Zone. Moreover, the data of this industry is relatively sys-
tematic. The situation in the financial sector as a counterpart to our 
previous description of capital mobility is of interest for an overall evalua-
tion in the financial sector. 
While heavy industries are more controlled by the central authority 
I04
. Robert K.Yin (p.53) has mentioned the research method of multiple-case 
studies: "If one has access to only three cases of a rare, clinical syndrome in 
psychology or medical science, the appropriate research design is one in which 
the same results are predicted for each of the three cases, thereby producing 
evidence that the three cases did indeed involve the same syndrome." 
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and belong more or less to the planned part of the economy, the light 
industries of the unplanned part of the economy are more likely to be 
integrated. Furthermore, duplication is typical of the light industry sector, 
especially in consumer goods production. That is why the textile industry, 
as well as the bike industry have been chosen. For the Oriental Textile 
Corporation the significance lies in the principle of joint responsibility 
which is reflected in the case. 
The integration in the machinery industry is characterized by single 
product integration which is quite typical as a form of integration at the 
current stage in the Shanghai Economic Zone. 
The information in these cases was taken from extensive interviews 
with those involved in the integration scheme, visits to the Shanghai Bike 
Factory and the Shanghai No.3 Bike Factory, the Oriental Textile 
Corporation and the Financial Bureau of the People's Bank of China 
Shanghai. The data was supplemented by the hand-outs of the factories in 
question. The case of the bike industry was cross-checked and expanded 
by consulting the Yearbook of Light Industry in China (1988) and the other 
provincial Yearbooks. 
11.2 The Bicycle Industry: A Case Study - Diffusion of Technology 
Background 
China's bike industry is the largest in the world and has been 
expanding rapidly in recent years. Between 1978 and 1982, according to 
the World Bank report(1985), total bike production increased from 8.54 
million to over 24 million and the number of enterprises engaged in bike 
production had grown from 38 to 140. By 1988 total bike production had 
increased to 41 million. Our investigation in the previous chapter shows 
that all but three of China's twenty-nine provinces are now engaged in the 
bike production. 
From an economic point of view, the bike industry seems to have 
been expanding very inefficiently. "Bike production offers major economies 
of scale, with integrated enterprises producing fewer than 300,000 -
500,000 bikes per year likely to be unprofitable" (World Bank 
1985,p.l03). But in China, the average output per enterprise declined from 
225,000 in 1978 to 173,000 in 1982, and fourteen provinces produce fewer 
than 500,000 bikes per year. In 1988, among provinces which produced 
fewer than 500,000 bikes, Inner Mongolia produced only 50,000 bikes and 
Gansu province produced 40,000 bikes.10i According to the same report 
. See China's Industrial Statistics Year Book 1989, p.277. 
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of the World Bank, unit production costs range from 70 yuan in Shanghai 
to more than 200 yuan in smaller enterprises in Jilin, Heilongjiang, and 
Inner Mongolia. 
Our investigation into the bike factories in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone indicates that a large percentage of bike factories have been 
producing inferior quality bikes at higher costs. The following table shows 
the bike production volume in time series within the Shanghai Economic 
Zone: 
Table 11.1 Bike Production Volume By Province in the Shanghai 
Economic Zone (10 thousand) 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
1983 
520.05 
281.84 
109.85 
70.26 
26.59 
27.34 
1984 
562.17 
313.43 
144.80 
76.73 
36.48 
28.80 
1985 
619.54 
375.43 
169.71 
90.19 
49.19 
30.65 
1986 
634.76 
419.04 
191.09 
112.99 
64.39 
39.17 
1987 
655.76 
477.57 
225.57 
123.18 
72.15 
51.31 
1988 
694.47 
446.57 
234.84 
126.62 
64.83 
56.01 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks: 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 
1989. 
Table 11.2 Growth Rate for Bike Industry in Shanghai (1983 - 1988) 
1983-1984 1984-1985 1985-1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 
8% 10% 2% 3% 6% 
Source: See Table 11.1. 
A few points can be confirmed from the above table. Apart from the 
fact that all the provinces are involved in the bike production, it also tells 
us that the bike production was expanding in the least "qualified" 
provinces: the average growth rate in Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian and Jiangxi 
was 16.4%, 12.2%, 20.6 % and 15.4% respectively, being above 10%. 
Nevertheless, for Shanghai, which is relatively efficient in bike 
production, the average growth rate was 5.8%, being the smallest. What 
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is more, the growth rate in Shanghai does not appear to be increasing 
sharply. In some years it even appears to be declining (see Table 11.2). 
This reflects the fact that Shanghai has suffered limitations due to the 
lack of raw materials, capital etc. for expanding its bike industry. 
There are six bike assembly factories and over fifty parts factories 
in the Shanghai Economic Zone. Due to low quality, thousands of bikes 
could not be sold and were idled in the storage-house.I06 When the price 
for raw materials went up, some bike factories could hardly survive. 
The Shanghai Bike Factory and the Shanghai No.3 Bike Factory are 
key factories in the Shanghai Economic Zone. The Shanghai Bike Factory 
was established in as early as 1940, and the products of this Factory, 
"Forever" trade-mark bikes, have won the quality prize from the govern-
ment in the 1980s. The Shanghai No.3 Bike Factory also has a long history 
and the products, "Phoenix" by trade-mark, have won great popularity not 
only in the Shanghai Economic Zone but also in the national market. The 
market demand for name-brand bikes such as "Phoenix" and "Forever" 
produced in Shanghai had been increasing because of the quality. But both 
factories failed to expand due to lack of capital, labour and input materials. 
The Integration Scheme 
Realizing the economic inefficiency in the bike sector, the Shanghai 
Economic Zone office attempted to promote its integration by forming a 
regional network for bike production. One problem is, obviously, that the 
existing bike factories can hardly be closed down. What can be done, 
however, is to promote cooperation and to encourage the diffusion of 
technology (including the management skills) among the existing factories. 
In 1984 and in 1985 the Shanghai Bike Factory and the Shanghai No. 
3 Bike Factory negotiated with bike factories in Suzhou, Nantong, 
Shaoxing and Hefei. Eventually an agreement on "cooperative production" 
was reached, which included the following integration measures: 
a. Standardization of parts: 
The parts produced in each bike factory 
would be standardized and therefore interchange-
able. 
b. Technical cooperation: 
The Shaoxing and Suzhou bike factories 
were to receive support and technical guidance 
¡
. For details see Jianfan Daily August 17, 1985, September 21, 1986. etc. 
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from Shanghai and would improve both their 
business management skills and the technology. 
The Shanghai Bike Factories also promised to 
provide the other factories with technology 
needed to upgrade the bike factories in these 
provinces and allow them to use the Shanghai 
factories' trade-marks. The Shanghai factories are 
now working to improve the quality and are 
engaged in research and prototype production of 
new products. The director of the Shanghai Bike 
Factory went personally to the partner factories, 
and listed 162 items for technical improvement. 
Equipments were provided for inspecting the 
quality of the products. The bikes now produced 
use the trade-mark of Shanghai factories but the 
specific place (name of the province) is also 
given. The quality is inspected by the technicians 
from Shanghai factories. 
c. Production factor reallocation: 
It was agreed that some raw materials 
would be shifted to Shanghai and the profits 
would be divided between the Shanghai factories 
and their partners. 
Table 11.3 The Relationship of the Bike Factories in the Integration 
Scheme 
Type No. of factories Institutional Arrangement 
involved 
a 4 Shanghai Factory has decision power over 
production, personnel, raw materials and 
sales. 
b 11 The Factories become branches of the 
Shanghai Factory but still have some 
decision power. 
с 18 Contractual relation: co-operative 
production & co-operative sales. 
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Table 11.3 shows that the cooperative form varies regarding to the 
relationship of the bike factories within the scheme. 
We may notice that the co-operative relation is flexible in institu-
tional arrangements, and the ownership (collective or state) of the factories 
concerned remains unchanged. Standardization and specialization have been 
the major concern, including unification of technical standards for 
products, design and quality evaluation. 
As willingness to integrate would be likely to increase if some 
regional network were established, a common fund or some infrastructure 
being built is very important. Within the integration project, it was 
proposed to set up a Common Fund for further development: 5% of the 
total output would be contributed to the Fund apart from the issuance of 
shares of stock. In 1987 25500 thousand Rmb was raised to assist the 
backward factories in technical upgrading and investment for raw materials 
(Wuhan Steel Mill and No. 10 Steel Mill in Shanghai).107 
Benefits 
While quantification of benefits from such a complex integration 
process is indeed difficult, an essential point is always to establish that the 
changes, which could be attributed to the integration scheme, are at least 
positive. We should try if possible to ascertain not the exact but the broad 
orders of magnitude. The production volume after integration is therefore 
of interest to us. 
In fact, the production of co-operating enterprises has been 
increasing year by year. We take the integration project initiated by the 
Shanghai No.3 Bike Factory as an example. 
The increase in the production volume is of significance not only 
because of the volume itself but also because of the quality of the product. 
These products which could have been stored and remained unsold without 
the cooperative scheme. The improved type of bicycles was sold out in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone. 
Benefits can also be measured by increase in profits. With the techni-
cal guidance and facilities from Shanghai, in the year when the integrative 
project was implemented, the Suzhou Bike Factory was able to meet its 
yearly production targets three months ahead of schedule and realized a 
profit of 5.2 million yuan.108 The profits for Shanghai No.3 Bike Factory 
'
07
. Horizontal Cooperation Shanghai Statistical Handbook p. 157. 
108
. See The Shanghai Economic Zone JETRO Shanghai Office China 
Newsletter No.71 p. 13. 
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also increased greatly: before the integrative project they were 3.97 million 
Rmb and became 19.90 million in 1987.109 On the other hand, the 
taxation revenue for the State increased: 18.7% increase for No.3 Bike 
Factory, 50-100 % increase for the other members. The profits for Suzhou 
Bike Factory were almost 0 in 1983 but in 1984 the tax submitted to the 
State was 4310 thousand yuan and profits gained were 1260 thousand yuan. 
According to a government report, the increase in production capacity 
would have needed several million RMB of investment from the central 
government had there been no integrative project"0. 
Table 11.4 Production Volume Increase within the Integration Project for 
the Shanghai No.3 Factory 
Year Products 
1984 10,000 
1985 26,000 
1986 46,000 
1987 51,000 
1988 64,000 (estimated) 
Source: provided to the author. 
There are also dynamic effects. The Shanghai No.3 Bike Factory was 
able to specialize in products for the international market because some of 
the production for ordinary bikes had been shifted to other factories. In 
terms of management, there has been great improvement for Nantong, 
Suzhou, Shaoxing bike factories. The quality score for the products of 
these bike factories is above 93 and the costs have been below 100 yuan 
despite the rise in the price of raw materials. 
,0,
. Ibid. 
"
0
. See The Shanghai Economy Shanghai Social Sciences Academy 1988, 
p.76. 
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11.3 Case 2: the Financial Sector - Horizontal Mobility 
We have already discussed the centre-province (municipality) 
mobility model of capital which retarded the efficient allocation of capital: 
credit and cash plans were handed down through the hierarchy with little 
room for local initiatives and the mobility of capital among localities had 
been difficult in the past. The progress of integration in the financial sector 
is therefore worthy of our attention. 
As a matter of fact, the importance of financial integration for the 
economic integration as a whole was realized, as in Europe, at the very 
beginning. Early in 1986, it was decided to facilitate financial market 
integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone. One important change which 
provided basis for integration was that, ever since the economic reform, 
banks have also undergone significant changes and local bank branches are 
allowed to re-allocate loans as long as the total sum still fits the plan target. 
More important, if a local bank's deposits surpass its plan or it can speed 
turnover, the surplus can be used to grant more loans. All these measures 
enable banks to behave more freely in the financial business. 
The integration in the financial sector follows two lines: first, to 
establish a network to break through the rather exclusively vertical move-
ments of capital and second to have an institution that will help handle the 
emerging horizontal financial relations. In April 1986, heads of twenty-four 
banks in the Zone held a meeting in Nanjing. An agreement was reached 
to break down barriers to capital movement. The joint meeting of heads of 
banks in the Zone became the organizer of the market. The idea was that 
within the fixed amount of capital allocated by the central authorities, nine 
of the banks'" arranged among themselves, using the financial instru-
ments, to facilitate capital flows. The framework of the financial market 
integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone is presented in table 11.5. 
The arrangement of financial integration was actually to guarantee 
the horizontal movement of the capital without going up the bureaucratic 
hierarchy to the provincial authorities and down again to communicate with 
their neighbouring counterparts The market is divided into two parts: a 
visible market, where persons concerned meet and negotiate, operates half-
day per week, and an invisible market, where persons concerned can 
communicate but do not necessarily meet, operates for the rest of the time. 
'". According to the China's financial system, capital used to move verti-
cally before the economic reform the central government allocated the capital to 
the provincial government and the local government could hardly borrow from 
or lend to the neighbouring provinces. 
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Information exchange is also performed. When the invisible market 
operates, banks' personnel may contact each other for potential deals. 
Apart from the half-day operation the visible market can open whenever 
necessary. 
Table 11.5 Framework of Financial Market Integration in the Zone 
Administrative level Organization 
county-level headed by the agricultural banks and 
centred in counties. The co-ops in the rural 
area facilitate borrowing and lending 
among themselves. 
medium-city level headed by the commercial banks in 
medium cities. The banks and other 
financial institutions join together to 
facilitate capital flow among themselves. 
large-city level headed by the commercial banks in large 
cities. The banks join together to facilitate 
the capital flow among themselves. 
Notes: 1. Co-ops are credit agencies in the countryside. Their busi 
ness is to take deposits and to extend loans. 
2. Under the central bank (The People's Bank of China), there 
are agricultural banks (borrowing and lending in agricultu 
re), construction banks (borrowing and lending capital for 
construction), commercial banks and the Bank of China (for 
foreign currency transactions) as well as other financial 
institutions. In the rural areas, there are financial co-opera 
lives (co-ops) for the villages and towns where people can 
hardly get access to the banks mentioned above. 
The significance of such a market integration lies in the fact that the 
financial market previously fragmented by administrative boundaries has 
now been re-organized. Transactions across provincial boundaries have 
now become possible. 
Moreover, "economic means", instead of administrative orders 
158 
which were usual in the past, are used within the framework of the 
financial market to promote capital flows. The financial instruments used, 
other than direct borrowing and lending, include discount"2 and 
rediscount,"3 bill acceptance, issuance of bonds and stocks. The interest 
rate and duration of borrowing and other information are all listed in the 
market. In the late half of 1987, 150 hundred million RMB was "created" 
through direct or indirect borrowing and lending."4 
Another very important event which shows capital movement in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone is the establishment of the "Bank of Communica­
tions" to play some role as a regional bank. This bank breaks through the 
old banking framework because it is not a specialized bank but a "compre­
hensive" bank. The specialized banks, such as Bank of China which is 
specialized in foreign trade and external relations, have a centre-local 
network. Local branches of these specialized banks have to be under the 
control of the centre. But the "Bank of Communications" has a relatively 
free hand with respect to branch office facilities, establishment of accounts, 
and lending. The bank was established as a joint-stock corporation with a 
capital of 2.6 billion yuan RMB; 50% of its stock is held by the national 
government, at least 25% by the regional government, 15% by other 
corporations, and at most 10% by private individuals. To allow private 
participation in the banking sector, though still small in percentage, was 
quite a surprise to many. 
11.4 Case 3: the Machinery Industry - Single Product Integration 
The machinry industry is one of the important industries in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone. Table 11.6 shows 1983 statistics on the 
machinery industries in the Shanghai Economic Zone. The table indicates 
the general situation of the machinery industry in the Zone. 
The statistical data is consistent with our previous conclusion: the 
machinery industry is, like other industries, widely spread over the area, 
and there were quite a number of small machinery enterprises. 
"
2
. Discount as a financial instrument started as early as 1981 in the 
Agricultural Bank Shanghai. 
"
3
. Re-discount started on April 1 1986. Until the end of that year, 
transactions amounted to 921 (cases), 5.36 hundred million RMB in total. For 
details see Wenwei Bao May 7 1987. 
"
4
. Zhou Jon-кап, a journalist who is specialized in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone, has written an article entitled A Glance at the Money Market of the 
Shanghai Economic Zone in the magazine Outlook Weekly June 8 1987. 
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Prior to 1983, there were no plans for integration in the machinery 
industry integration as a whole. There were large numbers of enterprises 
which did not have to compete at all and which were engaged in overlapp-
ing, low-efficiency production. 
Table 11.6 Small Machinery Enterprises in the Shanghai Economic 
Zone, 1983 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Jiangxi 
Total 
Ratio to whole 
country 
Source: 
Note: 
Enterprises Production value 
(mil. yuan) 
514 
712 
341 
340 
210 
2117 
24.2% 
695,324 
378,246 
162,928 
92,685 
68,623 
1393,195 
29% 
Japan External Trade Organization. 
productivity = profits /no.of enterprises 
Profit 
(mil. yuan) 
181,919 
56,428 
26,617 
7,327 
4,770 
277,061 
41% 
The approach of integration in machinery industries is different from 
integration in the bike industry. Integration started from individual 
products. A new pattern of specialization emerged inside the Zone as well 
as between the Shanghai Economic Zone and provinces outside the Zone. 
There are now industrial associations in the Shanghai Economic Zone for 
individual commodities of the machinery industry, such as fasteners, 
bearings, oil and machine parts, and there are associated companies for 
welders, measuring equipment, cutting tools and valves. 
Fasteners are simple products which do not require complicated 
production processes. The integration scheme allows greater effort to be 
put into improving quality and developing new items. The technical level 
for bearings is low. Therefore they are produced by a large number of 
scattered factories. Integration has thus enabled improvement to be realized 
by eliminating inferior products. Various joint conferences are being held 
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to exchange information and to prepare surveys and tests on production, 
trade and technology. A comprehensive production system is thus taking 
shape. To facilitate the establishment of new plants for the machinery 
industries in the Zone, advanced and high grade products are being now 
promoted and low-level redundant production eliminated. 
11.5 The Case of the Oriental Textile Corporation and Other Cases 
The Case of the Oriental Textile Corporation - Joint Venture 
The Oriental Textile Corporation as a case of economic integration 
is different from our case of bike industry integration. It is actually a trans-
provincial organization which was established to break down the vertical 
mobility model. 
As a joint venture, it was established in September of 1985. The 
Corporation is actually a shareholder-company and the joint-meeting is the 
decision-making body. Usually the bigger the shareholder is, the more 
influential he is. The principle of "joint responsibility" is reflected in this 
Corporation. 
There are 158 textile companies in the Shanghai Economic Zone 
which contributed to the Corporation financially and 20 million RMB had 
been raised at the outset, with some financial support from the Ministry of 
Textiles. 12 production projects were established within the Zone to 
ensure the procurement of raw materials and improve the marketing of the 
products, especially marketing abroad. 
To encourage competition, the Corporation itself opened a bazaar, 
which is called a "window" for the textile products of the related com-
panies. Consumers can now see and compare the price and quality of the 
products produced in different provinces. 
The business of the Corporation covers a wide range. Apart from 
some production projects, the Corporation attempts to establish cooperative 
relations with some raw material producing bases and to provide service 
for the textile industries in the Zone. There are three branches of the 
Corporation which were located in Beijing, Amoi and Suzou respectively. 
Beijing branch is mainly involved in technology research and development; 
Amoi branch is mainly involved in promoting export via Amoi and Hong 
Kong, and Suzou branch is involved in technology research and develop-
ment. Amoi branch is also involved in wholesale and retail of the textile 
products. Therefore the basic function of the Corporation is to better utilize 
the existing production capacity in the textile industry by promoting 
coordination in supply, production and marketing. 
161 
Other Cases 
There are also many other cases which show the benefits of 
economic integration One case, provided by Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO),"5 shows the development of the division of 
labour based on comparative advantage between Xuzhou and Shanghai. 
Xuzhou, a city in Jiangsu province has all the conditions for the develop­
ment of products such as cement, sheet glass, marble, and gypsum, but has 
been short of funds. It has therefore lagged behind in production, 
technology and facilities The Shanghai Building Materials Supply 
Corporation collected 11 million yuan in funds to upgrade 11 kilns in nine 
Xuzhou cement factories into modern mechanized facilities This is a case 
of capital flow and technology diffusion As a result, there is an increase 
in cement production capacity of over 500,000 tons per year Quality was 
also improved and consumption of coal as source of energy was reduced 
by 15%. Shanghai has established similar associated cement producing 
bases in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and elsewhere to cover the shortage of 
cement as a raw material In this way Shanghai is able to concentrate on 
some high-technology products as a result of the division of labour Plants 
are being relocated, technical cooperation is being extended, and 
production of parts is being subcontracted out 
Another case is that of the co-operative production of wnstwatches 
The Shanghai No 3 Wristwatch Factory has been joined with by the Hefei 
Wnstwatch Factory - a factory in Anhui province A total of "70 engi­
neers eight times""6 were sent to solve problems in the processing, 
technology, quality and inspection of the branch factory's watches. In 
1985, the Hefei Wristwatch Factory produced 580,000 "Jewelflower" 
watches and achieved its profit target of 11 85 million yuan Out of this, 
9 45 million yuan was paid in taxes, twice the level of the previous 
year 117 
The Shanghai Light Industry Corporation is also reportedly engaged 
in associated production of printing machines and currency making 
machines with factories in Wuxi and Shazhou The Hangzhou Boiler 
Factory has the country's largest plate bender and can produce giant 
cylindrical boilers for power stations, but lacks flaw detection equipment 
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 China Newsletter No 71, ρ 15 
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 "70 engineers 8 times" literally means that if there are 70 engineers, each 
of them went 8 times But some engineers went there less than 8 times and some 
more 
117
 China Newsletter No 71, ρ 14 
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and specialized welding equipment. The Shanghai Boiler Factory, on the 
other hand, has the flaw detection equipment and specialized welding 
capacities. The two have now joined together. 
11.6 General Implications of the Cases: An Analysis 
Looking back at these case studies, some general implications of 
integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone may be summed up, and the 
summary actually follows two lines: the first line follows the theme that 
these cases present examples for future economic integration in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone, whereas the second concentrates on the theme 
that there ais benefits in integration. 
As a matter of fact, a framework of costs and benefits of economic 
integration has already been provided in Chapter I."8 In simple terms, 
it is convenient to think of the benefits of economic integration as being 
removal or reduction of constraints for desirable structural changes which 
will lead to economic growth. Constraints, as described, include the non-
availability of raw materials, skilled labour, technology etc. Naturally, a 
limited market can also be considered as a kind of constraint. 
If we now look at the case of integration in the bike industry, the 
benefits for the Shanghai bike factories are the availability of raw 
materials, and the expanded market for the products, while for the other 
factories involved in the integration scheme, the benefits are the availability 
of technology. In the case of the Oriental Textile Corporation, the benefits 
for the members of the joint venture are actually the availability of market 
for both input and output. Joint efforts will enable some raw materials to 
be available for production, and the bazaar offered by the Oriental Textile 
Corporation is an outlet for domestic competition while the role Amoi 
plays certainly helps to export. In the financial sector, an enlarged financial 
market in the zone is taking shape by reducing the restrictions on 
horizontal capital movements. The benefits of the integrative scheme for 
machinery industry are the gains from specialization and the improvement 
of efficiency by eliminating redundant production. 
What are the implications of these cases for the future integration in 
the Shanghai Economic Zone? 
First, the case of integration in the bike industry is found especially 
instructive and many of the observations on that case apply to other cases. 
The important implication of the bike production integration lies in the 
diffusion of technology by the Shanghai Bike factories. This is a kind of 
"spread effect" - transmission of improved skills, capital and technology 
'". See 1.6 Economic Integration: Costs and Benefits. 
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from the developed area to the less developed area to minimize the technol-
ogy gap within the enlarged market Shanghai was able to specialize in one 
or other advanced type of the commodity by subcontracting the less 
advanced type of production among the existing factories in the neighbour-
ing area. This could be an important pattern for future integration in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone, as well as in other regions Given the difficulty 
in closing down all the inefficient factories, technological improvements 
seem easier and more feasible The case of wrist-watch integration in the 
Zone follows exactly the same line Other industries which could follow 
this line of technology diffusion include the refrigerator industry, the TV 
industry and other consumer goods industries 
Secondly, single commodity integration and/or sector integration are 
typical in the Shanghai Economic Zone Bike production integration and 
wnstwatch production integration are two relevant cases for sector integra-
tion. Machinery industry integration may serve as an example of single 
product integration Economies of scale are realized from cooperative 
production by some factories specializing in the production of components 
or from sharing facilities, equipment and labour with enterprises involved 
in other activities to ensure their full utilization Since more comprehensive 
integration seems unlikely to occur in the near future, single product or 
sector integration could be a promising form of integration at this stage for 
the Shanghai Economic Zone 
The implication of the case of the Oriental Textile Corporation is that 
the investment is on a voluntary basis and joint stock is the organizational 
principle. Many of the reform measures as of today seem only to 
rationalize the planning system of the national economy rather than to 
replace bureaucratic forms of allocation with market relations. In this 
regard, using share-holder system to manage the supply, production and 
marketing seems to address directly the integration issue By encouraging 
the development of important cooperative joint ventures, the administrative 
barriers are supposed to be bypassed and the economic integration is to be 
enhanced. Therefore joint ventures as mutual investments may help 
dismantle the vertical mode of factor movement The Bank of 
Communications in the case of financial market integration is yet another 
such example 
For the case of financial market integration, the implication is that 
similar integration policy and organizational structure at different 
administrative levels (county, municipality and province) for horizontal 
linkage would be possible in the labour market, if not in the commodity 
market which is more complex 
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While the costs of underutilization, inferior quality, non-standardiza-
tion, non-cooperation etc. can not be calculated exactly, the benefits from 
the progress in economic integration are obvious. In both the bike industry 
and the textile industry cases, there are economic benefits in terms of more 
output (or better output) and profits, not to say motivational effects - easier 
acquisition of things that were thought not attainable previously. 
All these, however, do not mean that the economic integration 
pattern is the optimal. Back to the case of bike sector integration. It 
appears that the integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone follows the 
pattern of realizing economies of scale by improving the existing produc-
tion network. Some factories are specializing in production of components 
by subcontracting; facilities and technology are being shared to ensure full 
utilization. But the economic costs of land, labour, materials and transport 
are much higher in large cities as has been mentioned earlier in Part 2. The 
economic costs of production for the Shanghai bicycle factory in its present 
location are at least 1 0 - 2 0 yuan greater than if it retained the same 
management level but was located in a nearby medium-sized city such as 
Suzhou. There incurs an efficiency cost which has to be borne by the 
grouping or by the nation as a whole. This raises two issues which are 
inter-related: to improve the existing inefficiency of duplication situation 
and to project new investment to realize better economic consequence. 
While these cases in the Shanghai Economic Zone indicate some 
benefits of economic integration, they, however, do not claim that, due to 
the existence of the Shanghai Economic Zone, economic integration has 
been fully realized at the commodity level or even at the sector level; nor 
do these case studies claim that, economic integration is entirely 
attributable to the establishment of the Shanghai Economic Zone. This 
would be a naive claim; the general policy of the central government to 
encourage horizontal ties"9 would undoubtedly have pushed the 
integration even without the Shanghai Economic Zone. Nevertheless the 
Shanghai Economic Zone does play its role as a catalyst in promoting 
economic integration. 
According to recent statistical data, horizontal linkages have 
developed rapidly. Table 11.7 and Table 11.8 are the summary of 
enterprises involved in the "horizontal linkage scheme" in 1987 and in 
1988 respectively in the Shanghai Economic Zone. 
In the first column the figures for total enterprises and for the 
"
9
. In March 1986, the State Council issued some regulation for facilitating 
the horizontal relations. The document gave detailed policy in terms of goal, raw 
material arrangements, financial settlement and taxation. 
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enterprises involved in the scheme are both mentioned for comparison. As 
usual, the gross output is expressed in the local currency (RmB). 
Table 11.7 Summary of Enterprises Involved in the Integration Scheme in 
the Shanghai Economic Zone (1987) 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Jiangxi 
Fujian 
Source: 
Enterprises 
(total/involved) 
9,059/1,804 
38,985/ 238 
41,857/ 494 
20,827/ 282 
14,654/ 57 
11,349/ 210 
Capital 
RMB 
236,421 
57,700 
54,152 
9,663 
5,726 
34,369 
Gross Output 
RMB 
496,286 
295,800 
187,784 
20,420 
18,957 
34,369 
Profit 
RMB 
68,026 
27,000 
17,162 
1,652 
1,836 
3,488 
the Statistical Yearbook of the Shanghai Economic Zone 198 
Table 11.8 Summary of Enterprises Involved in Integration Scheme in the 
Shanghai Economic Zone (1988) 
Province 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Jiangxi 
Fujian 
Source: 
Notes: 
Enterprises 
(total/involved) 
9,668/1,733 
38,853/ 350 
42,202/ 416 
21,587/ 60 
15,163/ 47 
11,792/ 221 
Capital 
RMB 
67,253 
146,229 
66,630 
7,135 
8,002 
42,449 
Gross Output 
RMB 
1008,953 
687,208 
205,538 
17,596 
31,279 
122,979 
Profit 
RMB 
118,565 
611,745 
19,066 
1,340 
3,316 
9,143 
The Statistical YearBook of Shanghai Economic Zone, 1989 
China's Industrial Statistics Year Book 1989. 
1. Total number of enterprises refers to the number of the 
enterprises in the province. This is compiled on the China's 
industrial statistics. Number of the enterprises involved 
refers to the number of enterprises involved in the "horizon 
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tal linkages". 
2. The capital, gross output, and the profit refer to the capital, 
gross output, profit of the enterprises involved in the 
"horizontal linkages schemes" in terms of RMB. 
These tables are official statistics on "horizontal linkages". The data 
is admittedly rather rough and too simple for any in-depth analysis. There 
are, however, still some observations which are relevant to our study. 
We can see that, apart from in Shanghai for which the figure of 
enter-prises involved in the horizontal linkages is relatively large, the 
figures for other provinces are not very significant in absolute terms. It 
appears that Shanghai is more active for the horizontal relations probably 
because, as a city, Shanghai needs raw materials as well as an outlet for 
its products. On the whole the production value and the number of the 
enterprises involved in "horizontal relations" are still rather small and there 
are fluctuations as some 1988 figures are lower than the 1987 figures. This 
shows that the economic integration in the Shanghai Economic Zone and 
accordingly in China as a whole is still in its initial stage. Furthermore, it 
should also be pointed out that the "horizontal linkage" in the official sense 
does not cover all dimensions of our integration concept - it merely refers 
to intra-provincial joint ventures and direct investment or trade is excluded. 
Nevertheless, the fact that some statistical data is available is an important 
indication of the attention from the central government to the issue of 
economic integration.120 
12C
. There are reports about "horizontal relations". A Beijine Review (No. 
12, 1988) report says that of 72 cities chosen by the state to try comprehensive 
reform of the economic structure, 66 have extended their jurisdiction over the 
surrounding counties, allowing for greater integration. The cities have broken 
administrative barriers, and encouraged trans-departmental and trans-regional 
cooperation. In that report, the Qingdao Son Drinks Factory was mentioned. It 
has entered into cooperation with 82 factories throughout the country, forming 
a beverage enterprise group that has an annual production of 250, 000 tons. 
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EPILOGUE 
The traditional economic integration theory concentrates on the pros 
and cons of a trading bloc. By reducing tariffs among custom union mem-
bers, benefits are supposed to derive from such a union scheme. 
The present study, however, examined the integration theory from 
another angle: economic integration was examined as a device for 
development. Economic integration first brings changes in economic 
structure. These changes in economic structure will enable a more rational 
allocation of resources to take place and will eventually bring economic 
benefits. The theoretical framework presented in this study in fact attempts 
to re-examine the established literature on economic integration. 
Basically, any theory must be tested through replications of the 
findings in a second or even third case, where the theory specified that the 
same results should occur. The argument that economic integration can be 
a device for development has to be submitted to test. In other words, such 
an argument will have to be confronted with integration reality, especially 
the reality as expressed in the statistics. 
The experience of the EC has been summarized, not only for testing 
the theoretical framework itself, but also for analytical purposes later on. 
The major part is understandably the economic integration in China: What 
is the difference between integration within a nation and integration among 
nations? More generally, where does a nation like China fit into the story 
of economic integration? 
Certainly for a large country like China, the allocation of production 
between regions is an issue as crucial as international trade, or even more 
crucial, given the fact that international trade occupies a relatively small 
part of the total GNP of China. To understand the unique structure of the 
economy is thus an important starting-point. 
We first examined the fragmentation of the Chinese economy by 
presenting the commodity and factor mobility scenario. The fragmentation 
and duplication of the industrial systems has then been outlined and high-
lighted. Both the fragmentation and the duplication of the economic 
activities served to support the central theme: until recently the national 
market of China is not integrated economically. The costs of such an 
irrational situation, though not quantified precisely, have, however, been 
identified. 
As our detailed study suggests, apart from the influence of the self-
sufficiency policy pursued in the past, the transportation system, recent 
169 
decentralization policy measures, especially the revenue-sharing fiscal 
arrangements, the absence of sound market relations with prices as signals, 
and, last but not least, the vested interests of localities are all explanatory 
factors for lack of integration in China. 
To promote economic integration will therefore require action on 
several fronts: to have systemic price reform so that prices will give the 
right signals for rational allocation of resources, to improve transportation 
and commerce on which integration depends, and to have more policy 
measures to ensure economic integration. 
Of fundamental importance will be systemic reform. It is true that 
the Chinese economy has introduced the market mechanism in many ways 
and there is an expanding private sector. However, the price reform as in 
most centrally planned economies is still in a dilemma: if the price reform 
moves further, inflation is hardly avoidable, which is likely beyond the 
public tolerance. Reforms for resource allocation have only rationalized the 
administrative planning system rather than to replace, to a large extent, 
bureaucratic forms of allocation with market relations. But market relations 
are crucial to the success of economic integration in the long run, 
especially for a large country like China. As Xue Muqiao, a well-known 
Chinese economist, said: 
"The state has no way of establishing 
economic ties with several million collectives 
except through a commodity exchange in which 
each side satisfies the needs of the other with its 
own products. During the exchange, each side 
has to consider its economic interests."121 
To emphasize that market relations are important for integration in 
China does not mean that integration through policy measures is not so 
important. On the contrary, under the current situation it is important to 
have more policy measures to promote integration. If we look at the 1992 
Single Market in Europe, we can see that integration has been promoted 
by many policy measures behind which there are negotiations and compro-
mises. The same should be true for integration in China. Some policy 
measures are necessary anyway. As suggested by the World Bank report, 
"the central government might consider legal measures to back up its 
m
. Xue China's Socialist Economy p.62. Foreign Languages Press Co. Bei-
jing 1981. 
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existing general prohibition of barriers to interlocality trade, including 
possibly the establishment of a special regulatory institution, with the 
power to levy large fines."122 
There are also other exogenous factors which can be of importance 
in determining the success of integration. Foremost among these factors is 
the presence of a developed infrastructure. Transportation should be given 
high priority because greater industrial specialization usually involves a 
very large increase in inter-provincial and inter-regional transport of 
industrial goods. 
Since the establishment of the Shanghai Economic Zone, transporta-
tion has aroused attention: the building of Shanghai-Nanjing and Shanghai 
-Hanzhou double-railway; the re-opening of the internal canal; the faci-
litating of cooperation among the four ports (Shanghai, Ningbo, Zhangjia-
gan and Nantong); and the repairing of the road. 
On the other hand, the difficulties of integration cannot be underes-
timated, and the prospects are by no means rosy. It should be realized that 
the existing patterns of production and trade in the national economy are 
not such that the mere lifting of barriers to promote horizontal relations 
would in all cases realize immediate benefits. It is only in the long run, 
when the provinces involved create a new complementary pattern of 
production, the benefits become important. What is crucial, though, and 
what does not yet appear to be happening, is that new industrial invest-
ments should become more specialized and consider more the locational 
and scale factors. 
As part of the economic reform, promotion of economic integration 
in general depends largely on the success of the reform as a whole. As 
Michael Ellman pointed out correctly: 
"Particularly important factors (for success-
ful economic reform) would appear to be a 
supportive political environment, a compatible 
macro-economic situation, micro-economic con-
sistency, appropriate institutional changes and the 
comprehensive nature of the reform"(Michael 
Ellman, p.78). 
This statement has summed up the macro-factors that will influence 
the economic integration of China as a whole and the Shanghai Economic 
Zone in particular. 
. World Bank: China Long-Term Development Issues and Options p.6. 
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The first part of this study has included some theoretical discussion. 
While theoretical speculation alone cannot prove that economic integration 
is a device for development, the available evidence from the empirical 
studies, however, does permit us to draw a fairly reliable conclusion that 
economic integration is important for economic benefits. 
The former Premier of China Zhao Ziyang mentioned the term "inte-
gration" in his report to the national Congress in 1982, saying that the 
economic reform was intended to "break down the strong barriers between 
different localities and departments and, in accordance with the needs of 
co-ordination among specialized departments and of production, develop 
economic integration."123 
At a first sight, we might expect any connection between the EC 
Common Market (integration of several countries) and China's national 
market (integration within a country) to be tenuous. The EC Common 
Market is a multi-country model with market-oriented economies whereas 
China, in spite of all its recent reforms, remains basically a planned 
economy. Moreover, China is a sovereign country with provinces under the 
control of the central government. In contrast, the EC countries are 
independent countries and the supranational arrangement is minimal as of 
today. Finally, the political systems are obviously different. 
Despite these important differences between EC integration and that 
of China, we have seen that these two do have enough in common to make 
some comparative analysis set out in this study a worthwhile and fruitful 
effort. We can find at least the following common aspects: 
- the purpose: maximize prosperity by improving resource allocation; 
- the theoretical rationale: economies of scale, the division of labour 
and competition; 
- the mechanisms: integration through market forces and integration 
through policy measures; 
- the constitutional arrangements and the institutional arrangements; 
- some general principles such as spiral progress, joint responsibility 
and flexibility. 
. Zhao Ziyang Report to the National People's Congress 1982, p.52. 
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In fact, the lines between international trade theory and regional 
economics are becoming blurred in some important cases, one of which is 
the 1992 in Europe. If "1992" does what it is supposed to do, then, "it will 
make less and less sense to think of relations between its component 
nations in terms of the standard paradigm of international trade. Instead the 
issues will be those of regional economics - and it will help if we actually 
have some interesting regional economics to offer when the time comes" 
(Krugman, 1991, p. 12). A bridge between integration among nations and 
integration in a nation is obviously necessary. 
Needles to say, integration is "no panacea for all economic ills, nor 
even indispensable to success, but there are convincing reasons ... for 
supposing that significant economic benefits may be derived from 
well-conceived and well-implemented arrangements for economic integra-
tion"(Robson, 1987, p.4). If integration is accepted as a device for 
development, then the issue of how to integrate becomes our major 
concern. "Feel for the way out in the water step by step" is said to be the 
motto for the reformers in China. But why not look into the experience of 
others? If this question should be addressed positively, the experience of 
the EC should then be of some relevance. 
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DUTCH SUMMARY 
Dit onderzoek beoogt ten eerste een analytisch kader te genereren voor 
mtegratie. Het laat zien dat economische integratie - in landen zelf of 
tussen landen - de markt vergroot en winsten oplevert als gevolg van 
economische schaalvoordelen, sterkere concurrentiedruk, en voortgaande 
arbeidsdeling. Dit analytische raamwerk wordt vervolgens getoetst aan de 
hand van de situatie in de EG. 
Het tweede deel van het boek behandelt het vraagstuk van integratie in 
China: de opzet van "economische zones", het verschil tussen "economi-
sche zones" en "economische samenwerkingsgebieden", en het ontstaan en 
de ontwikkeling van de "Shanghai Economische Zone". Ook worden enkele 
beleidsopties besproken zoals die zijn voortgekomen uit de integratie 
binnen de EG. 
In deel drie wordt een "twee-stappen empirische test" toegepast - eerst voor 
de "Shanghai Economische Zone" alleen en daarna voor China als geheel. 
Hieruit blijkt duidelijk dat er sprake is van gebrek aan integratie, of zoals 
geconstateerd in deel twee, dat de Chinese economie veel te 
gefragmenteerd is. De factoren die geleid hebben tot het gebrek aan 
mtegratie zijn met name de "self-sufficiency" politiek uit het jongste 
verleden, het transportsysteem, recente decentralisatiemaatregelen zoals de 
invoering van het principe van winstdeling bij bedrijven, de afwezigheid 
van marktprijzen en een vrije markt, en ook de sterke machtspositie van 
lokaal georiënteerde belangengroepen. Een grotere economische integratie 
in China zal voor de toekomst veel veranderingen op verschillende fronten 
tot gevolg hebben, waarbij de ervaringen in de EG van belang zijn. 
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There is little doubt that regional economic integration is becoming 
a prevailing topic in today's world the 1992 Single Market in Europe, 
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN and other propos-
als for regional economic integration in East and Southeast Asia 
etc 
While economic integration as such is becoming important, a 
related topic is what is the difference between economic integra-
tion in a nation and economic integration among nations9 More 
specifically, where does a nation-state like China fit into the story of 
economic integration9 This book will touch upon this topic 
Some empirical study has been undertaken to show that China has 
trade barriers against the outside world, but does not have free trade 
within its national boundaries Can China develop further by 
encouraging more integration of its national market and how can 
China use integration as a development device9 These are the 
questions to which the author intends to give answers For that 
purpose, experience of the EC Common Market has been carefully 
examined to help throw light on the topic of integration in China 
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